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Abstract 
In the decade following the ten-plus percent stock market collapse of 2000, regulators 
enacted a myriad of regulations in response to increasing angst experienced by U.S. 
capital market retail investors. Systemic asymmetric disclosures have fractured investor 
confidence prompting many commentators to characterize the relationship between Wall 
Street and the investment community on Main Street as dire. Though copious works exist 
on the phenomenon of corporate behaviors, especially matters of shareholder welfare, 
weak boards, pervious governance mechanisms, and managerial excess, current literature 
has revealed a dearth in corporate governance praxis specific to the question and effects 
of asymmetric disseminations and its principal impact on the retail/noninstitutional 
accredited investor’s (NIAI) confidence and decision-making propensities. This 
phenomenological study is purposed to bridging the gap between the effects of 
governance disclosure and the confidence and decision-making inclinations of NIAIs. 
Conceptual frameworks of Akerlof’s information theory and Verstegen Ryan and 
Buchholtz’s trust/risk decision making model undergirded the study. A nonrandom 
purposive sampling method was used to select 21 NIAI informants. Analysis of interview 
data revealed epistemological patterns/themes confirming the deleterious effects of 
asymmetrical disseminations on participants’ investment decision-making and trust 
behaviors. Findings may help academicians, investors, policy makers, and practitioners 
better comprehend the phenomenon and possibly contribute to operating efficiencies in 
the capital markets. Proaction and greater assertiveness in the investor/activist 
community may provide an impetus for continued regulatory reforms, improved 
transparency, and a revitalization of public trust as positive social change outcomes.  
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Overview 
Capital markets across the globe have become increasingly dynamic (Al-Mamun, 
2013; Jawadi, Jawadi, Nguyen, & Obeid, 2013; Zhao, 2010) given groundbreaking 
innovations in technology. Encompassing a variety of media formats, these innnovations 
have served as conduits in facilitating convenient and instantaneous public access to 
disseminated information flows and investment opportunities. Verging on this capital 
market expansion, the U.S. mutual fund industry has also undergone its share of rapidity 
in market development, increasing in excess of 12000% in just over seven decades, 
growing in size to over 8,726 by 2006, and attaining market valuation levels exceeding 
$10 trillion (Traflet & McGoun, 2008). Equally spectacular is the recent history of 100-
plus stock market crashes since 1980, with profound economic ramifications: (a) post-
crash net losses exceeded four percent of market value; (b) of the 100-plus crashes, more 
than twenty erased over 10% of gross domestic product (GDP); and (c) ten stock market 
crashes produced losses in excess of 20% of GDP (Calomiris, 2003).  
Widespread democratization of capital markets (Armijo, 2012; Boutchkova & 
Megginson, 2000) and access to technology have instrumentally flattened the investment 
landscape, and increasingly larger populations of individuals have become more involved 
with overall decision-making and management of their investments. As retail investors’ 
agitation has heightened, so too has the level and effects of information asymmetry. This 
outcome, according to some commentators, has been unfortunate because corporate 
disclosures are vital sources of information in forecasting future prospects of business 
(see e.g., Hu, Liu, Tripathy, & Yao, 2011; Misra & Vishnani, 2012). 
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An inquiry into information asymmetry and its impact on the decision-making 
propensities of retail investors, a large segment of whom are reasonably affluent and 
noninstitutionally accredited, is essential because the pricing of investment assets is 
dependent on the quality of information available and utilized (Epstein & Schneider, 
2008; Leuz, & Verrecchia, 2012; Veronesi, 2000). The escalation of information 
asymmetries, given the wave of scandals and corporate indiscretions following 2000, has 
proven daunting for many investors. Further, dubious activities and the proliferation of 
adverse corporate reporting (e.g., accounting restatements and fraudulent actions 
[Carcello, Hermanson, & Zhongxia, 2011; Yevdokimov & Molchanov, 2011]), have 
undermined quality investors’ experience, and heightened frustration with a system that 
appears to favor corporate insiders (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Hovakimian & Saenyasiri, 
2010; Tardivo, Breciani, & Fabris, 2011). In recent years, schemes of deception favoring 
corporate and executive interest, ranged from earnings manipulation (Gunny, 2010; 
Xiaomeng, Bartol, Smith, Pfarrer, & Khanin, 2008) to outright accounting fraud (Boyle, 
Carpenter, & Hermanson, 2012; Ferrell, & Ferrell, 2011). The facts suggest that duplicity 
and excess have undermined the notion of honest dealings. Researchers have called into 
question the integrity of corporate governance and its role with respect to disclosures, 
which for many including Rhodes (2010) is a process fraught with significant information 
asymmetries, and for Bhattacharya, Desai, and Venkataraman (2013), a likely distortion 
and undermining of earnings quality in the financial markets. 
The complexities of asymmetry that exist as a part of the stakeholder-
management dynamic have been repeatedly documented by scholars such as El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, Ni, Pittman, and Saadi (2013), Jensen and Meckling (1976), and Kothari, 
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Shu, and Wysocki (2009). These researchers have elaborated on the persistent tensions 
that often prevail between management and shareholders, explained in part by the 
precepts of equity theory proffered by Adams (1963) and subsequently Yanli and Liu 
(2010). Equity theory enumerates the position of fairness and perceptual dynamics of 
social interchange (Yanli & Liu, 2010) exhibited, in this instance, through the dictates of 
corporate governance and the ensuing effects on investors appraisal and judgments. This 
dialectic, apparently, has succeeded in fostering certain presumptions in the stakeholder-
governance relationship. An important presumption has been the expectation of 
equlibriated moorings of shared value, where management accedes to the imperative of 
an integrative approach (Qingmin & Mingli, 2011) or one of mutual benefit to 
shareholders. Given this ideal, the investors’ expectation is that the rate of return on their 
investments would be reasonably similar to that of larger institutional investors and 
corporate insiders. Huseman, Hatfield, and Miles’ (1987) articulation of the sentiment is 
succinctly that, when appraised by the individual, the levels of equity rests on the simple 
notion of the relationship of the ratio of input to outcome of themselves versus a 
comparable ratio of input/outcome of others. This is what is described by Purnell and 
Freeman (2012) as the fact/value dicothomy, where the alignment of management and 
core stakeholder interest is in question. Consequently, the perceptible difference for the 
investor between input/outcome variables is empirical evidence of the degree of inequity.  
To address this perception of inequity and to mitigate its impact, legislatators 
introduced Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) and the Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOX) as prudential augmentations to the Securities Act of 1933. The purpose was to 
thwart opacity and asymmetries with the installation of disclosure controls in order to 
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assuage fears and boost investor confidence (Chang, Choy, & Wan, 2012; Evans, 2009; 
Lansing & Grgunch, 2004). Regulations that should have been alembic in prescription, 
were unfortunately attenuated by the economic crisis of 2007, which demonstrated that 
corporate governance disclosures remain problematic, as evidenced by the diminution 
and loss of investor confidence during which time over a trillion dollars fled to alternative 
markets (Kulathunga & Rehman, 2011). 
Problem Statement 
In the past decade, the U.S. capital markets have experienced stupendous rallies 
culminating in crashes and meltdowns, emblematic of significant market reversals, 
resulting in trillions lost, causing hyper-anxiety, trepidation, and greatly diminished 
confidence amongst investors and the concerned public (Kulathunga & Rehman, 2011). 
Major gyrations of the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) and other market indices 
have yielded increased levels of apprehension among investors. A capital market 
environment fraught with corporate chicanery, escalating management fees, diminishing 
returns on stock portfolios, falling yields on debt instruments, and shaken investor 
confidence (Arnuk & Saluzzi, 2012; Gallant, 2010), has provided the impetus and 
fomented the groundswell for a more independent investment-oriented approach. Gallant 
(2010) further underscored this conjecture by suggesting that in the current climate, the 
market must prepare for increasingly pragmatic, involved, and informed investors who 
trust their own judgments over that of their financial advisors. Given the importance of 
fees generated from managed capital and the dispensing of advice, it is important that 
firms heed investors’ concerns so as retain them as active market participants.  
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The problem that the study addresses is that although extensive quantitative data 
have been accumulated regarding incidences of director independence, weak boards and 
governance practice, and stakeholder management in relation to investor confidence and 
behavior, to date, little is known about the phenomenon of the lived experience of the 8.5 
million noninstitutional accredited investor class (Thorpe, 2014) who have asserted an 
interest and chosen to more actively engage in managing their own investment portfolios. 
What we do know is that these investors’ efforts have been bedeviled by a system that 
appears preferential to company insiders, while investment efforts have been impeded by 
dubitable management practices and brimming information asymmetries. Underscoring 
this notion, Arkes, Dawes, and Christensen (1986); Lang, Lins, and Maffett (2012); and 
Ryback (1967) have suggested the importance of transparency and emphasized that 
greater quantities of information reduce asymmetries thereby increasing investor 
confidence, judgment, and decision-making abilities. With extensive studies conducted in 
the area of information asymmetry, there is a noticeable sparsity with respect to what is 
understood about the phenomenon and lived experience of the noninstitutional accredited 
investor. 
Background 
There may have been a time when there was the widely held belief that 
managements’ disclosures would have occurred under the vigilance of government 
regulators, benchmarkers, auditing contingents, and other capital market intermediaries 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001). The massive frauds and scandals at Enron, Adelphia, Global 
Crossing, WorldCom, and Tyco International (Gerstein & Friedman, 2013) have 
resoundingly dispelled that notion. These failings in corporate governance systems 
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resulting from acts of fraud and abuse as well as regulatory responses are futher 
examined.  
Governance Failures and Firm Behavior 
Academics such as Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia (2012) and Marcel, Ortan, and 
Otgon (2010) have conjectured on the prevalence and detrimental impact of information 
asymmetry and fostered efforts to capture and quantify the phenomenon that has 
profoundly affected stakeholders. In this regard, the authors have described the 
expectations and relationship of the investors of the firm as decidedly polycentric with 
the company’s interest being centrally prioritized and stakeholders relegated to a 
principally supplicated and disempowered position of having to rely upon the expectation 
of reasonable investee conduct (e.g., see Lambert et al., 2012; Marcelet al., 2010). Healy 
and Palepu (2001) have added support in noting that the main objective of the 
information user/investor is ensuring that management is faithful in its exercise of agency 
and governance and that it is not merely engaged in perpetuating its own self interest. In 
this regard, informative disclosures permit the shareholder to assess management’s 
stewardship.  
Bhasin (2012) suggested that disclosure by any corporate entity is a powerful tool 
for providing guidance to investor constituents. In this respect, its import has been 
exploited by firms who use communication as a tool of impression management (Collett 
& Hrasky, 2005; Rahman, 2012) in the quest to attract capital and improve share price. 
Given the gravity of abuse and asserted managerial rent-seeking, there have been calls for 
enhanced disclosure, improved transparency, and a more adaptable regulatory system 
(Hannes, 2013). With this growing concern regulators have come to recognize 
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managerial opportunism and have sought redress through a host of regulatory 
mechanisms.  
While there are limitations in exploring all relevant antecedents of information 
asymmetry and the resulting impact on investor confidence and decision-making, it is 
worthwhile to consider the backdrop herein elaborated. Corporate governance, rife with 
myopia and managerial indifference, has perennially exhibited a dearth of organizational 
leadership (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012). It has also been criticized for anemic 
independence and corporate cronyism, which have prompted a steepening of weak 
internal controls and effectively undermined prudent governance mechanisms (Beasley, 
Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 2000; Carcello, Hermanson, & Zhongxia, 2011). With 
an environment of inadequate and often symbolic but seldomly enforced regulations 
investors have been victimized repeatedly. In scope, the savings and home loans crisis of 
the 1980’s took nearly a decade to be finally resolved and legislation enacted to mitigate 
or safeguard against recurrence (Johnson, 2010). With the many legislative prescriptions, 
improvement and reform might have been expected, yet financial fraud has persisted, 
plaguing the capital markets and indiscriminately sieging the most trusting and gullible of 
the investing class.  
Time and again, investor and public confidence have been betrayed through the 
surreptitious use of asymmetrical disclosures. As inferred by Chi, Douthett, and Lisic 
(2012) and more resolutely stated by Mastracchio (2007), audit firms have the 
responsibility for keeping damaging news concerning their clients out of the headlines. 
For the most part this responsibility has engendered diligence in monitoring, controlling, 
and assuring compliance of accounting standards. Still, it has also been the case, that 
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some audit firms, Arthur Andersen being the most notable, have compromised their 
professional duties and have been complicit in abetting and in instances perpetrating 
fraud. Significantly and equally to blame, when assessing the soundness of a firm’s 
position, was management’s effusiveness and optimism about their company’s forward 
looking prospects. Managements have also shrewdly and subtly overplayed or feigned 
financial conservatism, to satisfy legal compliance by severely tempering prospective 
performance in order to window dress results (Iatridis, 2011; Kempf & Osthoff, 2008; 
Rogers & Stocken, 2005). The extraction of value followed given lower securities 
valuation (Bujang & Nassir, 2007) where insiders were able to acquire equity at 
discounted price levels. 
With incomplete and asymmetric disclosures, the risk of prospective future 
returns are borne directly by investors (Mun, Courtenay, & Rahman, 2011). 
Consequently, it is apparent why the opacity of information has been a source of 
frustration to many investors. In evaluating market composition, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997) highlighted the distinction between classes of investors, suggesting that while 
larger more informed investors are still reliant on the legal system, they do not need 
nearly as many rights as small investors do in order to protect their interest; and given the 
abuses of the past decade, experience and resources have become invaluable to many 
investors who have found it necessary to litigate as a recourse.  
Retail investors are largely dependent on information received through various 
channels. Management disclosures, for instance, are weighed more seriously given the 
proximity to the business and access to value-relevant information (Døskeland & Hvide, 
2011). Reliability on the quality of such disclosures is predicated on perceptions of 
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credibility (Dastgir, Sajjad, Khan, Shafi, & Ur Rehman, 2011). The confidence intimated 
in investors’ decision-making has been manifestly tethered, in many ways, to the 
perceived credibility of reporting firms, which invariably have an impact on investors’ 
fortitude and discretion. Moreover, even though investors are presumed to assess 
informative disclosures, there is little else in terms of alternative information against 
which to make judicious comparisons. Commentators such as Beyer and Guttman (2012); 
Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003); and Jong-Hag, Myers, Yoonseok, and Ziebart (2010), 
have discussed investors’ sensitivity to management disclosures and have opined on the 
nuanced qualitative elements highlighted within various reports, which are intended to 
influence and bolster their firms’ credibility.  
A dissection of some of the many incidents of asymmetrical and fraudulent 
disclosures perpetrated by countless corporate entities on their investor constituency 
reveal varying levels of creativity, but in many respects reflect a basic re-fashioning of 
fraudulent schemes that existed in the past. In various ways Cohen, Ding, Lesage, and 
Stolowy (2012) and Duska (2004) have conjectured on a number of these schemes 
ranging from abstruse special purpose entities, to accounting fraud, to employing 
aggressive and questionable tax avoidance schemes, to the manipulation of research 
findings to support pre-conceived investment theses. The housing and capital markets 
debacle of 2007, amply illustrated the self-serving nature of advice given to investors; 
advice that was rife with asymmetrical underpinnings.  
A Decade of Regulatory Reforms  
The financial crisis of the last decade dealt a tremendous blow to the investment 
community and economies all around the world. The U.S., long regarded for its stellar 
  
10 
financial innovations, found itself under scrutiny and heavily criticized (Helleiner, 2011) 
as a consequence of the U.S. manufactured financial tools that were at the center of the 
crisis. More significantly, the U.S. suffered a bruising downturn in employment and 
economic activity. With investors reeling from the effects of major losses sustained in the 
1997-1998 and 2000-2001 stock market downturns (Brenner, 2009), amidst public 
outcry, and against industry protestations the government enacted a number of 
legislations aimed at greater consumer and investor protections.  
As a forerunning legislation at the beginning of the new decade, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD) on 
August 15, 2000. In substance it proscribed the selective and prejudicial disclosure of 
material non-public information by publicly traded companies and other parties to 
preferred members of the professional investment community, unless simultaneously 
disclosing to all interested parties (SEC, 2000). Whereas the objective was to attempt to 
treat all parties/classes of investors equally and thwart insider trading, almost 
inexplicably, the SEC provided exemptions in the statute for credit rating monitors, 
agencies, and nationally recognized statistical rating organizations (NRSROs) compiling 
statistical ratings. 
The cataclysmic collapse of Enron towards the end of 2001, and the resulting 
financial abuse and inequity that investors suffered as a consequence (Benston, 2003; 
Noe Cross, & Kunkel, 2012) engendered the enactment of the Public Company 
Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act or Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. 
Ensuing legislation had a wide swath, broadly addressing inadequacies in essential areas 
of corporate governance including reporting and disclosure, auditor independence, the 
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pervasive conflict of interest in the analyst community, board of directors dereliction, 
banking practices, resources for SEC enforcement, compensation schemes for company 
executives, protection for whistle blowers, and civil and criminal penalties for corporate 
malfeasance (Bainbridge, 2007). 
Following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, the trillion dollar Wall Street bailout of 
financial entities considered too big to fail, as well as the devastating contraction of the 
U.S. economy, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was 
signed into law on July 21, 2010 (SEC, 2010). Its regulatory reach extended well beyond 
the financial services industry to all publicly traded firms. The bill addressed many 
aspects of financial dealings, from depository banks being restricted in trading 
proprietarily, to limitations on the level of tier one capital that could be utilized for 
hedging of positions, to the regulation of debit card interchange fees, to limited proxy 
access. More considerable than these reforms, nonetheless, was that in October 2010, the 
Dodd-Frank legislation amended Regulation FD to nullify the earlier protection that 
exempted rating agencies from disclosure relating to appropriate credit monitoring 
activities. 
The spate of regulatory reforms enacted to curb the inexorability of excess, 
restore rationality, and re-establish a sense of orderliness in the capital markets provoked 
criticisms from the many affected interest groups. Those whose views were rooted in the 
laissez-faire tradition concluded that government and regulatory intrusion would have 
very little effect in forestalling corporate malfeasance and the cost of compliance by far 
exceeded the benefits (Gadinis, 2013; Hochberg, Sapienza, & Vissing-Jørgensen, 2009). 
Others who propounded transparency, fairness, less-self dealing, and the view that the 
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markets should provide a measure of safety in doing business have resolutely supported 
the aforementioned regulatory guidelines and enforcement (Jasso, 2009). 
Role of Confidence 
Amidst managerial self-dealing, instability of global finance and stock market 
turbulence culminating in two major market convulsions and a protracted recession, 
inspiring systemic reforms, improved codification and governance reforms, the role of 
investor confidence cannot be overstated. Decision-making subject to risk can be framed 
in the context of the distinction between prospects and gambles (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979; Koop & Johnson, 2012). Decision-making is also substantially shaped by 
confidence in judgments that are informed. As previously suggested, the cumulative 
effects of SOX, Regulation FD, and Dodd-Frank as augmentations to previous 
regulations were to have resolved matters of transparency and provide investors with 
confidence in a market system that worked as advertised. With the presumption of 
transparency, it is reasonable to surmise that the opportunistic investor will seek to 
respond to and exploit informative disseminations particularly if believed to be legitimate 
(Akins, Ng, & Verdi, 2012). Smith (2010) discussed the imperative of confidence and its 
reinforcement through the types of information received. A significant factor that must be 
emphasized is the distinction between quantity and quality of information that is available 
(Ryback, 1967). Notwithstanding, the essential appeal regarding the quantity of 
information available, some research findings suggest that a deluge of information can 
portend deleterious outcomes, particularly, as less sophisticated investors are falsely 
confident in their investment judgments (Akins et. al., 2012; Smith, 2010). As a result, 
the empirical evidence suggests that investors are likely to gain greater utility from 
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improved quality rather than larger quantities of disclosures (Gietzmann & Ireland, 2005; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2012; Zhang, 2001).  
In reviewing the body of extant literature bearing on informational dissemination, 
it is worthwhile noting the import of psychological drivers that are endemic to the 
confidence (Thayer, 2011) and disclosure process. Hirshleifer and Siew Hong (2009) 
examined the many elements entailed in analyzing the complexity of disseminations and 
as a consequence, how they are perceived. The fundamental premise of psychological 
attraction rests upon the idea that biases influence judgment and decision making, not 
only in the context of managerial actions, but its reciprocal impact on end users (investors 
in this case). More specific to the fields of economics, finance, and accounting, there are 
two underlying precepts enumerated:  
1. Good rules for bad users: Rules and policies that provide information in a form 
that is helpful for users who are subject to bias and cognitive processing 
constraints. 
2. Bad rules: Superfluous or even pernicious rules and policies' that result from 
psychological bias on the part of the "designers" [many of whom are managers, 
users, auditors, officials, or voters]. (Hirshleifer & Siew Hong, 2009, p. 1067) 
Good rules for bad users suggest misappropriated emphasis that users/investors place on 
information cues, or simple obliviousness to critical information. Bad rules address the 
fact that, through cognitive bias, information users/investors may perceive regulated 
disseminations as factually weighty/accurate and are generally trusting of such 
representations. The extent to which there is such explicit trust, has perversely incented 
influential market functionaries to fashion or advocate accounting rules and guidelines 
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that capitalize on misplaced investor/market sentiment (Baldvinsdottir, Hagberg, 
Johansson, Jonäll, & Marton, 2011; Hirshleifer & Siew Hong, 2009).  
While psychological attraction in its entirety is a reasonably expansive concept, it 
is not unique to investment decision-making, nor does it pretend to capture all facets of 
investor behavior. It highlights “…[cognitive] bias, overconfidence, [issues of] fairness, 
and mood effects” (Hirshleifer, 2008, p. 856), all of which are intrinsically essential 
ingredients of the psychological calculus that balances the prospect of undesireable 
outcomes with potential gains (Hirshleifer & Siew Hong, 2009; Prentice, 2012). Most 
essential, though, are the swirling arguments for and against investor responsibility. 
Sunstein and Thaler (2003) and Wesley II and Ndofor (2013) have argued that the 
investor is is not without some culpability, is subject to the influence of pre-existing rules 
and standards, and is likely to chose according to those dictates, making it necessary for 
some measure of regulatory paternalism (Falkenberg, 2010; Liou, 2013; Moloney, 2010). 
Researchers have supported this notion including Clement, Hales, and Xue, (2011); 
Hirshleifer and Siew Hong (2009); and Hirst, Koonce, and Miller (1999) all of whom 
have opined on the effects and impact of prior forecast accuracy as important in shaping 
investors’ confidence and judgment. In essence, investors have been trusting of default 
rules, which may explain why they have continued investing even in environments of 
duplicitous managerial conduct, fraud, and stock market hyper-paroxysms.  
Another of many interesting arguments aligning with the premised psychological 
behavior is loss salience, a powerful investor distaste for the prospect of losses 
(Hirshleifer, 2008). In other words, decisions and discretion which undergird financial 
judgements are considered highly salient because of emotional bias and considerable 
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weighting ascribed to payoff prospects in the risk-return investment outcomes (Bordalo, 
Gennaioli, & Shleifer, 2013). Salience is also positioned as a counter-balancing and 
rationalizing force (Schwager & Rothermund, 2013), as with the media, for instance, 
having the tendency to focus on salacious and shocking stories (e.g., see Enron, 
Worldcom, Tyco) ostensibly to provoke disgust, a negative emotional state that is 
commonly shared among masses of people (Heath, Bell, & Sternberg, 2001; Miller, 
1997). For the investor, nevertheless, whether equity or derative, financial decisions need 
not be fashioned as all-or-nothing propositions, as protective strategies, such as, hedging 
can be utilized in negating exposure, thereby protecting initial investments whether 
wholly or partially (Castellano & Giacometti, 2012; Watson, 2007), an effort consistent 
with the mitigation of risk, except in cases of omission bias, where ignorance may factor 
greatly. Omission bias is losely described as “the tendency to favor omissions (such as 
letting someone die) over otherwise equivalent commissions (such as killing someone 
actively)” (Ritov & Baron, 1990). Ideally, there is a standard of responsibilty that should 
be observed and the onus should be on the investor whose duty it is to be diligent, 
sufficiently informed, and with capacity and discilpline to act judiciously.  
CEO/Executive Compensation 
The thorny issue of fair executive pay (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006; Gregg, Jewell, & 
Tonks, 2012; Shaw & Zhang, 2010) is a long-standing matter that has plagued countless 
CEOs and frustrated with equal circumspection, even more investors. Management 
compensation and attenuating performance have evoked a firestorm of criticism over the 
past decade and fed into the widely espoused narrative that governance and executive 
remuneration are a broken system. Regardless of the many reasons advanced for and 
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against the levels of corporate pay packages, a consistent claim regards its role in 
furthering dysfunctional disseminations. 
Some of the most resolute pro-compensation arguments centered around the belief 
that pay packages should be sufficient to attract and retain best in class talent necessary to 
successfully administer the affairs of their respective companies (Morse, 2006; Suwina, 
Lui, Shum, & Shuk Fong Ada, 2010). The effort to align generous compensation 
packages with investors’ interests in the 80’s elicited criticisms where management 
benefited even when equity prices declined. The advent of stock options as a remedial 
response to this quandary, while costing companies very little to issue, provided a 
powerful remunerative incentive for executives to manage for greater shareholder value 
through increased earnings and higher equity prices. What is concerning, is that in many 
instances the increase in price of stocks was not benchmarked, nor did the stocks have to 
retain the gains for any considerable period (Drennan, 2008; Zheng & Zhou, 2012). The 
absence of sound criteria designed to set longer-term and more clearly delineated 
benchmarks have not only subjected the process to a system of manipulative devices but 
invited the consequential tragedy of the commons, a self aggrandized process devoid of 
cost when corporate leaders all behave similarly in terms of exploiting short term wins 
despite long term detriments (Dutta & Sundaram, 1993; Lin-Hi, & Blumberg, 2011). 
CEO hubris is also a driving force, exacerbated by incessant media adulation as 
well as egoism of out-sized proportions (Martin & Davis, 2010; Mathew & Donald, 
1997). CEOs are emboldened in their roles as being exceptional, wealth creators, and 
their compensation should bear congruence to that of similar industry actors, such as, star 
athletes (Drennan, 2008) entertainment professionals, and other high level professional 
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employment. Regardless of credibility or justification, the empirical evidence is that U.S. 
executives have been spectacularly paid (Chia-Feng, 2014) (see Harris (2009) for a 
balanced and some opposing views). Drennan (2008) validated this point in observing 
that U.S. CEOs: “In comparison to their counterparts, take home twice as much as 
Canadian top dogs, three times more than English bigwigs, and quadruple the 
compensation of Germany’s big cheeses” (p. 1). From 1999 to 2003 executive salaries 
increased by a factor of two over the preceding five year period, and compensation for 
the five highest paid executives in the largest 1500 publicly traded companies exceeded 
$122 billion (Morse, 2006). Growth in the size of corporations, given their complexity, 
accounted for 40% of the increase in compensation; the other 60% is yet to be explained. 
Significantly, the average CEO’s compensation was $3.7 million in 1993, $9.1 million in 
2003 (Morse, 2006), and leveled at $9.3 million by 2010 (Lublin, 2011).  
Over the past decade, there have been arguments that have asserted some putative 
debilitation to the extent that there are debasements and rents to both investors and the 
economy (Bebchuk & Fried, 2006). Boone, Khurana, and Raman (2011) concluded that 
positive incentive alignments (of investor and management) did not assure improved 
disseminations and information quality. Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann (2010) and 
Bebchuk and Fried (2006) have also noted the impact of dysfunctionality in remuneration 
schemes, which have threatened the sustainability and creation of economic value over 
the long term for the investor constituency, citing in the latter case, instances where 
excessive risk-taking was encouraged because of compensation incentives at the now 
failed Bear Stearns and bankrupt Lehman Brothers. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The central goal of an interpretive, naturalistic approach (Denzin & Lincoln, 
2011) to this phenomenological inquiry was to evaluate the extent and depth of the forces 
of information asymmetry propagated through the corporate governance process, and to 
discover the essence as well as the lived experiences of retail/noninstitutional accredited 
investors (NIAIs) as it relate to themes of confidence, judgment and decision-making. 
The phenomenological design centered on an amalgam of standard open-ended 
interviews (Englander, 2012; Patton, 2002) with intent to describe specific responses, 
capture participant narratives, and explore the meaning of the life-world of informants 
(Englander, 2012; Vagle, 2009) who engage in the practice of retail investing. Further, 
information that was derived through the interview transcriptions and related field notes 
were used for substantiation and verification as well as a means of triangulating the 
strands of data for improved accuracy and credibility of findings (Kolb, 2012; Whitehead, 
2004). 
The ensuing discoveries permitted greater insights regarding the overall 
challenges encountered by the retail/NIAIs and revealed a window to the decision trail, 
that is, investment initiation, position enhancement/reduction, risk management, and 
investment termination in realizing losses or gains. Some approximate benefits are to (a) 
aid the retail investor/NIAI in forging a more precise understanding of the role of 
confidence in the formulation of decision making, (b) advance considerations of 
informative disseminations as it relates to governance praxis, and (c) improve the 
interpretation of governance signals and intentions that characterize the disclosure 
process (Mercer, 2004). 
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Research Questions 
The study attempts to describe the economic, behavior-influencing imperatives, 
and implication of asymmetrical corporate disclosures. Research questions are 
consequently framed pursuant to the objective of the study as well as being consistent 
with contemporary literature. In this regard, questions underpining the research study are:  
(1) What are the lived experiences of the retail/noninstitutional accredited 
investor regarding corporate disseminations, its role in the proliferation of 
information asymmetry, its impact on confidence, judgment, and decision-
making propensities? 
(2) What role has technology played in magnifying and/or minimizing the effects 
of informative dissemination and how does this affect the investor’s discipline 
and psychology with regards to decision-making? 
(3) What is the perception of the state of principal-agent relations as it pertains to 
governance and disclosure?  
(4) To what extent have regulatory reforms changed the investment environment 
in restoring confidence by holding bad actors to account? 
The inextricable links between management disclosure, financial reporting, and 
resulting investor behavior have continued to provide fruitful opportunities for empirical 
investigation in light of capital market impacts and massive financial losses sustained by 
shareholders particularly in the past decade. In this regard, answers to the research 
questions may sharpen the investor’s awareness of the gravity of regulations, the extent to 
which they impact managements’ disclosures, and how these inform the retail investor’s 
confidence, and decision-making.  
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Rationale of Research Questions 
Answers provided to the foregoing questions should offer greater understanding 
of the role of asymmetrical disclosures and the ways in which the retail investor collects 
and utilizes information in key decision-making. The investor and concerned interests 
may also appreciate, even with the pervasiveness of asymmetry, the role of hubris, 
overconfidence, and over-reliance on both public and non-public noise-related indicators 
(Uygur & Tas, 2012) catalyzed by pervasive pseudo-information signals. Specifically, the 
study’s findings demonstrated: the significance of corporate informative disseminations; 
its influence on the confidence and decision-making propensities of the retail investor; 
investor responsibilities in terms of psychological framing relating to bias, heuristics, and 
cognitive capacity to rationalize and process copious and complex information streams. 
The merit of each question and associated rationale are articulated below: 
Question 1: Probes involvement, experience, and background of the corporate 
governance/investor confidence phenomenon. This also crystallizes what is 
known about information asymmetry and aligns theoretical perceptions with 
behavioral pragmatism.  
Question 2: Provides a view into the investor’s attitude, feelings, and conception 
relating to the intensity of information and its influence in moderating investment 
behavior. More broadly, answers to this question reveal: insights into the 
perception of outcomes based on immediacy and availability of information; the 
shaping of contingencies as it relates to heuristic reliance; the formulation of 
decision frames; and the role of emotions in light of resource constraints and 
technology-centered drivers. 
  
21 
Question 3: Queries the notion of trust in management’s stewardship and whether 
there is a perceived cognitive bent to the idea of feathering of its own bed. 
Question 4: This probes the investor’s perception relating to the regulatory 
impact. Positive feedback, would reflect improved confidence in governance 
praxis and assuage some investor apprehension.  
Theoretical Framework 
There have been many theoretical frameworks proffered that have sought to 
explain the machinations of investor decision-making, the resulting confidence that 
guides each process, and the critical influence of corporate disclosures that induce 
behavioral tendencies. Information theory and the conjunctive trust/risk decision-making 
model establish a linkage between dissimilar yet complementary theoretical platforms; in 
one sense the deleterious effect of information asymmetry, and in the next, the import of 
trust and recognition of risk as mediative variables in decision making. There has been 
scant use of an all-encompassing model that informs the investor’s confidence and 
decision-making process particularly as it relates to governance disclosures. Figure 1 
depicts an initial conceptual framework that attempts to represent the theoretical linkages 
of information asymmetry, the impact on the investors’s decision-making process, and 
the inter-relations of principal-agent conflicts. The framework incorporates fundamentals 
consistent with information theory and the trust/risk shareholder decision-making model. 
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Figure 1. Asymmetrical conceptual framework. Researcher’s conceptual framework 
providing perceptive, behavioral, and consequential linkages that informed development 
of the research questions.  
 
Information theory, as enunciated by Akerlof (1970) explicates information 
asymmetry, using as a backdrop the clichéd market for lemons, as illustrated through the 
adverse effects and questionable efficiencies of the used car market. The trust/risk model 
espoused by Verstegen Ryan and Buchholtz (2001), delves into the elemental particulars 
of decision-making, the effects of risk, behavioral influences, and the constructs of trust, 
whether generally or situationally oriented (see Figure 2). 
Theory of Information Asymmetry 
Consistent with the premise of asymmetry, where seller has superior knowledge 
to buyer, Akerlof (1970) held that the market for used cars was hyper-inflated thereby 
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exerting downward pressure on the price of new cars, resulting in undervaluation. This 
phenomenon is analogous in many respects to information disseminated by corporate 
officers of firms. Executive disclosures are highly regarded, respected, and valued, and 
have often buttressed the confidence of investors, and should therein foster, at a 
minimum, practical standards of certainty, transparency, and credibility (Mercer, 2004; 
Norman, Rose, & Suh, 2011). Studies have noted the investors’ reliance on and 
receptiveness to managerial disclosures, where financial information about the company 
is critical to strategic objectives and is integral to decision-making on investments and 
finance (Almer, Gramling, & Kaplan, 2008; Elliott, Hobson, & Jackson, 2011). 
Information asymmetry and its conceptual underpinning are also linked to many 
governance factors including rent and personal interest extractions as the priorities of 
executive management (Coff, 2010) and investors have become increasingly conflicted 
(Chu & Song, 2010). Kumar and Sivaramakrishnan (2009) articulated the welfare costs 
resulting from the illicit use of information and the deleterious consequences for the less 
informed investor, and the public’s collective interest. In effect, there is the asserted 
redistribution of wealth, resulting in reduced liquidity of traded equity (Fishman & 
Hagerty, 1992; Nagel, 2012) and ultimately an increase in the firm’s cost of capital 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Upadhyay & Sriram, 2011). 
Trust/Risk Model of Shareholders Behavior: The Rationale 
Trust is a sentiment that is grounded in expressed confidence. Contextualized 
within the trestle of governance, the shareholders/investors express confidence in 
managements’ ability to competently operate their enterprises in their role as agents 
working on their behalf. Trust operates best in an environment where feedback is 
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unimpeded (Manapat, Nowak, & Rand, 2013; Zingales, 2009) and confidence is 
mediated by risk or opportunity (Koller, 1988). Too, trust has significant situational 
dependency (Ba & Pavlou, 2002; Manapat et.al. 2013). The trust/risk model articulates 
the precepts of a framework that describes the decision-making process of the investor. A 
synoptical view of the trust/risk model of shareholders behavior (see Figure 2) facilitate 
the intrinsic components to be framed under three essential descriptors: (a) the initial 
motivational impulse engendered by the opportunity (situation involving the 
opportunity/discovery) (Nilsson, Nordvall, & Isberg, 2010), (b) pre-disposition to risk 
taking (Hirst et al., 1999; Rose, Norman, & Rose, 2010), and (c) satisfaction of a need or 
requirement as with a potential outcome (Praba, 2011). 
 
Figure 2. Trust/risk model. Models shareholders behavior.Adapted from “Trust, Risk, 
and Shareholder Decision Making: An Investor Perspective on Corporate Governance” 
by L. Vertegen Ryan and A. K. Buchholz, 2001, Business Ethics Quarterly, 11, (p. 180). 
Reprinted with permission. 
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While the streamlining of the model conveniently sharpens its focus and provides 
a useful distillation of the various elements, the central premise is that decisions are 
filtered through the ideational prisms of trust and risk which are influencers that are 
principally within the domain and discretion of management as previously observed. 
Research has also shown that the influence of economic agents, with respect to 
information provided, is a powerful tool in winning trust (Izquierdo-Yusta & Martínez-
Ruiz, 2011). Most significantly though, is that the investors’ behavior rests not in large 
measure on the perceived levels of risk but in the trust gleaned from social preference, as 
in the case of managements’ disclosures as well as signals perceived from the macro-
market environment (Fehr, 2009; Verstegen Ryan & Buchholtz, 2001) and the confidence 
that is inspired. 
Definition of Terms 
It is customary that studies will incorporate terminologies and language that in 
many instances may be particularized and merits clarification for the sake of consistency 
and cohesion. In certain instances acronyms are used to abbreviate the name of agencies 
and regulations. The following constitute guiding definitional frameworks for the study: 
Non-Institutional-Accredited-Investor (NIAI): Rule 501 of Regulation D 
[stipulates] a natural person with a net worth of at least $1 million, individually or jointly 
with a spouse, excluding the value of the primary residence in the calculation of net 
worth. The definition extends further as: 
a natural person with [earned] income exceeding $200,000 in each of the two 
most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those 
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years and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year. 
(SEC, n.d., para 2)  
Individuals are required to satisfy either net worth criteria or income criteria (So-Yeon, 
2011). The definition involves a copious series of enactments with the Dodd-Frank 
amendment raising the threshold to exclude residential value from the computation of net 
worth.  
Information asymmetry:A circumstance in which a principal has difficulty 
obtaining credible information from the agent. This places the agent in a superior position 
to exploit the principal and the contractual agency agreement (Kapucu, 2007; Hui, Zaric, 
& Tao, 2011). 
Confidence: A cognitive bias linked to the prospect of success that is 
commensurate with the meritorious facts (Casper, 2012). 
Perverse incentives: Compensation given to CEOs and executive officers which 
incentivize risk-taking (Lin, Kuo, & Wang, 2013). The desire to maximize profits led to 
numerous financial crises in the past decade. 
Psychological attraction: These are judgments and determinations that are 
heuristically biased, which impact upon decision-making particularly in the framing of 
accounting rules (Hirshleifer & Siew Hong, 2009).  
Financial disclosure: This is purposeful revelation of financial information. Such 
information may be either mandatory or in other instances discretionary and are 
quantitatively or qualitatively descriptive (Gibbins, Richardson, & Waterhouse, 1990). 
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Psychological bias: Approach that holds that political actors, policy-makers, 
voters, mass communicators, favor rules that result in dysfunctional regulation 
(Hirshleifer, 2008); cognitive bias (Pflug, Pichler, & Wozabal, 2012). 
Insider trading (promulgated under SEC guidelines is described as follows):  
Under Rule 10b5-1 the issue of when insider trading liability arises in 
connection with a trader's use or knowing possession of material nonpublic 
information; [further] Rule 10b5-2 addresses the issue of when a breach of 
a family or other non-business relationship may give rise to liability under 
the misappropriation theory. (SEC, 2000, Selective Disclosure and Insider 
Trading, section 1) 
Blackout period: Time frame where insiders, for example, directors or executives 
are restricted in the trading of companies shares (Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2002). 
Window dressing: Poor performing stocks are sold and stocks that are currently 
displaying strength are acquired to improve a portfolio’s appearance (Choi & Chhabria, 
2013). 
Semi-strong form efficiency: Public information is factored into a stock's price 
(Fama, 1965). 
Assumptions, Scope, Limitations 
Assumptions 
The research is predicated on a series of assumptions. First, there is presumption 
that the qualitative study would suitably capture the judgments, feelings, attitudes, and 
emotions of the studied participants (Maxwell, 2012). Second, it is assumed that the 
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representation made by each informant is truthful and accurately reflects actual 
investment experience. Essentially, in minimizing sampling error, interviews should be 
representative of each informant’s experience (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007c). Third, it 
is assumed that each participant is a NIAI and has experience investing in the capital 
markets, whether with an advisor/or broker’s assistance or through self-directed efforts. 
Fourth, it is assumed that given the criteria for NIAIs, the population of participants, have 
met the definitional requirement.  
Limitations and Scope  
Mason (2010) and Miles and Huberman (1994) have guided on the limitations of 
sample size and suggested, the constraints of an all-encompassing approach of a study 
relating to the breadth of sampling, across and within different environments, engaged in 
all endeavors. Further, the optimal sample size, as prescribed by Morse (2000) and 
Griffith (2013) for phenomenological studies where participants are subject to multiple 
interviews in the collection of data, is 6-10 participants. In light of the sensitivity of the 
subject matter and the time constraints that are involved a sample of approximately 20-25 
participants was deemed prudent. This allowed for potential participant attrition without 
measurably compromising the integrity of the study. The study was conducted by an 
interview process and subject to the inherent limitations of the selected method of data 
collection. Variability in participant response may be attributed to the level of investment 
experience and economic affluence. For the purpose of external validation, there may be 
limitation in terms of representativeness in the the sample population (Johnston & Sabin, 
2010; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007a) of NIAIs. Contextualized to natural persons, NIAIs 
having the ability to also invest in non-public securities under Rule 506(b) of Regulation 
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D, are not descriptively regarded as traditional retail investors nor institutional investors, 
and as a consequence findings may potentially be unique and/or specific to one or more 
classes of NIAI investors. Additionally, the unique characteristics of the NIAIs, that is, 
personal eccentricities, reluctance to divulge trading strategies and investment activities, 
and experiences that might be awkward to disclose, may be such that potential difficulties 
is a distinct possiblility in gathering timely data.  
An in-person interview method is the preferred approach to data garthering. In 
light of geographic and time constraints, telephones and other electronic media were 
utilized in stand-alone or combined applications. Electronic media is less personal and 
may have detracted from substance and textural richness that typically characterizes the 
qualitative approach. Lastly, the interpretation and analysis of the collected data was 
subjected to the judgment and discretion of the researcher.  
Significance of Study 
Phillips (2011) has provided context and Marshall and Rossman (1999) have 
provided a robust list of likely beneficiaries, who may include stakeholders, executive 
management, academicians, practitioners, and policy makers. Regulation FD, Sarbanes 
Oxley and Dodd-Frank have reshaped the corporate governance landscape particularly as 
it relates to the practice of informative disclosures, issues where interests have conflicted, 
and matters specific to governance and investor prerogatives. The phenomenological 
inquiry advances an appreciation of the effects of regulatory measures, the latitude of 
information asymmetry engendered as a result of governance mechanisms, and the ways 
in which these have influenced investors’ confidence, judgment, and decision-making. 
Given the import and reliance on disclosures as a key input variable to decision-making, 
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the retail investor community/NIAIs are foremost likely to be affected by asymmetries. 
Institutional investors are not necessarily immuned, but their professional knowledge of 
the securities markets, their large-scale access to resources, and ability to gather and 
exploit information, create an advantage and fortuitous opportunism (Shen & Cao, 2011). 
Improving command and proficiency of the market’s intricacies provide considerable 
illumination into psychological propensities, behavioral phenomena, investment 
proclivities, and confidence exhibited through market surveillance, discernment, and 
position taking.  
Additionally, policies can be reformed in terms of operational praxis, compliance, 
and selection of boards of directors to assure transparency and reinforce the 
organization’s commitment to responsible administration, discretion, audit and 
conformity, and intelligibility in shareholder/investor relations. Consequently, 
emphasizing requisite and ethical oversight through judicious and timely disclosures is a 
point of commencement. 
Social Responsibility 
The study meets the criterion of attending the shareholder’s need for fairness, 
equanimity, and reasoned behavior as it concerns management’s disclosures. Social 
change and its pertinence to the dictates of shareholder primacy policy transcends simple 
adherence to what is legally required. Most essential is that management’s ultimate 
charge is to improve the welfare of the shareholder (Ireland, 2005; Sharpe, 2011) 
regardless of demographic or constituent makeup. Further, there is argument that 
shareholders are neither abstractions nor mere adjunctive after-thoughts, but are vital 
parts of a community which provides crucial resources when required, supports firms by 
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retaining stock ownership, and are legitimate partners and owners of capital. Barnett 
(2007) and Cho, Lee, and Pfeiffer (2013) have underscored this notion in observing that 
corporations could gain by heeding the concerns of their stakeholders. For Barth, 
Konchitchki, and Landsman (2013), and Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan, and Aerts (2010) 
there are benefits that accrue to the firm’s cost of capital in the observance and practice of 
good corporate governance. Aspirationally, one can hope that organizations will revisit 
the notion of scrupulous and discerning standards through improved awareness, and 
greater diligence. In this regard the hope is to move to a place of governance where 
transparency is not simply an aberrant artifact and/or contrived afterthought, nor is it 
solely committed to the maxim of maximizing competitiveness and wealth. Governance 
which is engaged in and sensitive to veracious disclosures is purposeful in its promotion 
of social welfare for the entire shareholder constituency and the communities they serve.  
Summary 
This qualitative study is undertaken to better grasp the phenomenological 
machinations (Englander, 2012) and impact of corporate disseminations and its role in 
shaping confidence and decision-making processes of the retail/NIAI. The literature’s 
contribution to issues of governance and management’s pursual of policies that scantly 
promote the interest of the shareholder are many. For instance, informing specific 
measures of asymmetry Baik, Kang, and Kim (2010), Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'hara 
(2002), and Cai, Liu, Qian, and Yu, (2015) asserted that asymmetric information 
negatively impacted equity returns; Amoah (2008), Bebchuk and Fried (2006) and Chen, 
Lu, and Sougiannis (2012) found that executive compensation increased asymmetry; 
Bushman, Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) and Rouhi and Khalifehsultani (2012) posited 
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the dangers in a dearth of transparency, the inevitable strains placed on the governance 
mechanism, and the ancillary effects of moral hazard and; Dobre (2011) examined the 
investor confidence based on SOX mandated managerial reporting standards. 
Considering the importance of the investor to the structure of capital markets, it is 
unsurprising that regulatory regimes have been actively installing new and more 
comprehensive rules that have conceivably touched all facets of the industry from 
reporting protocols, to firm capitalization, to executive compensation, to financial market 
surveillance. Nothwithstanding these efforts, there is still evidence of questionable 
investor confidence as acts of asymmetry persist.  
The chapter examined the market events and environment that enabled the 
pernicious growth of information asymmetry, that is, incomplete and fraudulent 
disclosure and its consequent effects on the confidence and decision-making propensities 
of retail investors/NIAIs. Investor behavior and the role of psychological bias as a 
contributing factor are also examined. A conceptual framework and theoretical model is 
also proposed as prisms through which the study might be comprehensively discoursed.  
The study’s theoretical grounding, which further informs the inquiry, is addressed 
in the body of literature and is reviewed in Chapter 2. The review encompass a number of 
areas to include authoritative works on information asymmetry, investor behavior, greater 
exploration of the confidence and decision-making calculus, the ancillary effects 
supporting an outgrowth of agency (Hüttel, Mußhoff, & Odening, 2010), adverse 
selection, and moral hazard.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
The literature review is consistent with views on governance models grounded in 
business and organizational studies, law (e.g., Letza, Kirkbride, Sun, & Smallman, 2008; 
Perrini, Russo, Tencati, & Vurro, 2011), and behavioral finance/psychology (Døskeland 
& Hvide, 2011). An essential goal of the review is identifying suitable literary works that 
provide insights as well as empirical and theoretical relevance to the subject regarding (a) 
informative asymmetric corporate dissemination, (b) its implication as catalyst for 
confidence, and (c) the role of parts (a)/(b) in the decision-making propensities of 
retail/noninstitutional accredited investors. Adjunctively, the review also examined the 
ancillary effects of the agency-problem and its contextual spawning of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. 
Literature Search Strategy 
Strategies undertaken for the review contemplated applicability, availability, and 
suitability of resources for the validation of the study’s composition. Principally, 
materials utilized in supporting the review included dissertations, contemporary research 
reports/studies (peer-reviewed) from academic journals, scholarly publications (both 
open access and subscribed), authoritative books, public documents, and reports from 
government institutions. Reference lists from an assortment of scholarly works were also 
vital resources in supplementing the review. Resources integral to review were accessed 
via online searches facilitated through numerous university portals as well as physically 
acquiring literary materials available in a number of public and university libraries. 
Although there is preference for current literature, in the absence of contemporary works, 
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there is utilization of older yet highly relevant literature, particularly those that are 
seminal and/or have been reprised in more recent publications. Many searches 
concentered to several keyword variations such as: retail investors (accredited), 
information asymmetry, trust and risk specific to confidence, corporate governance 
specific to disseminations, investor decision-making, investment psychology, principal-
agent exchanges, moral hazard, adverse selection, and SEC regulation specific to 
disclosure and reporting. Refinements in search criteria included but were not limited to 
titles, authors, and abstracts. Findings are instrumental in complementing the extant 
knowledge-base on information asymmetry and its effects on the investor’s confidence 
and decision- making process. 
Overview 
Conceptions on organizational behavior and disclosures, the stakeholders who 
rely upon them, the influences that come to bear, indeed the behaviors of information 
users have given rise to a myriad of opinions some of which posit dichotomous and 
controversial contentions. Key exemplars are Sundaram and Inkpen (2004) who 
advocated value maximization; Freeman, Wicks, and Parmar (2004) who argued for 
organizational values and the notion of value creation; and Grzeda and Rowden (2014) 
who sagaciously examined these and other perspectives. The ideological constructions, 
arguments, and theoretical precepts underpinning the study aimed to illuminate the 
gravity of the anteceding propositions as well as advance an understanding on the 
phenomenological perceptions of investors’ lived experience. Thus, the chapter is 
organized along the lines of the investor confidence as catalyzed by information flows; 
corporate disseminations, managerial actions and impacts on credibility; investor 
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behavior and culpability; conceptual ratiocination; explication of psychological agents 
and behavioral frameworks; and hazards of the agency problem. The chapter concludes 
with a brief summary.  
Background and Review 
Throughout the years, investors have held the belief that management disclosures 
occurred under the vigilance of the regulatory agencies, industry bench markers, legions 
of auditing professionals, and a myriad of capital market invigilators (Healy, & Palepu, 
2001; Sapienza, & Zingales, 2012). The catastrophic collapse of Enron and WorldCom 
(Thornton, 2012); the subsequent revelation of massive frauds at Global Crossing, 
Adelphia, and Tyco (Markham, 2006; Viton, 2003); the implosion of Lehman Brothers; 
and the emergency government bailout of AIG in 2008 (Sapienza & Zingales, 2012) have 
shaken that belief. The fact that staid companies such as Xerox, Bristol-Myers-Squibb, 
and Rite Aid disclosed serious accounting irregularities between the 2002-2004 period, 
was even more unsettling. The scope of the fraudulent activities and losses to investors 
was breathtaking. Investors recorded losses of $60 billion in Enron (Viton, 2003); 
WorldCom accumulated losses of $12 billion, which it hid from investors (Bower & 
Gilson, 2003; Buckhoff, Higgins, & Sinclair, 2010); and Global Crossing’s $50 billion 
market capitalization imploded in bankruptcy (Markham, 2006).  
More than just the salaciousness and sensationalized nature of the cases, the rash 
of accounting restatements of publicly traded companies skyrocketed to exceed 650 in the 
four-year period leading up to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 
(Markham, 2006). Using a referenced period of 1997-2005 Burks (2011) cited a 
Government Accounting Office study placing accounting restatements at 2309. 
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Dissecting the statistic, Burns (2011) identified 407 pre-Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
restatements versus 819 post-Sox restatements. This represented a doubling of incidents 
for the listed periods. There were 836 incidents not included because of statistical 
processing adjustments. Notwithstanding adjustments, SOX has unquestionably exposed 
a systemic shortcoming in financial statement reporting; a fact not lost upon the many 
companies that immediately rushed to amend deficiencies in avoidance of regulatory 
fines and possible criminal prosecution.  
Central to the pervasive incidents of avarice and fraud was a systematic process at 
work where management at many companies whitewashed ethics (Nangia & Jain, 2009); 
minimized the import of regulatory compliance; and duped lenders, creditors, and the 
investing public into providing funding for their companies. Funding was provided under 
the mistaken belief that capital was being supplied to seed viable investments in well-
operated enterprises. More significantly, stock sales and future investments that could 
have been delayed or otherwise foregone, were never altered or deferred because of 
asymmetrical corporate disclosures provided at the time (Nangia & Jain, 2009). Neither 
was the investing public privy to the acts of self-dealing and managerial chicanery, where 
corporate chieftains such as Tyco’s Kozlowski and cohorts looted the company for in 
excess of $600 million (Markham, 2006; Srinivasan & Sesia, 2011) through unauthorized 
bonuses, and loans made to themselves at preferential or below market rates, none of 
which was disclosed in the company’s reported accounting statements (Viton, 2003). 
Even more egregious was that many of these loans were forgiven, their borrowers never 
having to repay, in willful disregard and contravention of their roles as fiduciaries. A 
permissive corporate culture at the time made it easy for executives to award themselves 
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outsized compensations, particularly with the issuance of stock option grants, which 
invited even greater incentive to manipulate their companies performance to hike stock 
prices, thereby profiting with options attaining intrinsic valuation levels (Chng, Rodgers, 
Shih, & Song, 2012). 
Confidence, Judgment and Decision Making 
The noninstitutional accredited investor’s (NIAI) confidence, judgment and 
decision making propensities are intriguing and are an equally complicated phenomena 
examined by countless academicians particularly since the nineteenth century. 
Confidence, judgment, and decision-making, influenced by innumerable variables and 
communication signals, have had a prolific history stretching back to Holland’s famous 
tulip bulb bubble/crisis in the seventeenth century (Garber, 1989; 2012; Stephens, 
Atwater & Kannan, 2013). Since then re-examinations have been undertaken with 
varying degrees of circumspection, particularly notable during periods of financial crises 
as evidenced with the many stock market, housing, currency, and debt market bubbles 
that have occurred in the recent decades. Whether through acts of contemplation or 
inadvertence, investors have plowed headlong into the capital markets of the past decades 
and in many cases have suffered sizable losses (Jones, 2011) . 
Within the dictate of corporate governance, information disclosure is central in 
shaping investor confidence (Agyei-Mensah, 2011; Cormier, Ledoux, Magnan, & Aerts, 
2010; Holland, 2005) and is constructed along the lines of judgment, skill, resolve, and 
resource. To the extent that these elements weigh heavily, they reinforce the broader role 
played by influence and opportunism in the decision- making process of the retail 
investor, and are thus the focus of this qualitative phenomenological study. Principally, 
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the themes of this study aim to capture and forefront the essential examination of (a) 
governance and its role in corporate disclosures as a reinforcement mechanism to 
confidence and catalyst to strategy formulations, (b) the impact of information 
disseminations as tacit underpinnings to asymmetry and consequent determinant in the 
investors’ decision-making, and (c) trust and its opportunistic exploitation in the licensing 
of information asymmetry. The literature review has been presented to reflect the 
integration of these three essential contentions and the associated imperatives of agency, 
adverse selection, and moral hazard. The unification of these themes are engaged and 
deliberated through extant literature and through theories garnered from contemporary 
and seminal research.  
Information Theory 
Information theory, originally developed by twentieth century mathematician and 
cybernetics pioneer Norbert Weiner and later augmented through engineering and 
mathematical concepts courtesy of Claude Shannon in the 1940s, has crossed beyond its 
initial technical domain (Mitra, 2010), and in a more contemporary sense addresses the 
ways in which organizations gather, safeguard, and distribute information (Freeman, 
2005; Giles & Maliapen, 2008). As an adjunct to the theory, information is free-flowing, 
is everywhere, and is societal. Like an elixir it is needed by everyone, and everyone is a 
source. It is pervasive and intuitive and in many cases requires little thought. The force of 
information has become fundamentally illuminating to the disciplines of sociology, 
political science, and in general to the functioning and economics of the information 
society at large (Gray, 2011). 
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Knowledge, it is contended is only possible through the synthesis of information. 
A more precise understanding of information and its many uses, including manipulation, 
enables not only a greater appreciation of its social and economic implication, but its 
overall tendencies and behavior. Information, or to shape, as elucidated by the Latin 
informare (Gray, 2011), emphasizes statement of facts disseminated to an audience that 
represents some inherent value or worth to each recipient (Bhasin, 2012; Losee, 1997). It 
follows then, that despite the wide-ranging interpretations that are presumed, whether 
through distinct intelligibility or inference, what is indisputable and must be considered is 
that of its utility. The fact is, pragmatic usefulness is determined by not only the 
information itself, but also, the commensurate literacy of the user (Fiander, 2011) and 
related value as dictated by the veracity, interpretation, and satisfaction of the purpose 
intended.  
Information is vital in the mitigation or eradication of uncertainty (Gray, 2011). 
Corporate disseminations are in theory consonant with this simple premise. Information 
asymmetry, by its very definition, stands in stark contradiction of this principle. Over the 
most recent decades the level of asymmetry and information differential between 
management and investors have widened. This is evidenced by the number of CFOs 
implicated in fraudulent reporting, which has marked an increase from 83% for the period 
1987-1997 to 89% for the ensuing period 1998-2007 (Carpenter & Hermanson, 2012).  
Governance and Asymmetry in Corporate Disclosures 
Oliver Wendell Jr., an American Jurist sagaciously declared, “[a] page of history 
is worth a pound of logic" (Hartley, 2011, p. 34). The pithiness and truth that the 
statement embodies is appropriate to the universe of corporate governance and its 
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troubled disclosure process. Disclosure of a complete nature, it appears, has been a great 
source of apprehension, puzzlement, and in many cases one of routine annoyance within 
the choate of corporate governance. Disclosure it has been argued may be punitive and 
invites certain unintended costs (Deng, Melumad, & Shibano, 2012; Rogers, Van 
Buskirk, & Zechman, 2011). With decades of accounting fraud and mounting investor 
losses, there is ample evidence that comprehensive disclosure is of extreme importance. 
Managerial Actions 
Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein, (2012) and Healy and Palepu (2001), have 
enumerated the critical nature of disclosure in assuring the efficient operation of the 
capital markets. Cassar, Ittner, and Cavalluzzo (2015) and Healy and Palepu (2001) have 
argued the necessity and merit of financial reporting as being essential in the mitigation 
of information asymmetry. As a vital channel through which information is disseminated, 
corporate disclosures have the potential to impact the investing public (both existing and 
potential investors) as it exposes managerial discretion on valuation, the power dynamic 
between management and its shareholders, and the firm’s corporate governance 
philosophy. Johnson (2005); Lee, Lemmon, Li, and Sequeira (2014); and Ludman (1986) 
have opined on the corporate culture where insiders, for instance, misappropriate 
information when they engage in short swing trading activities. They do so by buying 
shares of their companies, which they subsequently resell at a profit based on their insider 
knowledge (Nagy, 2011). The fact that unwitting shareholders are willing to sell shares at 
those lower prices, reflect the information dearth and gap that exists regarding true 
valuation levels. 
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Expropriation and Asymmetry 
The essential question of stewardship framed against the backdrop of the 
corporation’s best interest and management’s propensity to exploit shareholders through 
expropriation (Faccio, 2001; Zattoni, 2011) is also of concern and bears heavily on 
corporate disseminations. On balance, the import of financial reporting is viewed as being 
crucial in mitigating the likelihood of managements’ expropriation of shareholders wealth 
(Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar, 2010; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleiferl, & Vishny, 2000b). 
Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, (2009) advanced the narrative on expropriation by 
highlighting the effects of entrenchment, which has the effect of engendering empire 
building and the extraction of excessive benefits and compensation. Freeman, Wicks, and 
Parmar (2004) addressed the notion of the folly of expropriation and spoke to its 
preclusion as vital in creating value for the shareholder. Contextually, it is unsurprising 
that corporate executives and CEOs are responsible for 89% of financial statement fraud 
(Boyle et al., 2012). There is ample confirmation in the capital market environment with 
examples of over-zealous corporate actors, such as Tyco’s Dennis Kozlowski and Scott’s 
Paper Al Dunlap (Ghoshal, 2005). Health South’s Richard Schrushy and Bernie Ebers of 
WorldCom (Lease, 2006; Prentice, 2012) are also dubiously distinguished in this regard. 
The fact is, the matter of corporate governance as it relates to disclosure and compliance 
is fraught with complexities that are non-random as disparate issues frequently coincide 
to produce results that in many cases are aberrant in spawning instances of self-interested 
behavior and incorrigible opportunism (Chua, Chrisman, & Bergiel, 2009; Mayer, 1997). 
Disclosures presented by corporate entities are powerful tools that provide 
guidance and reinforcement to investors’ perspective (Bhasin, 2012). Given the value and 
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importance of disclosure, firms have been strategic in their communication as a means of 
impression management (Collett & Hrasky, 2005; Rogers, Van Buskirk, & Zechman, 
2011) in the bid to not only raise capital but improve the firm’s value and share price. 
Against this backdrop regulators have come to recognize managerial opportunism and 
have exacted redress through a range of legal and regulatory mechanisms. 
Regulated Disclosure 
The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 required that publicly traded companies 
engage in periodic reporting (U.S. Security Exchange Commission, n.d.). Such annual 
reports were to furnish full financial disclosure of information that investors would find 
pertinent in formulating investment decisions. What was not foreseen was the level of 
complexity to which the capital markets and the securities industry would have evolved. 
And though the Securities and Exchange Act prohibited deception, falsification, and acts 
of fraudulence in securities transactions, it did not stipulate with utmost precision the 
level of transparency that was required. Transparency in substance and spirit, regardless, 
is integral to disclosure and is often considered a fundamental bedrock on which firms’ 
behavior is premised. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defined transparency to entail the “timely disclosure of adequate [company 
related] information [pertaining to financial] performance, commercial objectives, 
ownership structures, remuneration [relating to] third party [dealings], governance 
structures and internal controls” (Chung, Elder, & Kim, 2010, p. 266; Jhunjhunwala, & 
Sharvani, 2011, p. 62). 
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Extended pragmatically, Hutchins (2005) observes that financial reporting 
transparency (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, & Walther, 2010) requires more than simply 
voluminous quantities of information and notes:  
The real challenge is to produce…annual report[s] that [do not] bury information 
in page upon page of complex legalese, financial voodoo, and corporate jargon. 
Moreover, the challenge is to provide information in a way that all investors and 
potential investors—not just financial professionals—can understand. That's real 
disclosure and transparency. (p. 30) 
Barron, Kim, Lim, and Stevens (1998); Beams, Hua-Wei, H., and Yun-Chia, (2013); and 
Berger and Hann (2003) assert that forecasts attempted by analysts, and by extension, 
investors, are less accurate and presents greater risk where information is of inferior 
quality. Alkhawaldeh (2012) added to this notion and suggested that the risk to the 
investor increases in assessing future payoffs in an environment of reduced transparency. 
Tong (2013) appended this conjecture, arguing an environment of interdependent trust, 
where transparency is elemental and is vital in promoting assurance to the investor of 
potentially less likelihood of betrayal of expectations. This basic sentiment of reliability, 
accuracy and improved decision-making with the availability of more precise informative 
disclosure has been advanced repeatedly (Myring & Shortridge, 2010; Sunhilde & 
Hajnalka, 2009). Reinforcing this perspective, Zandi and Shahabi (2012) posited the 
notion of less information asymmetry with greater transparency in disclosure and Sadka 
(2004) has demonstrated that transparency provided through the public exchange of data 
within the analyst community has improved economic growth trends and factor 
productivity across thirty countries (abstract). Finally, the intermediation provided by the 
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analyst community and their prognostications and earnings forecasts have proven their 
impact on influencing investor opinion as this is widely regarded as a barometer of 
market sentiment (Francis & Soffer, 1997; Simpson, 2010). 
Mandatory Disclosures 
As previously noted, the Securities and Exchange act mandates disclosure of 
important financial information, which informs investors in their judgments and decision-
making as to choices they are able to make in their selection of investments in publicly 
traded companies. Although well intended, the act of providing credible and fully 
informative disclosure has, in itself, provoked a conundrum. Cooking the books, earnings 
manipulation, and outright fraud are some of ways in which information is misused by 
corporate managers (Rezaee, 2005; Francis, 2011). Schemes range from the sophisticated 
and sublime to less complicated yet brazen deliberations (Dorminey, Fleming, Kranacher, 
& Riley, 2012; Hamid, Shafie, Othman, Hussin, & Fadzil, 2013). Financial statement 
fraud, a major cause of information misappropriation, as well as trust crimes have 
escalated over the years. The Report to the Nation of 2008, has estimated the amount lost 
by organizations, and hence their shareholders, to approximate gross domestic product 
(GDP) $994 billion according to the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners 
(Ramamoorti, 2008). More contemporarily the dissemination of information has been 
circumstantiated to guile, parsing, and clever gamesmanship in identifying semantic 
loopholes. The obvious problem with information, or rather its appropriation is what Van 
Rijsbergen and Lalmas (1996) described as a condition of elusiveness. There is 
underscoring of the failure in adapting a suitable definition, at least in the capital market 
sense, which could arguably discourage managements’ propensity to move to the 
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extremes of the disclosure continuum in the ways in which information can be legally 
maneuvered to the company’s advantage.  
Publicly Required Disclosure 
The U.S. capital markets have been guided by an elaborate framework of laws 
and rules installed by the SEC. The overwhelming thrust of these laws was to ensure that 
the various population of investors, both institutional and private, were equally privy to 
the release of information, the pillar on which to make better and more informed 
judgments in their buying and selling decisions (SEC, 2013). At the outset periodic 
disclosure principally centered to financial statements of stocks listed on the exchanges 
(Markham, 2006). At the height of the Enron debacle, legislative changes were made to 
assure that reporting was more formalized through the filing of SEC Form 10K, and 
signed by the executive leadership, accounting principals, and the majority of the firm’s 
directorship. Regulation Fair Disclosure instituted in August 2000 was a critical 
augmentation, and a major step towards leveling the investment terrain. Information 
deemed price sensitive was to be released expeditiously into the public domain as was 
information considered material to the general prospect of the business enterprise, 
whether favorable or unfavorable (SEC, 2013).  
Information and a range of corporate incentive problems have been previously 
examined and have produced a myriad of findings on the role of corporate 
disseminations, the responsibility of managers to their investing constituents, and the 
effective shaping of investor perspective and behavior. For instance, in examining 
information disclosure Hermalin and Weisbach (2012) observed that firms incurred 
enormous costs to disclose information because there is an inherent public and 
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institutional expectation of this practice. Further, it is suggested that such disclosures 
improve public welfare by providing greater advantages to investors and also improve the 
environment of risk sharing. Focusing on systematic use of insider information, Van 
Geyt, Van Cauwenberge, and Vander Bauwhede (2014), utilized analysts disclosures and 
advanced theory where a negative relationship was asserted between high level of 
corporate disclosures and the profitability of insider based trading results. The 
perspicuous sentiment and governing thinking was that quality corporate communication 
would have had a curative effect in reducing the level of information asymmetry, making 
it difficult for insiders to reap outsized/abnormal profits. 
Semi-Private 
Disclosure, as argued by Holland (2005) and Kinney and Shepardson (2011), 
occur at many levels and in a number of ways. In addition to mandated public 
disclosures, voluntary disclosures occur in the context of semi-private disclosures. Firms 
take their cue from economic developments, industry/analyst prognostications, reported 
outcomes, and strategic company schemes (Holland, 2005). These are all essential signals 
that provide for corporate leaderships’ probe and to examine the fabric of the disclosure 
mechanism, how to acclimate to the disclosure environment, and the range of liberties 
that managements are afforded (Mohd Ghazali, 2008; Kahan & Rock, 2014). 
Private 
For decades, publicly traded firms have had a collegial relationship with the 
analyst community. The relationship calculus was always simple: firms provided 
guidance to a cadre of analysts, and the analysts as a consequence fine-tuned their 
forecast of expected earnings reports. The benefits were symbiotic as were the 
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implications of a quid pro quo factualism. Researchers such as Friend and Herman (1964) 
and similarly Fu, Kraft, and Zhang (2012) have argued the notion of less severe 
variability of returns in an environment of greater disclosure. With forewarnings to 
preferred investment communities, companies could be prudently safeguarded and 
forearmed with the prospect of reducing misses and disappointment in earnings forecasts. 
Given its impact, the mechanism of earnings guidance had been successfully utilized by 
firms to mitigate or avert sudden shocks and stock price decline; that is, until 2000 when 
Regulation FD mandated increased comprehensiveness and simultaneous disclosures to 
all market participants.  
Kim and Verrecchia (1991) and Yao (2014) have studied investors’ optimal 
portfolios. While Kim and Verrecchia have theorized about the heterogeneity of 
knowledge-levels of investors as well as their varied resourcefulness and ability to 
acquire private information, Yao highlighted the breadth of investors’ expectations, 
which ultimately influence their idiosyncratic behaviors. Extending the theory and 
explicating the handicap of individual investors, Puckett and Yan (2011) acknowledged 
the superior trading skills of institutional investors and Ali, Klasa and Zhen (2008) (in 
citing Utama & Cready, 1997) conceded the availability of vastly superior and more 
precise private information at their disposal. In an exposition of the phenomenon of 
differential precision private pre-disclosure information (DPPPI), Ali et al. (2008) argued 
its significance by pointing to the presence of institutional and noninstitutional investors 
as critical variables in producing a high conventional reading on the DPPPI measure. 
They also demonstrated the converse in positing that pronounced concentration of 
equities in the hands of either noninstitutional or institutional investors would produce 
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relatively low DPPPI readings. Moreover, there has been evidence to show that 
institutions with medium-size investment share of the market demonstrated the greatest 
propensities to acquire considerable amounts of private pre-disclosure information about 
equities which make them likely to exploit the information value, particularly around 
earnings announcements. In the context of information value at the core, Fama (1991) 
discerned market inefficiencies as a product of informational advantage, particularly 
where market makers/specialists access and utilize proprietary information in the 
generation of trading profits. In essence, there is the exaggerated flow of private 
information among certain institutional investors which necessarily disadvantages the 
noninstitutional investor constituency.  
Analyst Factor  
History suggests companies have been tactical in their disclosures, using this as a 
tool in influencing noninstitutional and institutional investors alike. In times of frenetic 
market activity, such as the late 1990 and early 2000 periods, companies armed with 
superior information may have aggressively stretched and established unrealistic earnings 
targets to excite investor involvement. In slower economic cycles the reverse may be 
inferred as true. All too often, the practice was that many analysts relied on the private 
guidance provided by the organizations they covered. A larger trend, though, is that 
regardless of the economic circumstance many companies are inclined to downplay their 
guidance (Hilary & Hsu, 2011; Hutton, 2005), the equivalent of lowering the bar so as to 
possibly depress share prices initially, only to later exceed expectations during earnings 
season. Han and Tan (2010) provide insights of management’s communication with 
analysts suggesting the classification of guidance is either range/elastic, affirming less 
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certainty and greater opacity (Han, 2013; Schweitzer & Hsee, 2002), or point (Han, 2013; 
Soffer, Thiagarajan, & Walther, 2000), which is more certain and serves to generally 
reinforce perspectives of those with specific ideational orientations or directional biases. 
In context, this is important because analysts in both cases serve as the gatekeepers, 
arbiters, and informational custodians, whose professional responsibility it should be to 
apply additional standards of perspicacity and balanced skepticism to assure the requisite 
integrity. 
Analysts with advanced visibility and guidance were inclined to greater levels of 
prognosticative precision thereby enhancing their professional reputations, market 
following, and levels of financial compensation. Regulatory settlements of the ten largest 
Wall Street firms with the SEC in 2003, for in excess of $1.4 billion, affirms the role 
played by analysts in their asymmetrical disseminations (Agrawal & Chen, 2005; 
Malmendier & Shanthikumar, 2014), rife with craven drives and corporate 
incestuousness. Suil (1999) in investigating the disclosure of private information, 
theorized that information acquired at a low cost provides a perverse incentive to be 
selectively disclosed to the extent that there is likely to be manipulation of the investors’ 
belief in forward looking prospects. 
The surreptitious use of private information where corporate insiders buy/or sell 
ahead of the shareholder constituency is a strategy that was often utilized to gain an 
advantage (Shijun, Nagar, & Rajan, 2007) through the delayed-disclosure process. Given 
investor concerns and heightened suspicion, legitimate disclosure of this activity was 
permitted to be subsequently reported inside of 45 days post fiscal year via SEC Form 5. 
With the apparent loophole, there has been ample evidence of opportunism and 
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exploitation by executive leadership. In 2001, Enron’s chief, Ken Lay liquidated some 
$70 million in stock holdings utilizing the Form 5 provision, even while promising a 
stupendous and optimistic future for the company (Shijun, Nagar, & Rajan, 2007). 
Executives at Tyco, Kozlowski and Schwartz, similarly conducted $109 million in equity 
sales and delayed reporting for approximately 385 days. Actions at Colgate Palmolive, 
where executive William Shanahan likewise conducted a maneuver in July 2001, netted 
$25.2 million in liquidated company shares, which were also reported via Form 5 some 
198 days later (Shijun, Nagar, & Rajan, 2007). To that end, many of these opportunistic 
sales, might have gone unnoticed or at best, labeled as innocuously routine, but for the 
fact that these were important signaling events. For many market participants, 
unscheduled insider sales reinforce the import of signaling and heightens its occurence as 
cautionary. Equally notable, is that evidence suggests that some members of the analyst 
and investor communities remained unaware of Form 5 activities until actual reports were 
filed, placing management at an extremely critical and strategic point of the disclosure 
vortex. 
Voluntary Disclosure 
Firms have considerable latitude and command over their business operations, 
and in many respects engage in voluntary levels of disclosure, for a variety of reasons. 
With the SEC not specifying the precise extent/nature of disclosures (Files, 2012; 
Laksmana, 2008) firms have been circumspect and strategic in its use (Beyer & Guttman, 
2012). Libby and Tan (1999), for instance, have shown the effects of warnings, 
particularly amongst analysts, in cases where the news tend to be unduly negative in the 
estimation of future earnings, bad news is trickled out rather than released all at once. 
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Veracious and timely information, in this regard, could be invaluable to all investor 
classes. In like manner, Soffer, Thiagarajan, and Walther (2000), observed the way that a 
firm appropriates and controls the news ultimately affects its perceived value. 
Accordingly, a strategy imperative aimed at managing shareholders’ expectations is that 
negative news is opportunistically disclosed in pre-earnings announcements, whereas the 
disclosure of bad news has a tendency of being tempered and piecemealed, as 
management deems fitting to the circumstance, as a means of controlling the messaging 
and mitigating any potential surprises. Bamber and Cheon (1998); Kasznik and Lev 
(1995) and; Shroff, Sun, White, and Zhang (2013) have been likewise consistent in 
considering motivations in the voluntary release of information and theorized the 
incentive as the diffusion or mitigation of otherwise negative information, with warnings 
such as reduced earnings estimates. 
Secretive Disclosures 
Secret information is information which is typically withheld or unavailable to 
others (Boxer, Perren, & Berry, 2013; Derlega, Metts, Petronio, & Margulis, 1993). 
Secret disclosures are typically of two kinds. There are disclosures that are unintentional 
or caused inadvertently as Allen’s (2012) legal descriptive elaborated. When there is 
accidental disclosure by a firm’s management, SEC rule 101 (c)(e) Selective Disclosure 
and Insider Trading is triggered and there is an immediate obligation for expeditious 
public disclosure to be made (SEC, 2000). There are also secret disclosures which are 
made surreptitiously, and are generally used insidiously to further some specific 
advantage and/or satisfy prescribed agendas. 
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The elements of confidence and secrecy are of great concern as these are essential 
to the corporate fabric as drivers of competitiveness and other vital advantages. In 
securing these advantages, corporate insiders, middlemen, and determined market 
opportunists are willing to go to great lengths to secure expediently earned outsized 
profits, regardless of means, unethical or illegal, by peddling secret information 
(Verschoor, 2011). It is what Plouffe (2012) described as a corruptive process endemic to 
bribery, the misemployment of process, and abuse of official position; acts which too 
often result in illicit or insider trading. Broadly, the case of insider trading stems from the 
abuse of secret company information that is misappropriated to secure unmerited 
advantage in the trading of a security. The breach in fidelity and confidence has become 
fairly pedestrian in the past decades. 
The examples have been abundant. Cases like the 2011 indictment of prominent 
hedge fund operator Raj Rajaratnam elaborates the foregoing point. Rajaratnam was 
convicted on 14 counts of securities fraud and conspiracy and sentenced to eleven years, 
after being fined $150 million criminally and civilly for his role in disclosing 
private/secret and sensitive information to third party cohorts who reaped hefty financial 
profits from the inside information. Rajaratnam’s hedge fund Galleon, also benefitted 
enormously from secret non-public information, enabling the fund to successfully front-
run other market participants (Verschoor, 2011). Almost a quarter of a century 
previously, famed Wall Streeter Denis B. Levine was arrested and charged with utilizing 
secret insider information to amass millions in profits (Torabzadeh, Davidson, & Assar, 
1989). This might not have been significant but for the fact that the investigation resulted 
in the arrest and conviction of Ivan Boesky, one of Wall Street’s most notorious 
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virtuosos, thereby precipitating major changes in regulatory and securities laws. It also 
mandated greater levels of scrupulousness in the conduct of employees of financial 
institutions. 
Arguments for Less Disclosure 
As meritorious as the arguments are for transparency and disclosure, there are 
opposing points of view echoed by as many detractors. Bushman (1991) for instance, has 
spoken to the issue of less disclosure in highlighting the benefits of a mechanism that 
enable firms to privately provide additional information to sellers, and by extension, 
preferred market actors prior to any public disclosure. Along similar lines, Bushman 
contends that in a market of monopolistic sellers, where companies also engage in and 
affect reporting and disclosure, a single monopolistic seller will strategically forge an 
approach, as it relates to public disclosure, so as to maximize potential gains, thereby 
disadvantaging traders/investors, who are generally information buyers. The interesting, 
though incredulous logic presented, is that with mandatory disclosures there is 
diminished incentive for regulators and the investor community to be steadfast in 
advocating the disclosure and public release of information. Kim’s (1993) examination of 
one disclosure model described the circumstance of adverse and dire consequences to the 
investor particularly in light of mandatory disclosure. At issue is the impact of negative 
information as it relates to risk sharing opportunities, and by virtue of this detriment, the 
investor is worse off. In this scenario, the investor cannot be trusted to make the decision 
that is most informed or beneficial, even though this premise contradicts the most basic 
notions of self-interested behavior. Even so, there is concession to the notion of an 
optimal disclosure policy. Aryaa, Gloverb, Mittendorf, and Narayanamoorthy (2005) held 
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that regulations mandating disclosure have had the unmitigated effect of fostering a 
mindset where analysts supplicatively groupthink by coalescing around particular schools 
of thought or findings. This coalesence, it is argued, ultimately diminishes the quality of 
the information received by the user and results in an outcome where the investor is 
worse off (Seetharam & Britten, 2013). Moreover, to the extent that herding is thought to 
be damaging, a method of selective disclosure is advocated as a more effective solution.  
The U.S. and European corporate governance regimes, approach their respective 
mandates from different regulatory and ideological perspectives (Anderson, 2008; 
Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 2012). In their review of European governance, Betzer and 
Theissen (2009) examined a number of Germany companies in the banking sector for 
transparency and informativeness, which utilized U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles. Findings were that despite a system of disclosure comporting with 
international standards, insiders were able to earn abnormally higher levels of returns. In 
arguing against greater freedoms and less regulation, laissez faire-minded proponents 
may well look to the foregoing to suggest the futility of enhanced disclosures, in that 
even with adherence and disclosure compliance, insiders earned higher levels of trading 
profits, due in part to lax German laws, which do not proscribe blackout periods. Siew 
Hong (1997) examined several levels of disclosure and theorized that increased 
disclosure worsened the position of market investors. The rationale was that in public-
good games, bad news precipitated a virtuous cycle of negative response feedback loops, 
where bad news feeds on itself, creating a downward spiral. 
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Disclosure In Excess 
Considering the notion of transparency, there is a pervasive belief that companies 
regularly attempt to control their disseminations and news flow. The late Justice Louis 
Brandeis made famous the adage of the proverbial disinfecting effects of sunlight, which 
was intended as a call to transparency in government. This dictum is highly applicable to 
transparency in corporate disclosure. Nonetheless, some have strenuously argued that 
salient disclosure is not a panacea. Excessive transparency it is contended, requiring 
management to divulge competitive advantages or vulnerabilities, promote apprehension 
and reservation in management’s inclination to take on potentially prudent and profitable 
investments (Sadka, 2004). Cao and Narayanamoorthy (2011) and Nagar (1999) speak to 
the fear of management in gauging the unpredictable nature and behavior of the investing 
public as well as an attempt at mitigating or precluding adverse performance assessments, 
which may trigger considerable welfare losses.  
Cost of Disclosure 
Barron, Byard, and Kim (2002) have shown through empirical studies that 
additional disclosure has produced further and excessive appetite for more information by 
investors. Further, in light of rational expectations, management’s interest is integral to 
any disclosure consideration, that is, depending on the nature, it may result in litigation 
against the organization, financial loss, or attract scathing publicity. In this regard, 
managerial disclosures can be best understood in a context where such may be considered 
an indictment of, or a referendum on leadership competencies. The cost effectiveness of 
disclosure requirements, in possible enhancement of informativeness and hence market 
efficiency, has been viewed by commentators such as Stigler and Benson (as cited by 
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Ludman, 1986) as being at best, straddling the margins and worst, as being wholly 
superfluous. Such managerial misgivings and apprehension may be heightened 
particularly, in an environment where large, mostly institutional investors, surreptitiously 
trade large positions in dark pools to avoid detection of the securities being bought and/or 
sold. Still, others have groused about the impact of Regulation FD where it was believed 
that greater disclosure increased return volatility, impaired analysts’ earnings estimates, 
diminished corporate disclosure, and heightened information asymmetry (Palmon & 
Yezegel, 2011). 
Credibility Issues 
Management 
Given the gravity and perceptions of informative disclosures, management’s role 
in the dissemination process has become as essential as it ever was. The import of 
management disclosure as underscored by earnings forecast and a variety of disclosures, 
both material and non-material, and consequent impressions of management credibility 
has been researched and documented by many scholars including Baginski and Rakow 
(2012); Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003); Mercer (2005) and; Evans and Sridhar 
(2002). According to prior research, left to the devises/wiles of the capital markets, firms 
would be mostly inclined to make favorable earnings disclosures (Comprix, Mills, & 
Schmidt, 2012). Rahman (2012) similarly addressed the role of management’s credibility 
in the context of disseminations by suggesting a belief that management may engage 
opportunistically in capitalizing on its position and leveraging critical information flows 
and asymmetries created in the reporting process. This largely imprecise function where 
there is latitude for discretionary narrative, potentially invites the ultimate province for 
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bias as there is little regulation guiding corporate dissemination (Merkl-Davies & 
Brennan, 2007). Barton and Mercer (2005) and Beyer and Dye (2012) addressed the 
matter of disseminations and the credibility ascribed or inspired in suggesting that 
management’s reputation weighs heavily and is a critical consideration for investors. 
Researchers have also pointed to the relentless pursuit of management to assuage and 
assure the investor of its expertise and competence as well as the firm’s forward-looking 
prospects (Barton & Mercer, 2005). 
Management’s disclosures and its gravity is even more considerable because of its 
explicit influence with the analyst community in eliciting coverage thereby stimulating 
investor interest (Anantharaman & Zhang, 2011). Providing insights into institutional 
behavior, Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008); Johnson, Fleischman, Valentine, and 
Walker (2012) and; Desender, Castro, and Escamilla De León (2011) noted the 
tendencies of management to frame disclosure so as to potentially influence the earnings 
consensus. Such would include the elevation of earnings expectations, particularly in 
cases of perceived stock undervaluation, to attempt correcting negative earnings bias in 
market environments fraught with skeptics and pessimists. Empirical examinations as 
with Rogers and Stocken (2005); Mercer (2004); Gibbins, Richardson, Waterhouse 
(1990) and; Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012) have presented findings that underpin 
managements’ motivation, impulse, and desire to affect the credibility of firms’ 
disseminations. They point to heightened tendencies to mislead and obfuscate during 
periods where credibility of disclosure is in question.  
Credibility impacts: noninstitutional investors. The impact of corporate 
disseminations on the noninstitutional investment community may have been 
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considerable in light of the voracious demand for information, the inherence of 
systematic risks, and invariable resource constraints when compared to sell-side 
institutions. In perspective, there are several challenges facing the noninstitutional 
investor, not the least of which is grappling not only with asymmetric management 
disclosures but in dealing with a market of shrinking noninstitutional participants where 
there is less market efficiency in noninstitutional stocks, a phenomenon that is vastly 
different for institutional issues (Shultz, 1976). As held by Miller (2010), Hvidkjaer 
(2008), and Shanthikumar (2012), small and large trades have different information 
characteristics; implicitly there is particularity in the delineation of flow and availability 
of information. Significantly, stock trades made by uniformed investors tend to fare 
poorly at the margin when compared to more informed investors having access to private 
information. Further, the tangible effects of such private informative disclosures and 
consequent asymmetry appears to have greater intractability in terms of lasting impact. 
Managerial disseminations. Theorists have evinced the advantages of 
information flow, and disparity between the informed and the uninformed investor 
(Barber, Lee, Liu, & Odean, 2005; Tetlock, 2011). In their study, findings confirmed 
punitive effects as evidenced by the apparent transfer of wealth from individual investors 
who were less informed to institutions that were more well informed and advantageously 
positioned to be opportunistic. Along the lines of the import of information, Wang 
(1994), Xiong and Yan (2010), and similarly Ziegler (2012) analyzed differences in the 
acquisition and utilization of information between heterogeneous groups. Wang 
principally focused on equilibrium equity price as an essential variable, and found it to 
have been substantially moderated by the mix of investors, that is, by the composition of 
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noninstitutional and institutional investors. Thus, investment opportunism and behavior 
were driven by information flow and structure as key deliberations. Here, informed 
investors were presumed to have been armed with private information, in instances, 
regarding dividend prospects, whereas lesser informed investors were relegated to rely 
upon intuition and the prospect of devising informative cues from realized dividend, 
equity prices, and public disclosures (e.g., see Alberquerque, De Francisco, & Marques, 
2008; Frankel, Mayew, Sun, 2010; Hart, 2013; Wang, 1993).  
Credible representations and disseminations are central to the issue of how 
disclosures are perceived and utilized by the investor/user. Driving this discursive Mercer 
(2004) and later Davis, Piger, and Sedor (2012) have pointed to the dual facets of 
credibility, namely, disclosure credibility and management credibility, and have 
contextualized the often polished and self-serving nature of these disclosures and 
elaborated the investor’s perception of these constructs. Rahman (2012) expanded 
contributions to this area by examining management credibility focused around 
disclosures. In so doing, he suggested elements of trustworthiness and managerial 
competence; situational incentives dictating the disclosure, the strength of assurance 
attributed to both internal and/or external presumptions; and other idiosyncratic elements 
centered around location of release, temporal considerations, and disclosure fidelity. 
Research has also indicated the presentation of information, where management has 
attempted to manipulate and dictate a narrative to influence the way in which financial 
disclosures are perceived by the investor. Adjunctive to a self-interested agenda, financial 
graphics presented in company releases, illustratively, provide a wealth and abundance of 
information, but also present copious opportunities for management to influence 
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shareholders in a manner of its choosing (Beattie & Jones, 2000; Camiciottoli, 2010; 
Godfrey, Mather, & Ramsay, 2003). In other words, discrete information provided by 
financial graphics/exhibits while potentially helpful, may be subject to a level of 
management contrivance and distortions.  
With credibility in question management has at times engaged in the manipulation 
of disclosure (Beyer & Guttman; 2012; Bhatia, 2010). In this respect, one approach 
suggested by Merkl-Davies and Brennan (2007) and Ding (2013) is the accentuation or 
hyping of positive news reports or the disguising of negative news, a process described as 
concealment. Alternatively, a process of attribution might be utilized where there is an 
exaggerated level of responsibility declared for success than for failures. Viewed on its 
merit, management’s disclosure and related agenda, although designed for a myriad of 
purposes, could and often legitimately and perfunctorily represent the organization’s best 
perceptions; or conversely be more sinister in its intent.  
Even so, disclosure for many researchers has not necessarily been an all-
encompassing exercise of medicament, as there is a cost associated with the goal of 
optimizing transparency (Barth & Schipper, 2008; Hyytinen & Takalo, 2002; Lang & 
Maffett, 2011). As noted by Gilbert (2012), the calculus of speech may be indubitably 
reflected in the “inverse relationship between the stringency of disclosure laws and the 
willingness of the [disseminator to engage] in…speech acts…[of the highest veracity]” 
(p. 629).  
While management and disclosure credibility are uniquely different, these do not 
operate in isolated domains. Disclosure quality has as much to do with management’s 
declarations, as management’s reputation is tied to the veracity of its prognostications. 
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Imbued in this contention is the fundamentality of trust. While precise definition is a 
matter of ideological grounding there is little doubt that some measure of trust is essential 
to the successful functioning of any publicly traded business enterprise.  
Though Mercer (2004) addressed disclosure credibility in its hardest, starkest, and 
most practicable forms utilizing market data and archival studies, Kim (2012) and 
Wagner (1996) electing to do the same, have opted for emotional descriptives like 
judgment, understanding, and personal values. Wagner’s expression on the meaning of 
soul in the universe of financial products is a notable example. The analog perhaps, is 
that disclosed data should be faithful. Simply stated, credibility in practice is rooted in the 
notion of faithfulness. Indeed, the guidelines for qualitative disclosure of accounting data 
has been principally captured and articulated in the Statement of Financial Accounting 
Concepts (SFAC 2) (Securities & Exchange Commission, 2000), where representational 
faithfulness, precision, and completeness are listed as subsets of reliability. Data, 
fundamentally, has a unique property of fungibility, to the extent that hard data may be 
diminished in its usefulness as, or when disclosed, as well as in its methodological 
composition/presentation. Fischer and Stocken (2001) have lent credence to this 
argument in suggesting a model that operationalizes in an environment where essential 
disclosure and communication of a firm’s value or investment is represented to investors. 
More critically, they have presented a picture of sell-side firms and the nature of relations 
with the investors to whom they sold. The unmistakable import is that usefulness and 
credibility of communicated information improves when the information is 
representationally faithful. In scope, there has been regulatory effort to strengthen the 
force of faithful disclosure and global settlement actions as with the $1.4 billion sanction 
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against ten top-tiered Wall Street Firms (Jones, 2004; Santoro & Strauss, 2012) relating 
to conflicts of interest provides a telling exemplar of the seriousness and magnitude of the 
concerns.  
Investors Perspective of Management  
Undoubtedly, stakeholders of all persuasions have deliberated the quality and 
veracity of managements’ disseminations (O'Donnell, Kramar, & Dyball, 2013). The 
view of calculated skepticism, unadulterated cynicism, and the more recent notions of 
non-routinized investor agitation have provided an interesting yet serious backdrop to the 
capital markets over the past decade. In general, noninstitutional investors are typically 
less informed than the entrepreneurial entities with which they do business (Hadani, 
Goranova, & Khan, 2011). This fact has been repeatedly affirmed with the 
acknowledgement of the varied informational asymmetry problems that have ensued 
(Healy & Palepu, 2001; Song, Thomas, & Yi, 2010). Nevertheless, savers and investors 
are drawn to the capital markets for as much the potential returns as the lack of viable 
investment alternatives, an instance, in this case, where reasonable cost-benefit analysis, 
uncertain as it might be, proves reasonably compelling.  
The average investor’s perception of managerial conduct is that their interest as it 
relates to disclosure preferences do not align with the shareholders (Merkl-Davies, 
Brennan, & McLeay, 2011; Nagar, Nanda & Wysocki, 2003). Stewart (as cited by Nagar, 
Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003) noted the observations of a participant at a Stern Stewart 
Executive Roundtable event, suggesting that companies’ managements have often 
engaged in very questionable and egregious behaviors of varying kinds, much of which 
they would prefer not to be publicly revealed, unless compelled by legislation or 
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regulation to do so. Further, even though there is an apparent symbiotic calculus to the 
management/investor relationship, it seems clear that there is argument that suggests that 
private management disclosures will selectively occur in instances where it is most likely 
to further the interest of management (Yang, 2012). 
Investor Culpability: Free Rider Problem 
The reshaping of investor responsibilities has been hastened with the generational 
shift in investment prerogative, necessitated as employers have cost-focused (Batt & 
Colvin, 2011) and in many cases abandoned defined benefit plans in favor of less 
financially onerous defined contribution plans (Campbell, Jackson, Madrian, & Tufano, 
2011). Market perceptions, the explosion of advisory services and investment strategies 
have transformed and redefined the investment paradigm and succeeded in foisting the 
onus upon investors to resourcefully strategize for their own financial security. 
Acknowledging this realty, an important consideration for the investor has been cost. 
Generally, the cost of attaining first rate information (Christelis, Jappelli, & Padula, 2010; 
Drake, Roulstone, & Thornock, 2012; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003) has been a source of 
consternation and has generally been weighed against its potential benefit. 
Theorists such as Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Teoh (2002) and contemporarily Beyer, 
Cohen, Lys and Walther (2010) have noted the propensity of firms to exploit investor 
perceptions and convictions regarding perceived interpretation frames. Similarly and 
almost perversely some noninstitutional investors have seized upon opportunistic 
behavior to engage in free riding and have copied the trading style and behavior of 
institutions and noninstitutional investors alike (Spatt, 2010; Choi & Chhabria, 2012). 
Investigation of the behaviors of professional and non-professional investors, their 
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psychology, and related biases found that those with training demonstrated greater 
independence with respect to aptitude, resilience, and competence in the use of 
extraneous sources of information (Kourtidis, Šević, & Chatzoglou, 2011; Nikiforow, 
2010). The converse would logically imply that some noninstitutional investors, lacking 
expertise and formal discipline, may exhibit greater reliance on a myriad of second and 
third-hand sources of information, and would perhaps, be more inclined to mimic the 
trading styles of more seasoned investors, with dutiful and herd-like behaviors (Blasco, 
Corredor, & Ferreruela, 2012: Chang & Lin, 2015; Kjetsaa & Kieff, 2014). This is 
particularly evident for those copying professionals in the mutual fund industry, where 
there is a propensity to sell winning investments prematurely to book profits and not 
divest losing positions often enough to avert recognizing losses (Bailey, Kumar, & Ng, 
2011; Hens & Vlcek, 2011; Schimank, 2010).  
The value of information held by the various classes of investors, has been for 
instance, elucidated by Macauley and Laxminarayan (2010) and Bonaparte and Kumar 
(2013), the latter authors having delved into information costs and its proxied relationship 
to the frequency of stock market participation, as moderated by levels of investor 
education, intellect, cognitive capabilities, and sociability. Extending the imperative and 
value of information, Dick-Nielsen, Feldhütter, and Lando, (2012) reprised arguments 
advanced by Duffie and Lando where they demonstrated effects of incomplete 
information using interest rate risk premiums as reflected in the shape and the widening 
of yield spreads of corporate debt, especially in times of financial market stress. 
With a liberalized capital market system, the investor has choices in the way that 
market significant information is obtained. Within the financial economy the propensity 
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for less-informed investors to secure and benefit from actionable market-relevant 
information is nothing new. Given the proliferation and value of information over the 
years, capital market-related intelligence gleaned from any number of sources without a 
commensurate cost has provided the basis for what might be considered a pronounced 
free rider problem. Exacerbation of the free-rider problem might be explained thusly: 
unlike large and institutional investors, smaller retail investors are not, or are loathe to 
fund the costs of monitoring and/or engaging in active ownership and management of 
firms’ equities (Rose, 2007). The simple calculation is the intrinsic belief that 
larger/institutional investors will exercise vigilance in monitoring managements’ 
decision-making (Panousi & Papanikolaou, 2012), thereby shielding the investor 
constituency from residual uncertainy, such as managerial excess and risk shifting. 
Inspite of this perspective, the empirical evidence is that institutions are themselves 
subject to constraints in their ability to monitor, as in cases of liquidity concerns, 
potential and/or conflicting relations with firms, agency-level imperatives, and their own 
inherent cost induced free-rider pre-occupations (Almazan, Hartzell, & Starks, 2005). 
Given the constraints of institutional investors, such devout reliance by free-riding retail 
investors then, may be considerably misguided. 
The acquisition of free-riding information also imposes an economic cost (Choi & 
Chhabria, 2012; Vissing-Jorgensen, 2003). As suggested by Bhattacharya et al. (2013) 
the cost of information is always concerning. Obtaining meaningful information and 
analysis which provides acute insights to facilitate constructive investment theses require 
an investment of time and often money (Abel, Eberly, & Panageas, 2013; Webb, Beck, & 
McKinnon, 2003). Webb et al. (2003) argued that the disclosure process is far from ideal, 
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and is rife with information asymmetry particularly where the investor has little or no 
knowledge of the internal motivations of management and there is no efficient method of 
validating managements’ disseminations. Broz (1998) and James (2011) more broadly, 
have indicated the individual’s inclination to seek out and exploit the benefits of any 
“public good”. The notion of the free-rider mindset and the investor is in some respects 
viewed as a veritable conundrum, as a free commodity often complicates and exacts a 
cost, compounding the very problem it was viewed as resolving.  
Hoaas and Drouillard (1993) referenced classroom experiments where students 
chose investing in private goods or public goods. The intuition is that a “rational investor 
[is likely to] invest only in [a] private [good] and free-ride on others’ contributions…” 
(para.1). Further, alternatively investing in the group account (public good) would have 
met the socially optimal test (see Pirinsky, 2013, p. 140-141 for an approximate 
discussion). The analogical reasoning, as it relates to the free-rider phenomenon, is that if 
one were to presume a public good as the ability to subscribe to expert advice, personal 
investment in research, and/or commitment of time to active shareholdership, there is a 
natural reluctance of the investor to bear such costs (Whittington, 1993). These 
behavioral tendencies are often common, permeating all aspects of daily interactions, 
economic, social, and political. Moore and Anderson (2006) provide a compelling 
illustrative:  
The decision by one apartment owner to install a sprinkler system that minimizes 
the risk of fire damage will affect the decisions of his neighbors, and; airlines may 
decide not to screen luggage transferred from other carriers that are believed to be 
careful with security….(p. 611) 
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Such is the paradox and arguably the incentive to free-ride, with each instance providing 
its own equilibriated outcome, ranging from little use of second hand information to 
almost complete reliance on its dissemination. The apparent cost-benefit calculus, 
curiously, may be negatively bent in that information obtained indiscriminately is subject 
to a variety of miscalculations, chief amongst which may be cognitive misjudgments in 
its veracity and interpretation (Kotlikoff, Johnson, & Samuelson, 2001; Beyer et al., 
2010). 
Coattail Investing Psychology 
As acknowledged by regulators, market practitioners, and academicians, 
disclosure is a critical underpinning that substantially levels the landscape and promotes 
the essential balance in the universe of investment opportunities. Underscoring this 
sentiment is the fact that the SEC has from time to time used the suggestion of disclosure 
to affect substance as in cases where insiders cannot trade without observing the requisite 
disclosure guidelines (Easterbrook & Fischel,1984). Significantly, disclosure has become 
a finely parsed issue with concerns, not necessarily for the level of disclosure in itself, but 
when it in fact occurs. Elton, Gruber, Blake, Krasny, and Ozelge (2010) have found that 
the availability or frequency of data reported could affect portfolio performance. A 
practical illustration would be the case where quarterly reporting became an industry 
standard, monthly evaluation would in some cases seek to embellish or contradict many 
of those quarterly outcomes. In one study Elton et al. (2010) provided empirical evidence 
to show that (a) quarterly data did not reflect 18.5% of the trades captured in the monthly 
data; (b) the timing and rectitude of trades were not as precise, as trades could have been 
executed anytime within the quarter; and (c) the phenomenon of window dressing was 
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most pronounced at year-end. This activity, believed by some, to be consistent across 
calendar quarters, was tested with intra-quarter data to evaluate its significance against 
the observed quarterly ex-post results/impact. In their entirety these results are of critical 
concerns because unsuspecting free-riders could be misguided by actions taken by the 
firm (Gilotta, 2012) or specific to investments, the timing of securities acquired and/or 
sold (He, Ng, & Wang, 2004), and their implication for overall performance.  
Copycat Tactics 
Mimicking the actions of star portfolio managers have been a strategy adopted by 
many institutional and noninstitutional investors alike in pursuit of prospective excess 
returns. This brand of copycat investing has been researched and documented with a fair 
amount of regularity (e.g., see Choi and Chhabria, 2012; Wermers, 2003). In their 
examination Choi and Chhabria (2012) found that, among other things, professional 
investors engaged in front-running ahead of funds by buying ahead of the investing 
public, and with subsequent and strategic disclosure anticipate that opportunistic 
investors might flock behind, thereby bidding up prices. The point is contemporaneously 
illustrated by an article of August 24th, 2013, written by Guglielmo and published at 
Forbes.com as follows: 
Billionaire investor Carl Ichan, who tweeted last week that he had bought a "large 
position" in Apple, tweeted again this week that he's planning on having dinner in 
September with Apple [sic] CEO Tim Cook. "Tim believes in buyback and is 
doing one.” (p. 1) 
The above-mentioned action is curious and elicits the following questions: why is a 
billionaire investor, or indeed any strategic investor, finding it necessary to advertise 
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portfolio holdings? Should this be considered an attempt at inciting investor response? 
Why would a reasonably informed investor consider investing utilizing ex-post decision 
criteria? Perhaps a more germane concern, still, is the implication for future SEC 
guidelines on the potential pumping phenomenon. 
Given the success of some investor gurus, free riding investors may be incented to 
co-opt their strategies taking advantage of their skills, due diligence, and abundance of 
resources. Nevertheless, a serious drawback of copycat investing is that many free riding 
investment theses are constructed on mostly incomplete and stale-dated information 
regarding the securities that are being held or traded by these stalwarts. Moreover, the 
guru investor can make undisclosed changes in the portfolio and also engage in window 
dressing to obfuscate or confuse copycat investors (Brown & Gregory-Allen, 2012). 
More ironic in fact, is that the free riding investor may know even less about the 
intricacies of the guru’s overall investment strategy. Whereas the average stock holding 
in a mutual fund portfolio was approximately 11 months (Bogle, 2005), investments 
made by investor gurus may be longer term and strategic or short-term and opportunistic.  
In the mutual fund environs, Gupta-Mukherjee (2013) compared the superior 
performance of certain simulated portfolio selections, for horizons of up to twenty four 
months, against a particular population of funds that had greater mean deviations. The 
results were found to be mixed, that is, returns for the copycat portfolios in quintiles 1, 2, 
and 3 were determined to be only slightly better than key market performance 
benchmarks. Another element, the hot hands factor, was examined and found to have 
merit in generating short-run returns with consistency (Hendricks, Patel, & Zeckhauser, 
1993; Howard, 2010). Emulating or mimicking the investment strategies of notable 
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investors has for some, long been a strategy, as throngs of ordinary investors and even 
investment professionals have routinely followed the activities and strategies of 
successful billionaire investors. John Burbank, hedge fund operator, for example, has 
studied the investing styles of Warren Buffett and Sir John Templeton and has, with some 
success, constructed investment models in value investing requiring concentrated bets 
rather than a system of traditional diversification (Kitchens, 2008). Equally interesting is 
that investors the world over, have taken to copying the strategies and fashions of not 
only the individuals and their selections but also of specific investment groups as with the 
technology sector. 
Regardless of the circumstance, it appears that performance-based information is 
an indispensable variable and key driver in luring investors to the capital market (Bailey, 
Kumar, & Ng, 2011; Busse, Goyal, & Wahal, 2010). Bachmann and Hens (2010) and 
previously Sirri and Tufano (1998) provided insights on investor’s psychological makeup 
and its relevance in the context of instantiated models of social practice. Sirri and Tufano 
(1998) in particular, suggested that the fund industry is a microcosm for understanding 
the actions and tendencies of average mutual fund investors and by extension, equity 
investors and consequently the marketing efforts directed at them. The more general 
contention, on the other hand, was that investors tended to coalesce to funds that 
outperform standard benchmarks. If this is to be believed, then such tractability portrays 
and positions free-riding investors as being opportunistic in their investment strategies, 
pursuit, and continued use of such information. 
Essentials of Trust/Risk Model 
The individual’s behavior and experience concerning reward and risk have been 
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examined for centuries by theorists and behaviorists through an aggregation of 
intellectual abstractions and ethical prisms. These consequent philosophical and 
pragmatic applications have evolved varied ideational and empirical conceptions. In 
broad perspective, the machinations of trust has been largely explained through the 
rubrics of individual behavior (Tanis & Postmes, 2005); social behavior (Pirinsky, 2013); 
organizational behavior, business ethics, sociology, psychology (Roy & Shekhar, 2010); 
and game theory (Davidson & Stevens, 2013). With scores of themes and the varied 
expanse of how trust is conceived across many disciplines there have been copious 
definitions regarding the concept. In defining trust, Yimin and Wilkinson (2013) echoed 
Moorman, Deshpande and Zaltman (1993) in suggesting the inclination or reliance 
through the expression of confidence in an exchange partner. In extending the definition, 
Yimin and Wilkinson (2013) (in citing Ganesan, 1994) suggest that trust reflects three 
essential beliefs premised on notions of reliability, intentionality, and fidelity in relational 
interactions. Similarly Caldwell (2005) (in reprising Pava, 2003) addressed the notion of 
trust by emphasizing the covenantal orthodoxy of ethical stewardship which shareholders 
acknowledge to be representative of their best interest, while at the same time balancing 
given priorities and prerogatives of the organization.  
Trust and risk collectively framed as an economic exchange precept, may be 
appropriately understood in the context of the analog of Jeremy Bentham’s felicific 
calculus. Lapidus and Sigot (2000) observed the utilitarian grounding of the principle, 
suggesting it as a keystone, which underpins the behavioral dynamic primordially linked 
to pleasure and pain. The co-existence and expression of pleasure and pain as diametric 
variables are largely bound to goals and outcomes, where rewards are expected to justify 
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risks taken. Trust and risk as non-standardized, complex, and multifarious abstractions 
inherently convey different meanings across geographic boundaries and philosophical 
poles. Buttressing this fundamental construct is the calculus and reliance on the integrity 
of the capital market system. Adjaoud and Ben‐Amar (2010) advocate protection for 
minority shareholders as does Black (2001), who acknowledges the difficulty in the 
formation and maintenance of the public securities markets. Black also identifies two 
essential imperatives that are integral to robust capital markets and include safeguards for 
minority shareholders: “(1) good information about the value of a company's business; 
and (2) confidence that the company's insiders…won't cheat investors …[engage in] 
‘self-dealing’ or outright theft” (p. 2). Müller et al. (2013) though oriented to governance 
in temporary organizations, provide an insightful discourse of trust to include personal 
interactions, ethicality, and character as well as its essential role as a mechanism of 
governance. In context, market constituents can and often trust the actions and 
disseminations of corporate leaders, which once betrayed, is difficult to regain (Elliott, 
Hodge, & Sedor, 2012).  
Krishnan (2011), Schwartz and Saiia (2012), Verstegen Ryan and Buchholtz 
(2001), and other academics have advanced sagacious arguments on managements’ role 
as fiduciaries to their shareholders, suggesting the importance of balancing the laissez 
faire profit maximizing doctrine (Friedman, 2007) with socially responsible approaches 
that comport with stakeholders ethical imperatives. Emphasizing the interests and 
concerns of the shareholder Verstegen Ryan, and Buchholtz point to the dearth of 
attention accorded shareholders welfare, particularly the changing paradigm through 
invigorated investor activism, and consequent impacts and reshaping of corporate 
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behavior. With observations circumscribed to transactional constructs, Geyskens, 
Steenkamp, Scheer, and Kumar (1996) and Ikram and Mustapha (2012) have elaborated 
the integral relational prescriptions and elemental skeins necessary in securing trust, 
particularly for the assurance of long-term relationships. Coulter and Coulter (2003) (in 
referencing Deutsch, 1958) observed, that in an environment of trust, vulnerability is 
heightened as one individual is willing to forego personal independence and becomes 
reliant on another in pursuit of a desired objective. For the noninstitutional investor, 
indeed all investors, trust is a congenital spark that kindles and unites differential habits 
of the psyche to states of belief and commitment thereby heightening exposure and 
susceptibility to increased risk. Viewed socio-psychologically, a cardinal construct of 
trust, center on the province of value, honesty, benevolence, and a number of other 
attributes (Cheng & Fleischmann, 2010).  
Interpersonally, benovelence induces comfort and hence potential vulnerability, 
while honesty (integrity) incites superficial acceptance (Larzelere & Huston, 1980; 
Schoorman, Mayer, & Davis, 2007) where circumspection may be warranted. As a 
consequence the tenuous line bounding benevolence and honesty between corporation 
and investor needs to be perspicaciously balanced. According to Tanis and Postmes 
(2005), trust is also represented as a highly regarded form of exchange where acts lend 
themselves to collective or universal dimensions void of regimentation and control. By its 
nature then, trust is the defacto antidote that catalyzes relationships in a universe of risk, 
dubiety, and equivocation (Tyler & Stanley, 2007). Given the circumstance, the non-
institutional investor appears to be engaged in a behavior that aligns with a condition 
described by Schoorman, Mayer, and Davis (2007) and Davies, Lassar, Manolis, Prince 
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and Winsor (2011) as a trust-based dyadic exchange between investor and disseminating 
organization. Additional dimensions of trust such as its unilateral and bilateral 
underpinings (Kuwabara, 2011; Tomlinson, Dineen, & Lewicki, 2009) have also been 
identified as essential mediators of the social exchange mechanism. Thus, the 
examination of trust contextualized in relation to the noninstitutional investor suggests a 
disposition that is directed unilaterally, as opposed to bilaterally, where there are 
parasocial expectations that dissemminators/organizations will act in the best interest of 
shareholder constituents. 
Trust, Confidence and Decision Making 
The concept of trust has been often riddled with uncertainty and in instances 
perceived as being equally rife with ambiguity. Trust has also played an important role in 
empirical investment literature particularly as it relates to investor’s confidence and 
decision making. With the investor, trust may reflect ambivalence because of unique 
experiences, perceptions, and personal idiosyncrasies even where there is perceived 
commonality in perspectives. Tomlinson et al. (2009) in investigating degrees of trust 
congruence, suggested the significance of relationships in dictating the levels of 
symmetry or asymmetry, especially in cases where there is no discernable standard of 
reciprocity or mutuality in trust. Tanis and Postmes (2005) reinforced this premise, noting 
that an agent deemed trusworthy, may not necessarily exhibit behavior that comports 
with such a perception. Rules of law or regulatory complaince requirements may have 
mandated behavior that should have commanded obligatory trustworthiness, but this is 
far from absolute given the pervasiveness and scope of trust violations as with the 
accounting chicanery at companies such as Enron, WorldCom, Adelphi, Qwest, Bre-X 
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Minerals, Bank of Credit and Commerce International and other once vaunted 
institutions. The confidence expressed, interaction with organizations, quality and 
autonomy of decision-making are all influenced by a myriad of trust factors. Further, a 
principal finding regarding trust examined through the lens of commitment theory (e.g, 
Morgan & Hunt, 1994) is that at the relationship level, it exhibits a moderative influence 
which acts to stymie the propensitites of opportunistic and distributive behavior as 
echoed by Deb and Chavali (2010). Given the capital market crises of the decade 2000-
2010, the discourse and imperative of myopic opportunism has become salient and 
profoundly critical in establishing a firmer conception of the trust-risk dynamic. 
Critical Themes: Confidence and Decision-Making 
As presented thematically, trust is substantially relied upon in the mediation of 
confidence, particularly where the investor has faith in the veracity of information 
disclosed and the general expectation of reliability in financial reporting. Spekman (1988) 
in the elucidation of exchange or trading relationships, articulated the force of 
interdependence between constituencies to reduce skepticism and assure integrity in 
transactional relationships. In many ways there is the presumption of relative similarity of 
intentions, a measure of reliability, and professional consistency as foundational 
determinants. Transposed to the capital markets, the central issue is whether there is 
investor culpability in misplaced confidence, where confidence might be conflated to a 
level of trust, which may not have been earned. Airline pilots, surgeons, and other highly 
placed professionals because of reputational and regulatory dictates, are trusted for their 
practiced discretions; but driven by abundant caution, it might be argued that trust should 
  
76 
be tempered with prudence and should never be absolute. Earle (2009) summarized this 
distinction in the following illuminating assertion: 
Trust is social and relational; confidence is instrumental and calculative. [T]rust 
[is]… willingness, in the expectation of beneficial outcomes, to make oneself 
vulnerable to another based on a judgment of similarity of intentions or values. 
Confidence is the belief, based on experience or evidence (e.g., past performance), 
that certain future events will occur as expected. (p. 786) 
Investor Complacence 
The 2000s’ enormity of scandalous corporate behavior perpetrated through 
asymmetric deception and fraud provides ample evidence of the insatiable investor 
conceding confidence and trust, only to be disappointed and disadvantaged repeatedly. 
The statistics are revelatory, with whistle blower filings increasing 525%, from 6400 
monthly in 2001 to in excess of 40,000 monthly in 2004 (Brewer, 2007). Paradoxically, 
the markets continued to expand at a torrid pace reflecting little trace of investor 
antipathy or caution. This attitudinal disconnect is what market commentators and 
theorists described as cognitive dissonance, where market participants contrive reasons to 
validate the irrationality of their beliefs and actions (Antoniou, Doukas & 
Subrahmanyam, 2013; Brewer, 2007). Antoniou et al. (2013), are aptly illustrative in 
suggesting that in many cases of acquiescence, investors react minimally or wishfully to 
information that is inconsistent with their perspectives. 
Compounding the notion of investor perceptual selectivity is the application and 
reliance on the doctrine of materiality (Padfield, 2009), where disclosures by corporate 
leaders, even when highly embellished, could be considered immaterial. Explicated 
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through the rubric of the puffery doctrine, sellers/disseminators of information under the 
guise of simple sales talk are shielded from liability, for reason that purveyors are likely 
to perfunctorily exaggerate the qualitative nature and value of representational 
statements, a finding supported by the Massachusetts Supreme Court in 1887 (Padfield, 
2009). Given this doctrine, the investor would be advised and presumed to exercise the 
requisite skepticism by adopting the dictum, caveat emptor. Empirical evidence, 
nonetheless, suggests the investor appears drawn to a behavior that subordinates 
cognitive rationalization to one that is eminently affective. This is singularly reflected in 
the observations of Schwepker and Good (2013) (in citing Cohen, 2008) which 
highlighted findings across 19 countries that reflected pervasiveness and ongoing levels 
of cheating and dishonesty in contemporary business environments as compared to a 
decade earlier. Similarly, a prior survey conducted by Time/CNN found that 71% of 
polled participants believed that ordinary CEOs were less principled and honest than the 
average person (George, 2002).  
Prudence and Animal Spirits  
Having articulated the dispositional premises of ‘risk neutrality, expedience, and 
bounded rationality’ Chiles and McMackin (1996) argued the inextricable nature of trust 
and risk as indispensable elements to the decision making process. Arguably, there are 
investors whose behaviors differ in the pursuit of their financial objectives as they are 
driven by a myriad of ideational formulations underpinnned by their level of uncertainty. 
Akerlof and Shiller (2009) identified the tendency towards affectivity as perceptions and 
emotion, which serve to rouse investors in the aggregate as they fashion their respective 
strategies. In his exposition, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, John Locke 
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echoed Keynes’s invocation of Newton’s animal spirits, in suggesting that as it pertains 
to financial markets, investors were often driven by more than a dispassionate and 
mechanized analysis of expected outcomes (Walsh, 2008). Locke, in his explication, 
proffered the enigmatic nature of animal spirits and suggested that there is basic rationale 
which it in fact defies, and that for the most part, it is largely incalculable (Walsh, 2008).  
Uncertainty and Asymmetry 
Broadly, investor results are a product of the many elements that bear upon the 
decision making process. Substantively, market theory stipulates the notion of full and 
complete availability of information to investors, an ideal seldom attained, and one that is 
by objective measure, highly impractical (Chang, 2014 ; Khan & Hildreth, 2004). 
Further, buyers and sellers, even as they are presumed to have perfect information, rarely 
and most pratically do not, such that asymmetric failures are likely to occur according to 
Khan and Hildreth. Milgrom and Roberts (1987) liken the irrationality inherent in the 
belief of perfect information, and hence complete symmetry, to a game of cards where all 
participants are privy to pertinent information. With there being no uncertainty, there is 
little incentive to wager in the absence of risk, assuming a zero-sum game. In the context 
of investments, an investor’s willing participation in the capital markets, implies the 
exercising of a preference for potentially more money as opposed to less, inferring 
recognition and acceptance of some levels of asymmetry as a tradeoff. This paradigm 
aligns with the acknowledgement of an idealized notion of investing, perhaps in one 
respect, as a non zero-sum game proposition. Speaking game-theoretically and assuming 
risk is limited to the extent of the investment, the investor is willing to accept all possible 
payoffs even with the factuality of asymmetrical information (e.g. see Domansky & 
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Kreps, 1999). The key consideration for the investor, esentially, are the levels of 
asymmetry deemed acceptable based on propensities of risk tolerance or loss aversion, 
where there can be heightened sensitivity to negative outcomes much more so than to the 
alternative (Benartzi & Thaler,1995; Fisher & Montalto, 2011; Prentice, 2012). 
Information Moderates Decision Making 
There have been copious research findings that have stipulated a number of 
formal behavioral theories supporting investment decision-making. Less formally, 
increased access to information has been known to improve confidence in judgment 
(Baker & Dumont, 2014), even when it has been suggested, in some cases, to seldom 
improve the accuracy of judgment (Arkes, Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Gill, Swann, & 
Silvera, 1998; Smith, 2010). This in a sense implies that judgment ultimately moderates 
decision making. As reinforcement of this basic precept, it has been noted that the quality 
of information received has been highly correlated to the quality of decisions made 
(Abosede & Oeni, 2011). As further noted by Abosede and Oeni (2011), the prospect of 
ongoing capital market expansion and ability for financial markets to thrive is in many 
ways dependent on the veracity and usefulness of the information gleaned by the 
investor. Moreover, the quality of information dissemination, alters the psyche and 
behavior of the investor, which in turn is key in promoting market efficiency (see 
Akerlof, 1970; Edmans, 2011). For the investor, levels of information asymmetry are 
essential in the overall consideration of liquidity in stock market equities (Chung et al., 
2010) particularly relating to ease of entry and egress. Underscoring this point, it has 
been shown that protections for the investor both legally and regulatorily, to include the 
veracity of disclosures in limiting asymmetry, reduces bid-ask spreads thereby lowering 
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the cost of market liquidity (Chung, 2006), a vital component in pricing and valuation 
consideration.  
Reaction to Market Information  
The crux of decision-making has been predicated on the investor’s ability to 
aggregate and analyze information to sufficiently satisfy or forecast outcomes. This is of 
course influenced by the quality of corporate governance and the certitude inspired by 
dissemination practices (Saravanamuthu, 2005; Turcsanyi & Sisaye, 2013). Hamberg, 
Mavruk, and Sjögren (2013) crystalized this issue in postulating that, investors are 
inclined to a strategically cautious approach by investing in stock investments with which 
they are familiar, a disposition that renders them captive to their own ideational device. 
Foremost attributions to and rational explanations of this approach concern exposure to 
information asymmetry which might be mitigated by the localized advantages in possible 
flows of information (Coval & Moskowitz, 1999, 2001).  
Corgnet, Kujal, and Porter (2013) expounded upon the anteceding concept of 
aversion ambiguity in highlighting the preference of individuals to engage in lotteries 
where the probabilities of outcome are known as opposed to unknown. Of significant 
note, the investor’s perception plays a key role in behavioral disposition. In assessing the 
perspicuity and influence of decision-influencing practices, as epitomized by the last 
decade’s stock market crises, George (2002) (former CEO of Medtronic, Inc.) in a speech 
delivered to the Denver Forum provided a compelling illustration of what was then the 
status quo, when he observed that: “…idealized high profile personalities…were made 
into heroes; [there was the equation of] wealth with success and image with leadership; 
[and there was] veneration of the ‘flash in the pan’ [at the expense of acknowledging] 
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real [leadership] success…” (p. 792). Thus the investor, as noted by a number of scholars, 
invariably became hostage to the wiles of the market’s socio-psychological complexion, 
pulled and pushed by forces of interest rates, consumer confidence (Shiller, 1984), the 
cadence of the business cycle, market liquidity (Naes, Skjeltorp, & Ødeggard, 2011), and 
a host of other fundamental and technical factors. 
With over 30% of stock investments owned by noninstitutional investors, the pool 
of investors is far from homogenous (Brossard, Lavigne, & Sakinc, 2013) in that they are 
seperated by gender, strategy/philosophy, education, influence, sophistication/skill, and 
financial resources. Diverse as they are, the commonality of purpose and intersection of 
interest coheres around making money. These varied noninstitutional investment groups 
are sensitive not only to efficiencies and the myriad of behavioral theories espoused by 
academics, but are similarly influencd by paradigm shifts, variant social attitudes, fads, 
politics, fashion, etcetera according to Shiller (1984). This is evident in the ways in which 
individuals exchange information, digest investment literature, and become apprised of 
each others successes and failures (Shive, 2010). Friedman (1984) in accordance with this 
view, suggested that investors observation of the dynamism in social attitudes is keenly 
associated with the perception and formulation of investment thesis and securities 
valuation levels, even as these perceived valuations, in instances, disconnect from the 
realities of fair-market values (e.g. see Ofek & Richardson, 2003; Sornette, 2012).  
More formally, the utilization of material non-public information (Lekkas, 1998; 
for opposing points of view refer McGee, 2010) has never been more prevalent and 
concerning as evinced by the SEC’s prosecution of 168 cases, the highest level of 
enforcement of illegal insider trading in any three-year period in its history (U.S. 
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Securuties and Exchange Commission, 2013). The voracious appetite for information 
highlights most emphatically the role and responsibility of corporate disseminations in 
affecting the speculative investors perception, confidence, and tendencies in decision-
making.  
Behavioral Models/Psychology of Decisions 
Behavioral Considerations 
The actions of the investor have been largely framed by literature on psychology 
drawn primarily from behavioral economics and behavioral finance, centering around the 
decision-maker as well as the substance and interests served by the decisions made. The 
decision making process, it has been contended, should be made with measured 
ratiocination and with mindfulness of risk-reward considerations (Earle, 2009). If this is 
so, rational choice-related theories suggest, all investors having access to the same 
information might conceivably arrive at the same decisions. In theory, this presupposes 
that (a) investors have similar experiences and intellectual capacities to comprehend and 
structure decision making, (b) available qualitative and quantitative data are attended 
with the same precision and scrutiny, and (c) investors are similarly oriented with respect 
to the temporal immediacy and utilization of information, that is, there is similarity in 
decision-timing. This in many respects is borne out by, Agarwal, Gabaix, Driscoll, and 
Laibson (2009) in their examination of the quality of financial decision making in which 
they identified several factors including the principal imperative of psychology as it 
relates to cognitive functions.  
Annexing the decision-making operation is investor sentiment as expressed 
through confidence, an essential variable that is tied to degrees of optimism or pessimism 
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(Chen, 2011; Lemmon & Portniaguina, 2006). Indeed levels of optimisim or pessimism 
are key drivers in the decision making calculus for capital market investors. Given the the 
imperative of behavioral finance, there are many arguments that have contemplated the 
broad composition of market participants and complexities of information architecture as 
essential catalysts in weighing on investment outcomes and the investors’ decision-
making. 
Forefronting behavioral tendencies as with the decision-making prosesses, 
behavioral finance theory positions the investor to assess the proximate risk to reward 
analytic using probabilistic determinants that define potential outcomes as articulated in 
prospect theory (Hens & Vlcek, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory 
postulates that the value of returns and losses are rationalized more so on outcomes 
relative to specific benchmarks such as the entry points in capital market investments 
(Hens & Vlcek, 2011). Fundamentally, behavioral finance describes investors as non-
rational agents in their cognitive perceptions of the capital markets. Explicating one facet 
of this notion Altman (2010) in citing Thaler posits, “[b]ehavioral finance argues that 
some features of asset prices are mostly plausibly interpreted as deviations from 
fundamental value, and that these deviations are brought about by the presence of traders 
[investors] who are not fully rational” (p. 192). 
The many psychological machinations encompassing the various behavioral 
perspectives embedded in the markets, affords a heuristic-based or technical approach to 
analysis. Technical analysis is a catchall for a number of largely quantitative investing 
techniques (Brock, Lakonishok & LeBaron, 1992; Elena-Dana, & Ioana-Cristina, 2013). 
Given bounded rationality constraints affecting even the well informed investor, technical 
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analysis as a tool provides a solutions-based resource that can be utilized with a modest 
investment in effort and information costs (Kirkpatrick II & Dahlquist, 2010). On the 
opposing and more traditional end of the continuum are fumdamental decision-makers 
whose prognostications are an amalgam of guesstimation/or average opinions and 
findings gleaned from informative disseminations (Elena-Dana & Ioana-Cristina, 2013; 
Pixley, 2002). 
Fundamental analyses. To reiterate, with the many phases and approaches 
available, professional investors including retail NIAIs, have utilized the anteceding 
fundamental approaches as a staple in decision-making (see Biondi & Giannoccolo, 
2013; Graham and Dodd, 1934; Malkiel, 2003; Satchwell, 2005). In light of the 
regulatory reporting and public disclosure requirements, investors are heavily reliant on 
information with which to formulate analyses. Forerunning the process and providing the 
impetus for the process of fundamental analyses as an important valuation metric were 
the findings of Graham and Dodd, whose focus on the assessment of intrinsic value was 
centered on the enterprise’s financial idiosyncrasies (Mitchell, 2009). Gordon and 
Shapiro (1956) provided supporting validation with the formulation of dividend discount 
theory, a valuation model that has become one of the most celebrated foundations for 
equity value computation. Kabasinskas and Macys (2010) elaborated the pragmatism of 
the fundamental approach by suggesting that investors utilizing a fundamental approach 
to analysis, will examine the financial records of companies, such as income statements, 
balance sheets, and cashflow flows statements. Given the gravity ascribed to the veracity 
of financial statements the importance of accuracy in reporting and disclosure are 
paramount. 
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A systematic approach to technical analyses. Technical analysis contemplates 
stock valuation, analyses of historical chart patterns, market volume (Hodnett & Heng-
Hsing, 2012), open interest, and a host of other methodological indicators. With capital 
markets as complex and unpredictable as they are, one prevailing view over the years was 
that markets were rational and reflected the many information streams as they became 
embedded into equity prices. Central to the technical analyses discourse is Fama’s (1965) 
efficient market hypothesis (EMH) where its theorized strands incorporated weak-form, 
semi-strong form, and strong-form efficiencies as essential theoretical underpinnings. 
Sappideen (2008) astutely summarized the therory as follows: 
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) rests on three assumptions: (i) 
economically rational behaviour [sic] by market participants (utility maximization 
behaviour [sic]), (ii) homogenous expectations of participants in the marketplace 
and (iii) price movements based on the instantaneous transfer of information by 
arbitrageurs. (p. 326) 
Based on a presumption of market efficiency, there would be inordinate difficulty in 
achieving superior returns because past and current information streams on market 
performance have been imputed to existing price levels (Arnott, Li, & Warren, 2013; 
Borges, 2010; Kwon & Kish, 2002). The EMH principle also highlighted the dubiouness 
and possible futility in the predictive powers of cyclic patterns, and evinced the fact that 
extant opportunities, if any, would be quickly exploited by opportunistic investors, thus 
causing prices to revert to points of equilibria. Reinforcing the EMH notion, Hodnett and 
Heng-Hsing (2012) suggested that the effectiveness of technical strategies and 
mechanisms diminished with increased levels of market efficiency as experienced 
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investors behavior ultimately neutralize any advantage with the gain of expertise forged 
through continued practice. With a measure of prudence, Kwon and Kish (2002) also 
explained that a technical approach acknowledges the existence of some market 
inefficiencies making it plausible for savvy and opportunistic investors to profit from 
information lags and price patterns by acertaining investors’ appetite for the underlying 
equity.  
Contemporarily, the notion of market efficiency has been vigorously challenged 
by market skeptics (Sappideen, 2008; Willey, 2015). The 22.6% intra-day decline of the 
DJIA in 1987, for instance, along with the plunge of worldwide global indices, the 2007-
2009 mortgage-market debacle recording a 57% decline in equity prices, and other black 
swan events lacking foreseeability should not have occurred given the premise of EMH 
(Seigel, 2010). Moreover, questions of predictive failure and historically anomalous 
crash-related information not imputed to the markets would be an acknowledgement of 
analytical dereliction according to Seigel; the markets were rife with signals that should 
have been mitigated or vitiated by EMH. Siegel also argues the practicality and unrealism 
of EMH, but concedes that it is a touchpoint from which to comprehend a number of 
popular investment models. Arzac (1977) cited Umstead in the criticism of EMH semi-
strong form efficiency, where the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) 
Leading Composite Index was used as a benchmark indicator in determining the 
correlative effect on stock prices. Arzac also observed that, utilization and construction of 
a trading strategy underpinned by an autoregressive-moving average model was 
beneficial in outperforming buy-and-hold strategy applications, with some exceptions, an 
outcome that stands in contrast to the premised EMH convention.  
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Utilizing a technical strategy, Coe and Laosethakul (2010) analyzed 576 stocks 
across the S&P Midcap 400, S&P 100, and NASDAQ 100. In applying a series of tests 
with arithmetic moving averages (AMA), relative strength indices, and stochastic 
oscillators there were findings that no single strategy reliably predicted market prices and 
the ability to outperform. Specifically, Coe and Laosethakul (2010) recommended a 
fundamental approach to preliminary equity selection bolstered by technical treatment as 
a validating and performanace enhancing tool. With differing outcomes, Kwon and Kish 
(2002) utilized t-test and residual bootstrap methodologies and found that a buy and hold 
approach benefited from a technical application/strategy. Brock, Lakonishok, and 
LeBaron (1992) similarly tested a strategy utilizing moving average (MA) and trading 
range breaks proxied against the Dow Jones Index. The findings supported the viability 
of a technical approach. A number of statistical nonparametric kernel regression 
techniques were utilized on a series of U.S. stocks from 1962-1996 and technical chart 
formations including head-and-shoulders and double-bottoms were found to exhibit 
predictive patterns (Lo, Mamaysky, & Wang, 2000; Wang, Zeng, & Li, 2010). 
Technical trends. Inferential statistics have been cardinal to technical analyses. 
Neftci (1991) (also see Falbo & Pelizzari, 2011) examined technical trading principles 
and concluded that most advantageous outcomes were derived from Wiener-
Kolmogorov-type time-vector autoregressive models, where the predictive attributes of 
stochastical systems/operations generated effective results. In the quest to identify a 
technical trading system that exhibited reasonable predictability and performed reliably, 
neural network application was adopted as a principal instrument in forecasting equity 
prices. As noted by Fernandez-Rodrıguez, Gonzalez-Martel, and Sosvilla-Rivero (2000); 
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Khashei and Bijari (2010); Li and Ma, (2010); Van Eyden (1997) and others, the 
evolution of artificial neural networks have created an apparatus for rationality and 
sentience in the treatment of nonlinear chaotic systems, to the extent that computing 
signals are used as primary forcasting mechanisms in lieu of traditional approaches. 
Consonantly, Gencay (1998) applied technical testing to ascertain the linear and non-
linear predictive capabilities of facile trading regimens on stock prices of the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average Index between 1897 and 1988. In the process, moving averages (MA) 
generating buy/sell cues were key in validating the efficacy of nonlinear predictability. 
Lucke (2003) analyzed the complexity of technical trading patterns in the foreign 
currencies market utilizing a basket of currencies between March 1973 and June 1999. 
Emphasizing the imperative of volatilty clustering, smoothed trends, trend reversals, and 
support and resistance levels, all of which are integral to shaping technical head-and-
shoulder formations, Lucke concluded that there was a dearth in excess profitability. 
Acknowledging the conflicting perspectives on the theory of efficient markets Choe, 
Krausz, and Nam (2011) point to the inconsistency in nonlinearities to provide accurate 
trading signals. This notwithstanding, there was contention that some trading patterns 
were deemed asymmetrical, to the extent that they are nonlinear and exhibit 
intelligibility, coherence, and consistency and may provide opportunities that could be 
profitably exploited.  
As discussed, there are enormous challenges with respect to selection and 
utilization of an approach that serves as a venerable or catchall strategy of investing, void 
of informationally asymmetric noise. The implictions of the efficient market theory 
(EMH) eliminates potential excess returns, by representing that in weak-form efficiency 
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all past price considerations have been previously factored into current equity prices 
(Fama, 1965). Random walk propensities imply that equity prices are similarly 
distributed and are situated independently of each other (Lim & Brooks, 2010) such that a 
stock’s short­run price characteristics are evolving and lack predictability because of 
competitive price discovery; more precisely, the investment analyst community’s 
judgments, earnings potential, and and technical analysis are pointless (Malkiel, 1999; 
Malkiel, 2012) as stock prices have already incorporated all current knowledge. The very 
nature of the precept has suggested that absent additional unreported information or the 
elevation of beta (risk), there is very little possibility of outperforming the markets 
(Dzikevicius & Stabuzyte, 2012), which in part may possibly explain the prevalence of 
asymmetry. 
Psychological Agents 
Psychographics  
A fundamental goal of behavioral finance is attempting to understand the complex 
psychological sensibilities and proprieties of the investor (Smith & Harvey, 2011), 
particularly in their decision-making, strategy formulation, and disposition to risk. 
Beyond the purely cognitive domain, personality-type and gender-related essentials are 
critical attributes of the individual investor that may serve to identify behavioral bias 
(Pompain & Longo, 2004; Sahi, Arora, & Dhameja, 2013). Bashir, Fazal, Shabeer, 
Aslam, and Jelani (2013) referenced the notion of psychographics in remarking on the 
significance of the role played by personality and gender in the interpretation of 
information, the structuring of investment theses, and the formulation of behavioral 
biases. 
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Irrational exhuberance and market dislocations. Robert Shiller, Yale 
University professor, has a keen understanding of the behaviors that drive investor 
psychology. Shiller’s initial prognosticative injunctive of irrational exuberance, also the 
title of his book, ocurred in 2000, just one year preceding one of the ten worst stock 
market crashes in U.S. history, where up to April 2001, investors lost in excess of $5.7 
trillion (Drenann, 2008). In further elaborating the phenomenon of irrational exuberance 
and investor behavior as it relates to the environ of real estate investments, Crowe (2009) 
accordant with Shiller (2007) observed: 
[I]t does not appear possible to explain the boom in terms of fundamentals such as 
rents or construction costs. A psychological theory, that represents the boom as 
taking place because of a feedback mechanism or social epidemic...fits the 
evidence better. (p. 3) 
Shiller’s observation proved prescient in identifying the 2007 housing market crisis, 
where investors again lost hundreds of billions of dollars. Shiller attributes his uncanny 
circumpection, not to/of economic theory or mathematical formulae, but to the 
understanding of human behavior, which enabled him to pin-point bubbles and excesses 
(Frick, 2009). Nobel laureates Shiller and Akerlof have also explicated the notion of trust, 
fear, and overconfidence and the ways in which investors can become harmed by 
ignoring these and other vital signs. 
Rational theory ideal. A large body of research in the field of decision-making 
under uncertainty has been seemingly inspired by rational theory precepts (e.g., Bagassi, 
2006; Sahi et al., 2013; Tversky & Kahneman, 1986). The notion of rationality as 
enumerated by the theory, relating to choice and decision making, presumes an approach 
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that weighs outcomes against consequences (Bastardi & Shafir, 2000; Eliaz & Schotter, 
2010). Research has also shown that optimal considerations of rational thinking is more 
idealized and often not grounded in reality (Thomas & Rajendran, 2012). De Bondt 
(1998) underscored this notion in elaborating, the differences in behavior between what 
psychologists have considered to be the hypothetical economic man and the real man, 
and the consequent challenges in utilizing the model as an incontrovertible descriptive 
and representation of decision making (De Bondt & Thaler, 1994; Mishina, Dykes, 
Block, & Pollock, 2010) as practiced in real world circumstances. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1977) have examined intuitive judgments and decision-making, albeit at a level 
where there is collaboration between experts and analysts, and found the pervasiveness of 
biases pertaining to over confidence in assessments and non-regressiveness in prediction. 
Where there are collaborative instances in decision-making, there is the benefit of 
potentially diverse judgments, wide ranging opinions, and prescriptions that may not be 
easily extrapolated to the average retail/NIAI investor. 
At the individual level, experimental psychology has yielded evidence that 
subjects tended to overeact to new information and in fact decisionally ascribed greater 
value to more recent information than prior base rate information (De Bondt & Thaler, 
1985). Further, De Bondt (1998) has held that results attained are driven by and are a 
product of the decision-making process, where in the extant case the process is subject to 
the force of corporate reportings. In the ideal, one of the many interesting questions to be 
contemplated centers on the role played by institutions and their disseminating practices 
in shaping the opinions of the investing public. De Bondt (1998) and Mortreuil (2010), 
have also presented a contrary perspective and have painted an unflattering picture of 
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investors, suggesting their inability to engage in behaviors that meet the modicum of 
common-sense standards.  
Personality-Type Influences 
Behavioral finance elucidates the union of psychology and financial and 
economic theory, providing explanatory insights to the intricasies of financial decision 
making, and in large measure, providing exemplars of the irrationality, that often 
underlies the cognitive process (Zaidi & Tauni, 2012). Having examined the effects of 
personality makeup, theorists findings have affirmed its influence in driving decision-
making (Durand, Newby, & Sanghani, 2008; Heinstrom, 2010). Barnwall developed a 
model centering on two types of personalities: (a) active investors who are more risk 
oriented and (b) passive investors who are more calculating, conservative, and risk 
adverse (Zaidi & Tauni, 2012). A subsequent examination of Barnwall’s findings by 
Bailard, Biehl, and Kaiser yielded the eponymous Five-Way Model (BB&K). The model 
principally highlights investor behavioral preferences and the idiosyncrasies of the 
individual’s personality that influences the choice of timing and selection of types of 
investments.  
The BBK model identifies investment tendencies by defined categories much like 
a functional Keirsey-Bates personality inventory identifier. The Five-way model 
expanded classification of investment personalities incorporating the initial confidence 
and method-oriented approach and placing them along two axes. Utilizing these axes, 
five distinct personality expressions and behavioral correlates/typologies were identified: 
Adventure, Celebrity, Individualist, Guardian, and Straight Arrow (Zaidi & Tauni, 2012). 
All had distinct attributes that served as primary influencers in the decision making 
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dynamic framed around the investor’s perception. Forerunning the BB&K model, were 
other personality models, one principally developed by Norman (1963) whose study was 
influenced by the works of Cattell (1947, 1957) and Tupes and Christal (1957, 1958, 
1961). Norman’s study centering on a system of peer nominations, conceptualized the 
phenotypic characteristics of personalities to include the primary designators: 
Extroversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Emotional Stability, and Culture. Each 
factor had additional orthigonal elements that laid the groundwork for a taxonomical 
model of personality descriptives.  
Pompian (2011), in setting aside mathematical theories and market models, 
conducted an exhaustive study in behavioral finance. Biases identified and theorized were 
principally cognitive, having subtype labels of belief perseverance and information 
processing, with elements of emotional clustering. Focusing on investor biases and 
market irrationality, Pompian found succeptibility to prediction overconfidence, where 
investors unscrupuously overlooked risk characteristics of investments. As a 
consequence, investors became succeptibile to certainty overconfidence; believing they 
had superior investment skills they engaged in less diversification and churned their 
investments excessively according to Shleifer (2000) (in citing Fischer and Black, 1986). 
This behavior was particularly in evidence during the technology bubble of the late 
1990s. Investor subjection was further explicated by Baker and Nofsinger (2002), and 
Leahy (2012) who examined investor vulnerabilities relating to cognitive and emotional 
pathologies. Creating a number of groupings that reflected the investors’ weakness in the 
context of psychological disposition, that is, how they thought and felt, Baker and 
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Nofsinger (2002) focused their inquiry on prescriptive solutions as moderative 
underpinnings to social influences that promoted investor misjudgments.  
Traditional behavioral models, in the ideal, often epitomize and conceptualize 
frameworks of rationality, intended to demarcate theoretic standard approaches to market 
efficiencies, purposed to improving the probabilistic likelihod of attaining desired 
outcomes (Baker & Nofsinger, 2002). Yet, systematic deviations of the investor from the 
dicta of economic rationality have positioned behavioral finance models as more suitably 
aligned with commonplace investor disposition. Given the presumption that the 
investor’s behavior is subject to irrational influences, including psychological bias and 
emotion, they are likely to commit decisional errors ranging from minor to catastrophic 
(Baker & Nofsinger, 2002; Sahi et al., 2013). As a key illustrative, former Fed Chairman, 
Greenspan, according to Baldwin (2011), said of investors and the 2007 financial crises 
in a BBC interview:  
[T]he unquenchable capability of human beings when confronted with long 
periods of prosperity [is] to presume that [sic] that will continue, and they begin 
to take speculative excesses with the consequences that have dotted the history of 
the globe basically since the beginning of the 18th century. Go back to the south 
sea bubble, go back to the tulip bubble before. It’s human nature, unless someone 
can find a way to change human nature, we will have more crises. (p. 126) 
In essence, investment outcomes, be it a product of investor psychographics or simply the 
response to corporate disclosures, asymmetrical or otherwise, are the responsibility of 
respective market participants. A number of studies have provided ample evidence that 
past financial disasters and the conditions that caused them are pratical foreshadowings of 
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possible future events. This is precisely the lemons problem that George Akerlof (1970) 
described, where sellers are incented to market, for instance, sub standard investments or 
secure a trading advantage in whatever ways possible. Commensurately, the investor’s 
discretion and intelligence should be paramount in the safeguard, protection, and 
assurance of his interest. 
Baldwin (2011) asserts the over-reliance by investors and regulators on market-
place mechanics, by presuming the laissez faire environment can be successfully 
managed through overt policies of deregulation and in many instances the absence of 
needed regulation. Others suggest investor culpability and that investors were largely to 
blame (Mortreuil, 2010). On one occasion, the Association for Investment Management 
and Research, sponsor of the CFA designation, in a featured webcast of professional 
securities analysts, pension fund managers, and public officials asserted that investors 
were significantly at fault for feeding the hyper-manic frenzy that led to the bubble. 
Notwithstanding these remarks, the organization conceded that regulatory and 
institutional regimes could have done more to mitigate the problem (Goodhart, 2008). 
Daniel et. al. (2002) and Pompian (2012) astutely point to the implications of personal 
conviction and the extraneous influence of emotions, biases, and exibition of self-
interested behavior in making economic choices. Daniel et. al. (2002) have particularly 
advocated ex ante government regulation and private standards for enhanced 
reporting/disclosure, participative efficiency, and a more comprehensive palette of 
choices. 
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Heuristics 
Heuristics are highly germane when making judgments and have featured 
prominently in describing proclivites and tendencies that have influenced investor 
decision making (e.g., Dreman, 2004; Pompian, 2012). Significant works by Daniel 
Kahneman and Amos Tversky since the 1970s, have elevated the discourse and shifted 
the paradigm in the field of psychology particularly in the domain of cognitive heuristics, 
where decision making mechanics have become more flexible and adaptive. 
Conceptually, heuristics describe the propensities of subjects to apply rule of thumb 
practice, purposed by expeditiousness and convenience to the decision making process 
(Bingham & Eisenhardt, 2011). Here, there is evidence of bounded rationality, where 
there are time constraints as well as the inability to easily organize and compute complex 
and multiple streams of information (Thaler, 1983). Take the First (TTF) method, a 
process advocating the likely superiority of the first option, has been applied reflexively 
and economically to decision making in many fields including sports (Hepler & Feltz, 
2012). Nevertheless, despite the fact that the heuristic approach contemplates 
environment, experience, strategy, and situational commonalities, the approach also 
implies the application of incomplete use of information, a process that increases 
susceptibility to a myriad of decisional errors (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). 
Decisional errors might be caused or exacerbated, for instance, in cases of conditionality, 
where unstated assumptions, such as wars, adverse economic events, are not imputed to 
the decision making calculus (Kahneman & Tversky, 1973). Considering the inherent and 
systematic biases that pervade the descriptive properties of heuristics, investors are 
frequently disposed to making judgments that are inclined to normativity and are 
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similarly subject to systematic biases (Aduda, Odera, & Onwonga, 2012; Thaler, 1983). 
Of the many tenets of heuristics, Kahneman and Tversky have principally enumerated 
three key chance approaches as availability, representativeness, and anchoring (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1972b; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Morewedge & Kahneman, 
2010). 
Availability. Availability heuristic subjects consider the frequency of events, or 
catalogue events based on cognitive dexterity or speed of recollection. This approach is 
prone to bias as highly publicized events are prioritized or assigned greater weight. In 
social benefit debates, for example, most welfare recipients are presumed to be African 
Americans as opposed to Caucasians (for an informed discourse see Stichnoth & Van der 
Straeten, 2013). Similarly, as outlined by Loewenstein (1999) (in citing Loewenstein, 
1996), is the factor of visceral compulsion. Accordingly, the visceral nature of decision 
outcomes impact upon the construction of significance. Emotions such as hunger, thirst, 
fear, pain, anger, and drug craving, for instance, produce hyper sensations at the time of 
occurrence and are etched irrefragably into the conciousness. With the passage of time, 
memories diminish and impressions become less indelible. As with an addict, the 
investor’s decision making is at times perilously hinged to a system of prejudiced and 
unrealistic expectations (Loewenstein, 1999) stimulated by lure of visceral rewards 
(Ross, 2010). 
Representative. Representative heuristics are contextualized in terms of the ways 
in which situations conform to a similarity principle or are representative of perspectives 
and stereotypes (Kuhn, 2007; Lam, Liu, Wong, 2010). One such preconception is that 
CEOs are typically males and are in the majority Caucasian; that is, they are less women 
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and minorities, an apriori phenomenon that has perpetutated the convention of the glass-
ceiling, according to Kuhn (2007). Behavioral biases and decision-making contextualized 
to heuristics invite dissonance when frequencies and similarities do not align with pre-
conceived schemas and subjects/investors have the propensity to disregard useful 
statistics (Lakshmi, Visalakshmi, Thamaraiselvan & Senthilarasu, 2013; Thaler, 1983; 
Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). 
Anchoring. Anchoring and adjustment is a psychological label that describes the 
decision maker’s inclination to be overly reliant on one source of information in decision 
formulation (Andersen, 2010). Routinely, investors have based decision making on 
outdated figures and statistics as well as incorporated information with little meaning to 
their investment theses. A chief characteristic of anchoring is selectivity in focusing on 
certain aspects of the information stream such that its weighted value stunts almost all 
other considerations (Russo & Carlson, 2002). Proponents for instance, select an 
anchoring heuristic such as a recent high in the price of a stock. A retracement in the 
stock price or adjustment is conveniently and shrewdly viewed as a buying opportunity, 
perhaps for reasons of perceived undervaluation rather than a change in the stock’s 
overall fundamental prospect. If the stock were to be purchased at the initial retracement 
point and continued to trend lower, the adjustment point selected would have been 
deemed insufficient/imprecise and would have reflected a failing to move sufficiently 
away from the anchor, unless there was a deliberate strategy in place to ladder into the 
ownership of the stock, thereby rendering the anchor point as non-critical. 
One phenomenon of anchoring is the aversion to loss or disposition effect where 
investors divest themselves of winning investments and stubornly retain losing 
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investments (Hens & Vlcek, 2011; Khoroshilov & Dodonova, 2007; Kaustia, 2010). An 
even more inscrutable attribute of anchoring is that decision makers such as investors, 
might deny biases or be completely oblivious of the degree to which their judgments are 
impacted by the anchoring phenomenon. Further, even with effort at curtailment, these 
anchors often continue to be psychologically arresting where cognitive aversion should 
have tempered or rejected such influences, identifying them as being undesirable. In the 
case of the investor, anchoring has been cited as an explanatory descriptor of behavioral 
tendencies such as overconfidence, egocentric biases, and other bombastic behaviors 
(Russo & Carlson, 2002; Sahi & Arora, 2012). 
Framing. Framing is a cognitive response that guides the investor’s preference to 
risk-seeking and/or risk-aversive behavior against the backdrop of potential losses or 
gains (Lakshminarayanan, Chen, & Santos, 2011). Decidedly, framing describes a choice 
behavior of the decision maker and its inextricable link to the ways in which problems 
are presented and perceived (Gentry, Wiener, & Burnett, n.d.), whether experientially or 
by ratiocination, and the influences that catalyze a variety of factors in shaping the 
process. Some of these factors, according to Russo and Carlson (2002) include: 
[A]ccountability (Huber & Seiser, 2001; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999), analogies 
(Klein, 1998), boundaries and constraints, both stated and presumed (Bazerman et 
al. 2001; Knoblich et al., 1999), decision importance (Billings & Scherer, 1988; 
Tyszka, 1998), points of comparison (Hinsz et al., 1997), a requisite sequence of 
subordinate choices (Dawes, 1998), and whether the decision requires that one 
option be selected or multiple options be rejected (Chernev, 2001; Dhar & 
Wertenbroch, 2000). (p. 14) 
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The behavioral biases of framing, in this instance,  pertain to the consumers selection of 
financial products (e.g., insurance policies/premiums and fund investments). Johnson, 
Hershey, and Meszaros (1993) (citing Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) provide insights 
regarding two vital considerations. First, there is the premise that assessment is made 
based on specific or referenced benchmarks. Second, loss aversion assumes a critical 
imperative to the extent that a decision agent could be more greatly harmed by a loss than 
be gratified with a gain of a corresponding amount. Certainty-equivalence is also found to 
moderate attitudes to risky behavior when contexts are considered across the ways in 
which propositions are framed. Such might be characterized, emblematically, by differing 
views of the gamble proposition of the lottery, where risk is essentially incurred, as 
opposed to the purchase of insurance products or investments where risk is intended to be 
mitigated or transferred away (Hershey, Kunreuther, & Schoemaker,1982). 
Rational Behavior Theory 
Behavioral finance has chronicled social cognition and the investor’s decision-
making premised on the academic precept of rational behavior. It has also been 
represented more practicably as a process of irrationality where tendencies are driven by 
a methodology that diverts measurably from many of the patterned psychological 
behaviors and rational expectation postulations (De Bondt, Muradoglu, Shefrin, & 
Staikouras, 2008; Tversky, & Kahneman, 1986) professed by EMH and other similarly 
inspired theories. More certainly, investors’ decision making, subject to each individual’s 
discrete psychological complexity, is also underpinned by a myriad of exogenous 
measurements and factors (Durand et al., 2008) including reliance on information 
gleaned from disparate sources. 
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In delving into the notions of utility, judgment, decision making and risk under 
uncertainty, Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, and Welch (2001) have asserted that 
individuals/investors subjectively conduct some analyses of potential outcomes of choice 
alternatives and integrate findings into a decision-making framework, inferring that the 
process is grounded in fundamental rationality. This argument is supported by the 
findings of many academicians including Biswas (2009), who suggests that the purposive 
nature of rational decision making is calculated and aimed at vetting and analyzing 
information in order to optimize expected utility. Nobel laureate, Gary Becker, an early 
adherent and champion of the rational choice precept, concedes the abstract nature of the 
rational choice model, but defends its purpose and importance (Becker & Herfeld, 2012). 
The housing crisis of 2008 exposed the paradox in the theory that (a) people may, on one 
hand, not always behave rationally and that (b) with perverse canny, they indeed behaved 
rationally in responding to the allure of cheap money and lax lending standards, which 
created the incentive for massive sub-prime borrowing. The natural inferences are that 
there is difficulty in the model in determining precise expectations of the decision 
maker/investor, and the crisis exposed the unorthodoxy of irrational expectations.  
Ambivalence regarding the rational choice model, has been captured in Sen’s 
(1977) remark pertaining to the cross section of economic worldviews: “ (i) that the 
rational behavior theory is unfalsifiable, (ii) that it is falsifiable and so far unfalsified, and 
(iii) that it is falsifiable and indeed patently false” (p. 325); a position clearly postulated on 
the predicates of uncertainty and equivocation. Heinemann (2004) has been equally 
critical, pointing to a number of shortcomings in the rational expectations model; 
specifically, the degree to which all agents are presumed rational, and the question of 
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extant and consequent rationality if decision agents were not to have been presumed 
rational in the first instance. While ceding the prudence of rational notions tethered to the 
fact that all agents are presumed and may be rational, the same optimality in expectations 
could not be extended and would not hold in instances where agents presume behaviors 
that countermand the premise of rational expectations. Extending the idea of rationality, 
Sims, Neth, Jacobs, and Gray (2013) experimented with a group of twelve undergraduate 
students to investigate the effects of meloriation. Melioration is conceptually described as 
the election of an inferior short term gain in lieu of a more substanive long term payoff 
(Sims et. al., 2013). Each student was induced with the reward of prize of money. The 
findings were that the larger population of participants repeatedly made choices that were 
less than ideal or reward maximizing, and instead adopted a bias and strategy of 
systematic meloriation. Thus, the argument is that the irrationality in choice behaviors has 
contravened the precepts of rational choice behavior. 
Agency Imperatives 
Agency theory focuses on economic behavior that manifestly occurs as a product 
of informational advantage. Agency theory postulates that through informational 
dominance management has the power to leverage its knowledge and influence and 
engage in self-interested behavior at the owners’ expense (Beatty & Harris, 1998; Chen et 
al., 2012; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010). Ideally, managements’ role as 
fiduciaries would imply a calculated balance between the interests of owner 
investors/principals and agents/management. An espoused concern according to Kapucu 
(2007) is finding ways to pursuade agents to act in the best interest of principal investors 
in an environment rife with competing interests. Sullivan (2009) acknowledges the 
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conflicts of interest in the principal-agent relationship, particularly as it relates to equity 
prices in the financial markets. Sullivan also elaborated upon what is aptly described as a 
conflict-aware-culture, where the priorities of the short-term assume tremendous gravity 
to the extent that conflicts of interest are viewed trivially or ignored. Moreover, the very 
nature of the principal-agent relationship subject agents to the force of information 
asymmetry that cannot be stemmed contractually or be easily constrained because of the 
complexities of corporate governance praxis (Dawson, Watson, & Boudreau, 2011). 
Equally challenging in the agency dynamic is the quantity and/or the import of the 
resources at stake as well as the legal and social constraints against which these issues are 
framed. To varying degrees Goldman and Slezak (2006) and later Dicks (2012) for 
instance, have examined the assumptions of agency in the context of compensation as 
well as the impact of SOX and its effects on management’s stewardship. Goldman and 
Slezak (2006) concluded that even with the prudentiality of stock-based compensation in 
an effort to align all interests, management was often inclined towards the misallocation 
of the firm’s resources and engaged in asymmetry thereby misrepresenting the firm’s 
results. Dicks (2012) identified a correlation between poor governance and excess agent 
compensation. Anson (2012) offers sagacious insights by expounding potential 
divergence of principal-agent interest, such that, management may have a different view 
of the business than its shareholders or in many cases believe its priorities to be greater in 
significance than the constituents whom they represent. 
Agency Costs 
The enormity of what is at stake makes the issue of cost a paramount concern. 
Agency costs are as inevitable as as they are often spurious. Harada and Nguyen (2011) 
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and Jensen (1986) examined agency costs via divdend payments and the potential and 
inherent conflicts of interest. The reduction of resources available to management adds 
another level of public monitoring and scrutiny thereby imposing a measure of financial 
constraint against governance opportunism. For Harada and Nguyen (2011) there is an 
optimum payout allocation that acts to minimze agency costs. Similarly Chae, Kim, and 
Lee (2009) argued the effects of information asymmetry in a number of respects 
including its adjacency and relationship to the agency problems. The argument is thus 
framed: in order to foster discipline and curtail management’s waste, excess, and 
expropriation tendencies, greater payout ratios in dividends are encouraged. Even so, for 
its operation and in circumvention of shareholders desires, the firm and managers may 
opt to seek out external funding (given excessive dividend payments) which is often more 
costly and may in instances impose limitations on the firm’s financial priorities in terms 
of asset management and the way it attends its obligations. Such an approach is also 
likely to increase the firm’s cost of capital at owners’ expense.  
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, (2000a) have analyzed the 
machination of agency costs in an effort to grasp the complexities, detriments, and 
conflicts which impact the governance process. These empirically are reflected in need to 
monitor executive leadership as well as installing important shareholder protections in 
order to safeguard company assets from opportunism at the firm level, in an effort at 
curtailing potential managerial extraction (e.g., see Adjaoud & Ben‐Amar, 2010). As 
additional measures, internal governance policing, as with independent internal audit 
commitees, varied incentive schemes, and stratified decisional processes (Durand & 
Vargas, 2003) have also been viable approaches utilized. Grossman and Hart (1983) and 
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Hart (2011) have examined the principal-agent dynamic and broached the question of the 
degree of risk-sharing between principals and agents, querying its reasonable optimality 
and cost-benefit calculus, specifically regarding the structure of agents’ incentives. 
Warfieid, Wild, and Wild’s (1995) investigation of agency was fruitful in strengthening 
the discourse attenuating cost-benefit by explicating the notion of value-destruction, such 
as shirking, extraction of perquisites, and very possibly free-riding that exist in instances 
where management’s interest was sufficiently distanced from that of investors (Lee, 
2010). Consequently, the natural response to mitigating the inevitability of conflict was to 
align the interest of the agent and principal constituencies by creating performance based 
incentives tied to accounting and financial performance. Despite this effort, incentives 
packaged as cash bonuses, stock options, and other corporate perquisites have been 
subject to widespread abuse courtesy of accounting statement manipulation, 
compromised audit processes, and even outright fraud as evidenced at large companies 
such as Lucent, Xerox, Rite Aid, Cendant, Sunbeam, Waste Management, Enron 
Corporation, Global Crossing, WorldCom, Adelphia, and Tyco (Rezaee, 2005). 
Adverse Selection 
Asymmetrical disseminations by corporations have demonstrably cut a wide 
swath, impacting not only confidence, attitudes, and decision making propensities of the 
investor but have also becoming intricately bound to the principal-agent discourse. 
Adverse selection is often the product of shareholders misjudgment in contracting the 
services of an agent/manager who proves incapable, lacks the requisite industriousness, 
or is of dubious ethicality and discretion, which are vital quality-centered attributes for 
the position hired (Holt & Rutherford, 2012). Agents hired by investors are hence 
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opportunistically positioned to exploit the trust placed within the purview of the 
management station. Kara, Duyar, Christy, and McNeal (2006) observed that the agent’s 
prerogative may divert from the principal’s objective of maximizing earnings. This is 
evidenced particularly in environments of reciprocal incentives, that is, greater base 
salaries and lower scaled incentives (Englmaier & Leider, 2012). Similarly, the agent 
might engage in activities that tax the resources of the firm, such as excessive spending, 
actions that provoke reputational risk, and in extreme cases pursuing activities that may 
result in financial insolvency. A contemporary example of agent indiscretion is evidenet 
in the case of former CEO Al Dunlap, who installed turn-around reforms at Sunbeam that 
were financially draconian and impossibly myopic to the extent that his decisions 
foreclosed the company’s prospects of achieving any operational viability (Nirenberg, 
2004). 
Paralleling managerial opportunism, adverse selection framed within the 
principal-agent problem may be manifested through an agent’s oblivious disposition to 
the scope and demands of the engagement. Through faulty hiring, an agent may not 
reflect appropriate managerial dexterity, competency, or essential discretion needed to 
capably execute the requirements of the job unless the organization explicitly provides 
guidance and instruction in remediation of the circumstance (Von Thadden & Zhao, 
2012). In this respect, the authors suggest that, managerial rigidity and ideational bias 
may trap an agent into behavioral default, a circumstance best addressed through 
instruction and/or incentive in order to alleviate or mitigate adverse selection costs. 
Akerlof (1970) and more recently Lewis (2011) provided one such analogy by utilizing 
the used car market as a touchpoint in illustrating the presence of asymmetry between 
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buyer and seller in promoting price distortions of used cars relative to new cars, and its 
consequential adverse selection where inferior products vigorously competed with, 
crowded out, and disadvantaged superior products resulting in levels of market 
inefficiency. Correspondingly, agents who have in many cases burnished their reputations 
in like fashion, vigorously pursue opportunities as corporate leaders and once on board, 
have become abusive of their agency, often to the detriment of the the shareholder 
constituency (Liu, 2011). An approach that potentially safeguards and mitigates this 
hazard is intermediate contracting, which is suggested by Ragozzino and Moschieri 
(2014) to be an effective mechanism in thwarting adverse selection. 
The key underpinning is always that of asymmetric informational advantage 
where one party has information that others do not, in this case, management 
disseminates information to the public and regulatory agencies. Kyle (1985) represented 
this issue in his dynamic model, capturing private information as a valued currency to the 
insider and highlighting the positive gains accruing from the exploitation of this position. 
In researching investor, and by extrapolation, agents’ behavior, Bartram, Fehle, and 
Shrider (2008); Monda, Giorgino, and Modolin (2013); and others have found ample 
evidence of adverse selection. At issue is the use of information possessed by informed 
investors who have a better understanding of more accurate price points of securities 
within a market (Bardong, Bartram, & Yadav, 2010). With access to this information, 
these informed investors will be opportunistic and only invest under the most favorable 
circumstance thereby potentially earning above average returns. Such gains are typically 
at the expense of market makers and other less informed investors.  
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Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis (2008) have reported that in reducing 
asymmetric informational advantage, market makers are forced to increase bid-ask 
spreads based on the perception of the severity of the asymmetry problem in order to 
mitigate potential losses (for an opposing perspective see e.g., Sinha & Gadarowski, 
2010). In so doing, less informed investors are disadvantaged by market distortions and 
potentially reduced prospects for success. Foster and Viswanathan (1996) have similarly 
demonstrated that with certain degrees of signal correlation and heterogeneity of 
information, informed investors are advantageously positioned to profit; albeit that profits 
are predicated on the strength of correlative signals. Even so, alternative studies have 
shown that private identical information that is long-lived and recursive will become 
incorporated into market prices. Such information in the hands of informed investors, 
when acted upon will likely yield results of a diminishing nature to zero (Foster & 
Viswanathan, 1993; Holden & Subrahmanyam,1992). 
Regulations designed to assure parity in disclosure, improve investor confidence, 
and mitigate the effects of informational asymmetry have also factored in the adverse 
selection complex. In a study undertaken by Sidhu et al. (2008 ) Regulation FD was 
found to have increased adverse selection costs by approximately 36% as well as 
extending the life-cycle and value of inside information. Further, market critics have 
lamented the contraints imposed by added regulations in suggesting that information 
quality and quantity is likely to diminish, which they believe will impose a cost to the 
avereage retail investor. Contrary to this assertion, Lee, Rosenthal, and Gleason (2004) 
have shown that in the post Regulation FD market environment there was no discernable 
increase in adverse selection costs. Too, Eleswarapu, Thompson, and Kumar (2004) and 
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Cook and Tang (2010) investigated trading costs as it related to smaller less liquid issues 
and found that information asymmetry declined with the advent of Regulation FD. 
Moral Hazard 
An agent is privy to a firm’s private financial and operational prospects and is 
cognizant of his own professional and administrative capacities as fiduciary. With access 
to material non-public information, the agent has a duty to act lawfully and ethically in its 
use and dissemination. Through his actions, nonetheless, an agent may chose to 
surreptitiously misappropriate the firm’s informational proprieties and/or assets for his 
personal benefit, a behavior consistent with that of a moral hazard. Moral hazard, an ex 
post phenomenon, describes the conflicts of interest between a principal and agent where 
the agent is engaged in self-interested behavior in the allocation of the firm’s resources 
such that the principal is disadvantaged (Holt & Rutherford, 2012; Quadrini, 2004), as 
with disturbing financial news being deliberately suppressed even as ordinary investors 
acquire the stock at inflated prices. It is therfore reasonable to view information 
asymmetry as primordial to the agency-problem, as agents are vastly more informed 
about the business’s condition and prospect (Million & Thakor, 1986; Ben-Shahar & 
Logue, 2012). 
With perpetual exposure to moral hazard given principal/governance risk, 
investors may adopt varied approaches to include increased ratiocination of their 
exposure to the capital markets, heightening the degree of circumspection of the types of 
securities in which they elect to invest, and being more deliberative regarding the 
modality of investing. One such approach is greater use of intermediaries, who are 
advantageously positioned in experience and resources to screen for potential hazards, as 
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opposed to conducting direct open market purchases. Where there is pervasive threat of 
moral hazard, the investor may elect to inject capital in stages, as in the case of venture 
investments, where a phased or laddering approach is utilized so as to be able to surveil, 
assess, and make determinations as to satisfactory progress while retaining the option to 
discretionarily terminate financing (Gompers, 1995; Wang & Zhou, 2004). There is also 
the strategy of contract sharing, but this only serves to mitigate potential losses as an 
agent’s access to a firm’s financial resources renders a principal incapable of completely 
restricting or thwarting the agent’s capacity at expropriation. Complementing this 
finding, Stoughton (1993) and Sheng and Yang (2010) investigated informational 
asymmetry and moral hazard in incentive contracts that were specific to portfolio 
management/managerial compensation and found linear contracts to encourage 
underexpenditure/shirking by the agent in the acquisition of superior information. 
Shirking occurs when the agent is disinclined to render first best-effort, principally 
because the structure of his contract may provide disproportionate or limited incentives, 
or even discentives at levels where the hurdle rate or minimum rate required before 
management incentive fees are earned, for instance, mitigates performance. In the same 
instance, quadratic-contracts (see e.g., Bhattacharya and Pfleiderer, 1985; Dybvig, 
Farnsworth, & Carpenter, 2010) were found to ameliorate this problem by incenting 
agents to be substantially more committed to the procuration and optimization of high-
value information where advice is provided directly to the principal investor, a process 
that encourages greater transparency. 
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Regulatory Culture 
The banking industry, with its proximity to financial risk, over the years has 
provided copious examples of systemic failures and the capacity for contagion. In this 
respect the role of central banks, deposit insurance agencies, and regulators have been 
paramount as functional safeguards. Panyagometh and Roberts (2009) theorize the moral 
hazard in the banking industry and suggest the existence of the situational element of call 
optionality induced by limited liability on bank assets, its attributed volatility, and hence 
the resulting premia associated with ownership. The impulse and incentive to invest in 
risky assets, consequently comes at the expense of uninsured claimants or bank insurers. 
Kane (2009) stresses transparency, obviation, and the notion of accountability and points 
to the failings within regulatory agencies where self-interested regulators, bent on 
preserving their reputations may be abusive of their offices. Consequently, they may be 
inclined to conceal, trivialize, or depreciate injurious information regarding prospective 
difficulties within businesses such as financial institutions, in order to deflect criticism 
relating to the effectiveness of regulatory prescriptions. Moreover, the tenuousness of 
aspects of the regulatory environment is evidenced where officials might be aware of 
financial improprieties at certain institutions, and ignore or delay action, because to do 
otherwise would be acquiescing to an indictment of their leadership and tarnishing of 
their reputations (Kane, 2009). Commensurate with this imperative, Chen, Conover, 
Kensinger (2009) in the examination of moral hazard have propounded value-based 
incentive systems to include growth considerations and real options as a possible solution 
to potential conflicts between principal and agent. Aligned with a solutions-based 
orientation, a market environment fraught with induced regulatory and insurer-related 
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moral hazard, and a system tilted to risk taking and systemic failures, Okamoto (2009); 
and Dell'Ariccia, Schnabel, and Zettelmeyer (2006) have empirically shown that 
institutional resistance to bail-outs and intervention in some market domiciles, 
impractical as it might be in certain jurisdictions, has reduced the force of investor moral 
hazard. 
Literature Gap 
The U.S. capital markets are reliant on a steady diet of confidence, buttressed in 
the main through arguably transparent legal, political, and regulatory systems as well as 
economic environs shaped by fiscal and monetary policies, which when called into 
question can be consequentially calamitous (Farmer, 2012; Harvey, 2011). In many ways 
the confidence of the retail investor has been tested with the proliferation of asymmetrical 
disseminations that have been the product of persistently poor corporate governance 
praxis. A perusal of existing theories and heuristic inquiries suggest an expansive array of 
corporate governance literature, but data specific to the logic of behavior, derived 
confidence in decision-making, and experience of the noninstitutional accredited investor 
appears sparse; particularly research with explicit phenomenological premises that may 
potentially further critical understandings of asymmetrical impacts.  
An abundance of asymmetry-related works center to a mix of qualitative and 
quantitative studies, largely focused to the domains of cost of capital (Lambert et al., 
2012; Rossi, 2014), accounting standards impact (Muller III, Riedl, & Sellhorn, 2011), 
shareholder welfare (Bratton & Wachter, 2013), weak boards and governance structures 
(Bushee, Carter, & Gerakos, 2014; Harford, Mansi, Maxwell, 2008), and managerial 
excess (Popescu, 2012). More recently, some reasonably structurally esoteric works have 
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focused on the pricing of information asymmetry in markets with considerable demand 
for market-pertinent disclosures, where the principal consumer constituents are 
predominantly institutional investors (Akins et al., 2012). Distantly prosaic on the topic 
of corporate governance and information asymmetry, are works updated and refashioned 
in the realms of earnings announcement undergirded by its intrinsic accounting quality, 
as well as the notion of declining levels of asymmetry as a consequence of improved 
accounting standards and practices (Bhattacharya, Desai, & Venkataraman, 2013). In 
seeking to grasp the magnitude of the suggested gap in the area of informative 
asymmetrical influences contextualized to noninstitutional accredited investors, a search 
utilizing the keywords noninstitutional accredited investor at Google Scholar yielded 
approximately 13,500 partial matches but less than a handful of meaningful results, with 
one cursory mention by Campbell (2011) of SEC’s Regulation D private offering 
exemption, and its unintended yet serious hazard to the wellbeing of smaller entities 
raising funds in the capital markets. 
An exhaustive examination of the literature, ensconced in the preceding review, 
has highlighted the sparsity of scholarly works in the sphere of information asymmetry 
with regards to the decision-making inclinations of NIAIs. Evidencing the assertion, 
Pollman (2012) in discoursing corporate dissemination and criteria for accredited 
investor’s engaged in private market investing, researched information flows specific to 
information asymmetry, the scantiness or lack of information, the exploitation of insider 
knowledge for personal gain, and rampant intra-market self-interested conflicts, and 
suggested the study to be the first of the kind in examining this topic. The foregoing sum-
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of-the-pieces examination of current research, thus, brings sharply into focus the 
pronounced and extant gap in the literature.  
In reiteration, the literature review highlights the void in all-encompassing 
scholarly works attendant to the concerns of, and addressing questions relating to the role 
of informative disclosures in shaping investor psychology/investment discipline, the 
investor’s perception of a myriad of factors including principal-agent exchange, and the 
extent to which regulatory reforms have affected the investment environment in restoring 
confidence. Most importantly, scholarly literature in the domain of information 
asymmetry (e.g., Marcel et al., 2010; Pollman, 2012), and in particular findings centered 
to the attenuation of NIAIs behavior, have been de minimis, as evidenced by the 
previously discussed paucity of theoretical research. This limited academic scrutiny of 
information asymmetry relating to the NIAI phenomenon is unexpected, paradoxical, and 
problematic as the apparent deficiency of significant academic offerings fundamentally 
undercut the constructs of scholarly intellection, the advancement of needed social 
theories, and explicitation of epistemological potentiality.  
Research herein purposes bridging a number of gaps in the extant body of 
literature in several ways. First, it attempts to traverse the dearth of available studies 
situated within the bounds of information asymmetry and machinations of investment-
related decision-making specific to NIAIs. Second, the study examines the 
epistemological grounding, philosophical leanings, and intricacies of the principal-agent 
exchange, adverse selection, and moral hazard, which have been progressively 
discoursed, primarily through the prisms of game theory and economic behavior, with 
many works emphasizing incentive contracts (Bamberg & Spremann 2012; De la Rosa, 
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2011) and myriad circumstances (Matsuhisa, 2012; Silvers, 2012). Third, the study’s 
qualitative orientation incisively penetrates and presents an approach seldom broached, as 
very little contemporary qualitative studies have been conducted across the framework of 
information asymmetry appurtenant to NIAIs, and none which are paradigmatically 
phenomenological that distinctly addresses corporate disseminations and its potential 
impact in moderating decision-making behavior.  
In additionally attempting to fill the gaps identified in the literature, four principal 
research questions presented and vetted by an expert panel, served to narrow the 
knowledge deficit. These questions comported with a phenomenological premise and 
delved into the lived experiences of the archetypical NIAI. The research questions have 
spawned a series of interview questions, which were administered electronically via a 
conference platform and in person, and were intent on evolving and evaluating themes, 
meanings, descriptive qualities, dimensions, and experiential essences of NIAIs. Most 
essential, is that through the conceptual frameworks of Akerlof’s information theory and 
Verstegen Ryan and Buchholtz’s trust/risk decision-making model a construct for 
organizing, presenting, and analyzing the literature is facilitated. Moreover, given the 
foregoing, the research may advocate the utility and intertwining of the conceptual 
propositions of Verstegen Ryan and Buchholtz (2001) and Akerlof (1970) into a richer, 
contemporary, and more comprehensive context such that its use might lend 
complementarity and illumination to investor-centered trust-risk issues and asymmetrical 
theories. Accordingly, this study narrows the gap in corporate dissemination and its 
related impact in moderating NIAI behavior-centered research. 
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Summary 
The literature review encapsulated research discoursing issues of corporate 
governance and consequent asymmetry deleteriously endemic to and associated with the 
praxis. What is less evident from the literature review is the precise magnitude of 
information asymmetry perpetuated via corporate disseminations and its attendant effects 
in decision-shaping. More apparent, notwithstanding, is that transparency (Kane, 2009; 
Subhash, 2009) and proximity to (Døskeland & Hvide, 2011) the disclosure process have 
been clearly advocated as essential undergirdings to confidence and investment behavior. 
On the basis of the investors’ expectations there is the centrality of fair dealings as 
exemplified by arguments presented on Adams’ (1963) equity theory. Pivotal in its role 
as an important genesis in investor decision-making is the description and distinction of 
the nature and types of disclosures. Contextualized against an integrated disclosure 
system, public disclosure enumerates the process of managements’ utilizing public 
channels such as SEC filings, press releases, conference calls, internet communication, 
public messaging and a range of contemporary media to effect the dissemination of 
market-sensitive information. Equally consequential is discussion of semi-private, 
private, voluntary, and secret disclosures which have served to frame the issue of 
information asymmetry, even as its gravity has since been substantially recognized, 
especially over the past decade with the advent of Regulation FD, SOX, and Dodd-Frank 
regulations. 
In many ways the various strands of the corporate dissemination mechanism 
circumstantiates a system archetype that is representative of an ecosystem of calculated 
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information movement and its ineluctable bearing on the stakeholder community. More 
significantly is the way information is processed by stakeholders at large and in particular 
by NIAIs. Hence, a synthesis of the various interpretations and understandings provide a 
lens and contextualize the behavioral tendencies engendered, such as information free-
riding, instantiated through leakage or exploitation of confidence by business partners, 
shareholders, contractors and others. It also highlights private information held by 
officers and directors being used as a means of exploiting agency-related proprieties and 
ultimately the fostering of moral hazard. Figure 3 provides a comprehensive diagraming 
of the corporate dissemination and asymmetrical process.  
 
Figure 3. Conceptual model of asymmetric information dissemination dynamic. 
Comprehensive concept map illustrating the corporate dissemination dynamic and 
ancillary behavioral impact (Buchanan, 2017). 
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Given the import of disclosure, management’s credibility is examined through an 
expansive literature review as an augmentation of the collective theories espoused as the 
basis of the study. The discernable impressions of a relationship between the trust/risk 
model (Verstegen Ryan & Buchholtz, 2001) and information quality and uncertainty 
(Akerlof, 1970), both of which served as qualitative research mechanisms, as well as the 
ancillary interrelations of confidence as fundamentally elemental to decision-making 
were foremost as antecedents to efficacious NIAI investor participation. The proffering 
and synthesis of behavioral theories, psychological agents, heuristic elements, agency 
complexities, adverse selection, and moral hazard precepts have been presented with 
related research and theoretical foundations. These have served to highlight not only vital 
literary works on the matter of corporate governance, but have more broadly framed the 
guise and characteristic of information asymmetry, its moderating influence on investor 
psychology and behavior, as well as to similarly expose shortcomings in the body of 
extant literature. Hence, the present study purposes a supplementation of what is already 
known on the subject and is intent on furnishing contemporary insights that may provoke 
additional questions, vital in furthering an understanding and knowledge of the 
phenomena. Chapter 3 presents a detailed account of the research framework and 
instrumentation utilized to capture the phenomenological constituents of the study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative phenomenological study is the examination of the 
impact of corporate disseminations, their role in the proliferation of information 
asymmetry, and effect on confidence and the decision making-tendencies of the retail 
noninstitutional accredited investor (NIAI), and the ancillary effects of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. Copious studies centered to the investor/stakeholder and corporate 
governance have coalesced theoretically and empirically to include, weak boards and 
governance praxis (Dewally & Peck, 2010; Sharma, 2006), director independence (Boyle, 
Carpenter, & Hermanson, 2012 ; Kumar & Sivaramakrishnan, 2008), stakeholder 
management (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Richardson, 2000), and asymmetry and the 
cost of capital (Akins, Ng, & Verdi, 2012; Armstrong, Core, Taylor, & Verrecchia, 
2011). Accordingly, a dearth in research specific to corporate disseminations and 
consequent bearing on the investor, particularly the NIAI, served as a significant 
determinant to the investigation.  
Patton (2002) in describing Durkheim’s view of the social scientist suggested that 
social phenomena be considered a behavioral dynamic reflecting an extraneous force that 
influences the cognition and behaviors of people. Accordingly, Subhash (2009) spoke to 
the influence and phenomenon of corporate governance, its role as arbiter of transparency 
as imperative to investor confidence and the ultimate measure of stakeholder interest. 
Holland (2005) posited the notion of the futility of employing research methods (e.g., 
event studies and analytical frameworks) to investigate a phenomenon from a distance, 
and emphasized the import of advantageous proximity in capturing the elemental strands 
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comprising the research. Patton (2002) in explicating a design method observed, a 
methodological approach is invariably a function of the researcher’s judgement, available 
resources, goal, and ingenuity. This perspective is also underscored by Yin (2009) who 
has similarly acknowledged the many constraints that influence the selection of a 
research paradigm. Thus, a phenomenological design enables an exploration of myriad 
lived experiences, essential structures, and relationships which might be represented with 
contextual dimensionality so as to capture the inner world and essence of the 
phenomenon (Hycner, 1985). 
Research Design 
This qualitative phenomenological study was purposed to evaluate the contexts 
and constructs of the retail investment environment, particularly the influence of 
asymmetry, as well as to appraise and theorize the lived experiences of NIAIs as essential 
market participants. Significant to this process and a vital consideration was the research 
tradition employed, which best harmonized suitability and fit. Annells (2006) and 
Cutcliffe and Harder (2012) spoke to the appropriateness of respective research 
approaches, suggesting that the examination of essential elements should be consistent 
and fit to the research problem in question. Consequently, the elected methodological 
approach must demonstrate rigor, criticality, and be requisitely systematized according to 
Plunkett, Leipert, and Ray (2013) and Speziale, Streubert, and Carpenter (2011). As an 
integral design and inquiry tradition of qualitative methodology, phenomenology as 
asserted by Patton (2002), leans heavily on circumspection and thoroughness in 
representing and relating phenomenological experiences and the way these affect the 
lives of people engaged in these experiences, specifically, its perception, description, 
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emotional evocation, cognitive impression, assimilation, elicitation, assessment, and 
attendant discourse. These collective attributes broadly represent the essence and 
constructs of the retail/NIAIs experience against the backdrop of corporate informative 
disseminations on which the premise of the study rests. 
Design Appropriateness 
As an essential paradigmatic component of qualitative inquiry, phenomenology is 
described as being interpretive in nature, how the senses are paramount to the descriptive 
process, and the ways in which various strands present structure, and are characterized by 
their distinguishing features (Patton, 2002). Further elaboration is provided by 
Groenewald (2004) and McCarthy (2015). Groenewald in particular, influenced by 
Alfred Schultz, characterized phenomenology as the examination of life’s events 
experienced at a social level by ordinary people. Here, the emphasis is on experiences, 
emotions, volitional awareness attained through the course of living, as typified for 
instance, by the general complex of investment experiences of retail/NIAIs. Consistent 
with the preceding observations, Hycner (1985) and Plunkett et al. (2013), spoke of the 
complex nature of the phenomenological methodology, suggesting the diverse ways in 
which it may be represented, noting the function of an investigative bent, sensibility, and 
perspective that orient to a series of objectives. 
A principal strength of a qualitative design is that it imbues the study with rich 
textural attributes not evident in quantitative approaches (Cambra-Fierro & Wilson, 
2011). Potter (2013) cited Denzin and Lincoln (1994a) in providing a unique insight into 
qualitative research, described elements of the lived experience as progressively 
humanistic and naturalistic in analytical premise. To this end, qualitative inquiry has been 
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proffered as a legitimate method of conceptualizing social inquiry that captures a range of 
social and human science examination.  
As with other notable theorists, Maxwell (2012) suggested that a study’s design 
must complement its environment in addition to satisfying its intended utility. In this 
respect the research questions, which are central to the study’s architectural foundation, 
should be pertinently answered. Ashworth and Chung (2006) and Patton (2002) 
addressed the merit of qualitative inquiry by elaborating on the philosophical premise of 
phenomenology where exploration provided insights and faciliated sense-making of the 
varied experiences and associated meanings gleaned by informants. Underscoring the 
appropriateness of a qualitative design, Goulding (2002) noted that corporate leadership, 
and by extension stakeholders, are often drawn to the qualitative richness/distinctiveness 
of the data and suggested that it is compelling and in many cases preferred when 
compared to quantitative data, which often orients to a mass of surveys and technical 
renderings. Given the focus of the study, lived experiences, feelings, meanings, intuiting, 
and intersubjectivity, a qualitative approach is determined to be methodologically 
appropriate as the study’s goal is to improve the breadth of understanding of the 
phenomenon of asymmetric disseminations and their attendant effect on the behavior and 
decision making propensities of NIAIs. 
Alternative Designs 
In light of the research presented and discursive claims underlying the subject, the 
research questions centering on the phenomenon could have been similarly answered 
using alternative theoretical frameworks such as pragmatism or a hybridized hermeneutic 
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phenomenology/grounded theory, both of which are paradigmatically suitable 
approaches. 
Pragmatism is enumerated by Patton (2002) as evolving from process driven 
activity, setting or context, and repercussive outcome as opposed to an apriori theoretical 
premise. Its grounding emphasizes the use of practical and judicious means to fully grasp 
the problem; that is, the utility in addressing questions that do not conveniently and 
methodologically fit into qualitative or quantitative domains. While ideal for social and 
management research (Armitage, 2007), such an approach orients the study to a mixed-
methods approach. This approach requires a comprehensive system of multiple phases 
and forms of data collection, data organization, and different forms of data analysis 
entailing greater complexity in terms of flexibility and sampling frames with copious 
triangulation and integration of data needed (Youngs & Piggot-Irvine, 2012). 
Gummesson (2006) advocated combining the strengths of natural science and social 
science suggesting that to do so averts validity and relevance being necessarily sacrificed 
for/subordinated to notions of academic reliability and replicability. While a more holistic 
approach, the primary thrust of pragmatism conceptually leans to deriving knowledge 
relating to a problem. Further, a pragmatic stance is epistemologically pluralistic 
(Goodbody & Burns, 2011) where conceptually a multiplicity of methods and 
instrumentation are engaged (Burke-Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). Even so, with the 
aforementioned large-scale sequential or concurrent data collection requirements and 
time-intensiveness needed for analysing both quantitative and qualitative data, as well as 
the associated methodological complexities (Youngs and Piggot-Irvine, 2012), this 
approach was deemed to be less than ideal. 
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To arrive at an epistemological destination that adequately undergirds and 
strengthens any empirical findings a hybridized approach, such as, hermeneutic 
phenomenology/grounded theory, is prospectively relevant. Annells (2006) discussed a 
two-phased approach to phenomenology and grounded theory, utilized in discrete and 
separate tracts for subjects, which are complex and where there is a pronounced scantness 
in research. Bryant and Lasky (2007) have similarly combined epistemological 
paradigms, albeit grounded theory blended with a narrative methodology. As a practical 
matter, a method of combining paradigms may have been considered constructive and 
suitable in addressing the breadth, depth, and unique sensibilities imbued in the 
respective provinces as suggested by Annells (2006). A principal drawback, in this 
respect, is the need to articulate separate strands or distinctions in interview styles, data 
collection, and data analysis procedures. Lapses in this respect invite a process of method 
slurring (Baker, Wuest, & Stern, 1992; Annels, 2006), a practice which often contradicts 
and sullies the integrity of the respective approaches. 
Phenomenology 
With the consideration of acuity, a phenomenological approach presented the 
optimum choice. A phenomenological design consonant with a qualitative tradition seeks 
to explicate feelings as essential underpinnings of an experienced phenomenon 
(Ashworth & Chung 2006; Groenewald, 2004; Shaw, Burton, Borg Xuere, Gibson, & 
Lane, 2014). Purposed to a thematic descriptive of motivation, perception, imagination, 
feelings and experiences as well as meanings interpreted from a variety of vantage points, 
Goulding (1998) notes the focal point of data source is principally the words provided by 
the informant. NIAIs/retail investors are uniquely positioned as informants who have 
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actively engaged in capital market activities and as a consequence, have amassed an array 
of experiences that they are able to articulate. As evinced by copious literature, 
information flows and corporate disclosures are often rife with asymmetrical-related 
conflicts as market participants are not equally privy to the same informative 
disseminations (Marcel et al., 2010). Epistemologically, the phenomenological paradigm 
provides an appropriate medium to describe variables and relationships, which are 
representative of the actors experience, in this case the investors who rely on corporate 
disclosures for its information content (Garcia-Osma & Guillamón-Saorín, 2011; 
Gibbins, Richardson, & Waterhouse, 1990). 
Population 
The makeup of a population is the universal expanse of indivduals who comprise 
a study. A population is consequently the cluster of individuals or cases that satisfy some 
pre-specified criteria from which inferential conclusions are drawn (Lepkowski, 2008). 
Retail/NIAIs in this case, comprising our population, typically engage in capital market 
activity and are consequently representative of approximate market sentiment. 
Evidencing this point, a Fargo/Gallup Investor and Retirement Optimism Index survey of 
November 2013 identified greater levels of bullish perspectives with larger/affluent 
investors, having investable assets greater than $100,000, and suggested 37% of these 
equity investors viewed the market as a strategically reliable method of wealth 
accumulation (Saad, 2013). The perceptions and perspectives of these investors are ideal 
in capturing the essence, motivation, and purpose of the study.  
Grounded to a qualitative interpretivist orientation, rather than generalizing, the 
objective was to obtain insights into a phenomenon as experienced by a series of like-
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minded individual (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007c) retail investors. With the purpose of 
attaining increased understanding of the phenomenon, a population of approximately 21 
NIAIs were purposively selected. In keeping with Morse’s (2000) exhortation regarding 
sample size and possible under estimation due to participant attrition, solicition was for a 
minimum of one-half the intended useful population. It is also worthwhile to note, that 
qualitative sample size may be guided by a number of factors such as the level of 
information redundancy and theoretical saturation relative to the mass of information 
obtained and the analytic complexity presented according to Kelly (2010). Moreover, 
once saturation is achieved, where constant repetition was not likely to yield additional 
useful variation in responses, the researcher has the discretion of utilizing the sample size 
to that point. Conversely emerging themes, or differences discovered within the 
population sampled could have warranted an increase of sampling so as to achieve data 
redundancy. 
With the study focused to retail/NIAIs, a population was drawn from data bases 
located principally in the U.S. as well as through snowball or chain (Patton, 2002; 
Trotter, 2012) solicitation of investors. Solicitation was independent of geographical 
location, but all participants engaged in U.S. capital market activities. Snowball sampling 
broadly entailed instances where participants/interviewees were asked to suggest referrals 
who they knew were qualified to provide informationally rich descriptions of their 
experiences (Raveis, Conway, Uchida, Pogorzelska-Maziarz, Larson, & Stone, 2014). 
Additionally, personal associations, relationships, and networks were utilized in 
identifying and recruiting appropriate NIAI prospects. A private data base (access 
facilitated through an asset management firm) was a repository for affluent investors for 
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which I requested use, and received the necessary access approval (see Appendix G). A 
generalized letter of particiapant solicitation was emailed or mailed through the postal 
service to each prospective participant (see Appendix A). Study participants were subject 
to semi-structured interviews orchestrated through the use of standardized open-ended 
questions designed to probe, prompt, and elicit the full breadth of thoughts and feelings 
(Patton, 2002). 
Informed Consent 
Prospective informants met the minimum age requirement of 18 years (e.g., 
Tottenham et al., 2009 conducted a study where the mean age was 19.4 years). Further, 
basic ethical principles should be observed in research endeavors involving human 
subjects in accordance with the precepts of The Belmont Report, advocating uniformity 
in standards of conduct and adherance required by federal employees, Institutional 
Review Boards, and scientific investigators (National Commission for the Protection of 
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, 1978). These ethical 
prescriptions are premised on the foundational tenets of respect for human subjects and 
the affirmation of justice, and beneficence. Consequently, subjects were provided a 
proposal document disclosing the nature of any/all risks inherent in the study. This 
informed consent document acknowledged that the rights of participants would be 
protected during the data collection process (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011) (see Appendix B). 
Aligned with the foregoing, Williams (2002) elaborated a number of additional 
guidelines for the informed consent, including the purpose of the research, avoidance of 
deception, and the amount/extent of information disclosed. Additionally, disclosure was 
provided regarding the researcher; informants’ obligations; scope and voluntary nature of 
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informant’s participation; the protocols of confidentiality; risks endemic to research 
participants; right of unrestricted withdrawal; benefits in participating, which is in this 
case, the ability to contribute to scientific knowledge as it relates to the impact of 
information asymmetry and its significance to investors; method of participant selection; 
and names of contact persons to whom questions may be addressed as needed (Miller, 
Birch, Mauthner, & Jessop, 2012). Disclosure was provided for tape recorded data and its 
retention for 5-10 years (McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003) after which all materials 
will be destroyed. 
Sample Design 
With the primary goal of the study directed at attaining a more complete 
understanding of the quintessence and meaning of lived experiences of NIAIs as it relates 
to the impact of asymmetric disclosures, a purposive sampling methodology was utilized. 
Purposive sampling or criterion sample facilitates the researcher screening for appropriate 
participants, who satisfy a preselected criteria (Maxwell, 2012; Patton, 2002). The 
research informants, having a minimum of two years capital market experience, were 
solicited from a number of U.S. databases and a number of other investment 
informational sources. The selection was intended to satisfy the the imperative of 
information-rich cases (Raveis et al., 2014) that fundamentally captured the essence of 
the phenomenon. A demographic supplemental questionnaire was provided to capture a 
profile of the surveyed population. 
Confidentiality 
All interviews were conducted with explicit commitment to privity and 
confidentiality. Interviews were conducted by telephone and in person where possible 
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and were documented with a tape recording device. Further, pesudonyms were 
substituted for names of participants in transcribed interviews, and discretion was 
exercised in cases where unique disclosures may provide clues to the identity of 
individuals (Rubin & Rubin, 2012). Additionally, words or phrases were substituted by 
the researcher for the preservation of contextuality as well as referential integrity 
(McLellan, MacQueen, & Neidig, 2003). Collected data, such as, tape recordings, 
transcripts, and informed consent documents are securely maintained in a locked safe 
such that the identity of each participant is protected. Access is permitted only to the 
researcher to avert acts of impropriety and/or possible misappropriation. 
Validity and Reliability 
The constructs of validity and reliability presuppose a trustworthiness in a 
research outcome by virtue of appropriate and demonstrable application of rigourous 
standards (Morse, Barrett, Mayan, Olson & Spiers, 2002; Roberts, Priest & Traynor, 
2006). In discoursing validity and reliabity in qualitative inquiry, Patton (2002) and 
Onwuegbuzie (2007b) posited that the researcher serves as the principal instrument. 
Consequently the quality and integrity of the findings are consigned to the degree of skill, 
competence, and rigor employed by the researcher. Rigor and robustness, in this instance, 
are addressed through the applied phenomenological paradigm and situated by a 
compendious literature review. 
Elaborating the foregoing, Maxwell (2012) submited that validity in qualitative 
research is achieved when an inquiry is examined for the precision of findings; in 
essence, the faithfulness in formulation or characterization that is explanatory, 
descriptive, plausible, and appropriately conclusive to the circumstance. Similarly, 
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qualitative reliability is asserted to be an approach that is invariable when applied against 
disparate studies and by different inquirers. Consistent with a phenomenological 
approach the key invariant to validity and reliability is methodical consistency as 
suggested by Giorgi (2010) who emphasized this precept as being essential to the practice 
of good science. Beck, Keddy, and Cohen (1994) provided added clarification, 
expounding the descriptive constituents of validity and reliability. Phenomenological 
validity, it is proposed, is attained when the essential characterization of the phenomenon 
faithfully describes its intuitiveness and its essence (Beck et al., 1994).  
Reliability is likewise achieved when the facticity of the foregoing is not in 
question; that is, it is reproducible with a measure of consistency. Additionally, Beck et 
al. (1994) stipulated two essential requisites that are vital to the premise of validity and 
relaibility. First, there is an imperative for phenomenological reduction where process-
oriented bracketing of the researcher’s presuppositions and perspective are suspended. 
Second, essences must be detailed so as to reflect the contextual meaning of the 
phenomenon.  
Considering the preceding, reliability was assessed by (a) applying a systematic 
process for the collection of data, (b) checking transcripts for accuracy (Hycner, 1985), 
(c) ensuring that all participants met the criterion of having two or more years experience 
investing in the U.S. capital markets, and (d) assuring participants satisfied the financial 
requirement as accredited investors who are noninstitutional in their investment status. 
Information obtained through this process served as a proximal indicator of the 
investment experience of investors who are generally reliant on informative 
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disseminations. Requisite care was taken to ensure that reliability standards supported 
validity considerations (Roberts et al., 2006). 
Qualitative rigor necessitates validity, defined as describing the fidelity of what is 
perceived to be assessed against what is intended to be assessed (Roberts et al., 2006). In 
the demonstration of validity, specific questions were presented as a part of interview 
protocol designed to capture the experience of NIAIs. Additionally, a software package 
(NVivo 11) was utilized to process and organize the data to assure consistency in 
developing themes and categories. The use of rich, thick descriptions is also suggested by 
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007c) and Turner (2010) who contend that detailed note-
taking streamlines the copious data collected, reduces confirmation bias, and enables the 
attainment of a fuller and more complete meaning of the experience. Although member 
checking and intersubjectivity served to validate and strengthen the accuracy of 
qualitative themes the general lack of procedural consensus (Beck et al., 1994) enabled 
deference, as anaytical discretion rest solely with the researcher (Giorgi, 1985). Finally, 
researcher bias and conflicts, if any, were also disclosed given its potential to impinge 
upon the integrity of the study (Miles & Huberman, 1994).  
Field Testing 
As an integral part of the interview protocol the researcher engaged the services 
of an expert panel comprised of industry practitioners and academics who are well-
informed on the subject and are versed in research methodology. Consistent with this 
notion, Aboelela et al. (2007) in their investigation of interdisciplinarity utilized field 
testing as an assurance of methodical appropriateness. 
  
132 
The four-member expert panel, in their role as field testers, facilitated content 
validation of the questions proposed for the interview as well as the particulars of the 
interview protocol. In this regard the panel perspicaciously provided understandability, 
relevance, and comprehensiveness as suggested by Mckenna et al. (2005). Panelists 
provided contemporary and informed perspectives, judgments, and knowledge-based 
insights into industry practice. Furthermore, field testing affirmed that the proposed 
questions were appropriately designed so as to elicit responses from the informants that 
are consistent with the purpose of the study. Foremostly, the contributions of panel 
assured that the interview instrument was effective in its construction to adequately 
reflect the idiosyncratic qualities of informants as well as the pragmatic elements and 
their ability to illuminate, capture, and test rich/thick ideas central to the existence and 
nature of the phenomenon (Maxwell, 2012). 
Summary of Experts 
Expert panels are typically comprised of individuals with unique knowledge in 
specific subject areas, and are drawn together ostensibly to proffer opinions, which are 
informed by their experiences (Hagen et al., 2008) and often reinforced by literature. The 
panel’s expertise was significant, in this case, because it facilitated ideational 
convergence and attainment of consensus. Each panelist, after reviewing a briefing of the 
study, evaluated a series of semi-structured open-ended questions for appropriateness, 
comprehension, redundancy and the like, through a process that was done independently 
to assure anonymity and confidentiality (Hagen et al., 2008). Commentary and feedback 
provided by each panelist facilitated corroboration or a basis for modification and/or 
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supplementation of questions to ensure that they captured or measured what was 
intended.  
Opinions and insights of a voluntary panel of industry practitioners and academics 
provided validation of the proposed interview questions. The four member expert panel 
was comprised of university professors, whose pedagogy covered a variety of business 
disciplines (see Appendix E). All panelists have completed doctoral studies, except one 
who has a master’s degree, has worked in the financial services industry for more than a 
decade in various capacities, and is a subject matter expert in the areas of compliance and 
capital market analysis. He also has several books and financial publications to his credit. 
The feedback provided was in the majority inclined to style, ranging from the length and 
complexity of some questions to the degree of open-endedness of others. One panelist 
suggested that optionally, there could be a follow up question to questions 8 and/or 9; this 
provided impetus for a subsequent addition now labeled question 10. Overall, there was 
positive consensus with respect to the appropriateness, substance, and purpose of each 
question. Hagen et al. (2008) suggested there are no known industry benchmanks for 
precisely the number of favorability endorsements which constitute consensus. 
Accordingly, consensus is presumed to be favorable at an approval level greater than 
50%. Additional details regarding academic credentials and professional background of 
each panelist is included in Appendix E. 
Trustworthiness 
Polit and Beck (2013) and McNulty, Zattoni, and Douglas (2013) (cited Guba, 
1985) in describing trustworthiness in qualitative research as capturing a range of 
dimensional facets including transferability, dependability, credibility, confirmability, 
  
134 
and authenticity. Interpretively trustworthiness is the qualitative equivalent of validity. 
Trustworthiness is highly tethered to the source data, and is characterized by the potential 
verification of the data to the original source. Other elements associated with this 
standardized marker are the potential to reached logical conclusions, prudentiality, and 
plausiblity (Mathison, 2005). 
Transferability 
Generalizability as noted by Finfgeld-Connett (2010) is typically associated with 
statistics and quantitative studies of the Kantian nomothetic orientation where universal 
laws exist; qualitative methodologies on the other hand are idiographic. Patton (2002) (in 
citing Guba & Lincoln, 1981) adopted the terms transferability and fittingness in lieu of 
the traditional positivist concept of generalization, when conducting qualitative 
naturalistic inquiry. The rationale to this re-definintion is the idea that generalization is 
not only bereft of context, but also that human behaviors are largely dictated/mediated by 
contextually embedded and circumstantial situations. Given the criticisms that have 
shaped the notion of generalizability in qualitative studies (Polit & Beck, 2010) the 
juxtapositioning of these paradoxically divergent descriptors is important in untangling 
the complexity and mitigating the challenge inherent in extrapolating the introspections 
of informants or settings in light of context-dependency. Largely, the results of 
naturalistic qualitative inquiries are not purposed to be generalized to large populations 
(Miles & Huberman, 1994; Easterbrook & Given, 2008; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011), an 
attribute, in this case, that is not perceived as a strength (McGrath, 1982). Rather, 
qualitative phenomenological studies’ results are intended to establish the meaning and 
context of experiences, the formulation of inductive propositions, and to better 
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understand the lifeworld concerns of informants (Polit & Beck, 2010; Mason, 2010). 
Moreover, it is essential that audiences assess transferability to decide whether the 
context of the study bears congruence to their circumstance and the extent to which 
results might be deemed transferable (Katz, Peace, & Spurr, 2012). 
Substantively, there is a considerable contingent of qualitative thinking which 
postulates that focused qualitative research is effective for exploring complex meta-
conceptualizations and paradigmatic constructs that are capable of being extrapolated to 
other informants or contexts (Butler-Kisber, 2010; Misco, 2007; Polit & Beck, 2010). In 
bolstering the notion of transferability Miles and Huberman (1994) presented twelve 
useful criteria as essential undergirdings. Misco (2007) summarizes these criteria as the 
demonstration of “methods, procedures, sequence, description, conclusions linked to 
displayed data, a clear audit trail, a full articulation of [the] role [of] researcher, and 
…[providing] possible alternative conclusions which [are] mutually challenging” (p. 6). 
This study contemplates the observation of these guidelines. 
Guided through the philosophical and theoretical lens of asymmetric 
disseminations, confidence, and decision making propensities moderated by trust, the 
study’s informants presented evidence that NIAIs may siginificantly realize similar 
phenomenological impulses. Chen, Donaldson, and Mark, (2011) in discoursing the 
Campbellian Validity Typology referred to validity, and hence transferability, as the 
interpretation and veracity of evidence facilitating a conclusion. Polit and Beck (2010) 
spoke of extrapolation in the context of proximal similarity, where an individual’s 
conceptualization of moments or instances, population, environment/structure, and 
prevailing circumstance are weighed along a continuum of relative similarity. Constraints 
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notwithstanding, it is reasonable to infer that NIAIs’ experiences are epitomes of a swath 
of experiential events and interpretations, which are likely to intersect such that these 
experiences could tentatively exhibit fittingness and be carefully extrapolated to other 
contexts or circumstances such as, moderatum generalizations (Williams, 2000); 
transferability (Lincoln and Guba, 1985); case-to-case translation (Firestone, 1993; Polit, 
& Beck, 2010); and generalizability (Misco, 2007). Contextual exegesis is fundamental in 
terms of capturing (a) overall response to asymmetric disseminations, (b) its potential 
influence on confidence and decision-making, and (c) the larger corporate governance 
and agency concern. 
Dependability 
Credibility cannot be assured in the absence of dependability; just as validity in 
quantitative research is a predicate of reliability (Polit & Beck, 2014). Dependability is 
foundational to consistency, that is, whether a study’s results can be reproduced with 
similar populations under similar/or same conditions or context. This is what Miles and 
Huberman (1994) described as quality control, that is, whether or not appropriate care 
was exercised in course of conducting the study. With a modicum of contextual 
difference, Rodrigues, Alves, Silveira, and Laranjeira (2012), helpfully described 
dependability as an integrating concept and suggested additional important attributes such 
as reliability, maintainability, and availability. 
Credibility 
Credibility is significant to trustworthiness and is an attribute that fundamentally 
moderates validity (Schwandt, Lincoln, & Guba, 2007). In assuring credibility the 
research method of the study should elicit and instill the requisite confidence to the extent 
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that the findings are truthfully and accurately reprersented (Polit & Beck, 2014). 
Triangulation is the use of different data sources and methods in constructing 
intelligibility and ratiocination of themes and findings as well as reducing exposure to 
errors and enhancing the study’s reliability (Lahtero & Risku, 2014). In the context of 
this study, triangulation facilitated member checking with the verification of transcribed 
and/or processed data by the informants as a part of a system of validation. Besides rigor, 
a secondary yet essential purpose of triangulation was the mitigation of random and 
potential systematic bias. 
Confirmability 
Confirmability is a qualitative checklist item of research trustworthiness (Denzin 
& Lincoln, 2009). It is an attestation of the credibility of the data reported in the study. 
Specifically, all data used in the study such as logs, recordings, fieldnotes, observation 
notes, and journals can be traced back the original source (Lincoln, 2004). 
Authenticity 
The experiences portrayed in qualitative research studies in many cases tend to be 
represented with various degrees of abstraction. Authenticity consigns a humanizing 
quality to the process such that the essence of lives depicted, scrupulously reflect the 
appropriate temperamental mindset, affectivity, maturity, language sensibility, and 
setting/background (Marshall & Rossman, 2011) of an informant’s social reality 
subjectively but also scientifically. More generally it is a representation of the fairness 
and faithfulness in the researcher’s account of the breadth of constructed realities. In the 
ideal, authencity requires that lives decribed are accurately presented in the ways that 
they are lived to the extent that audiences are transported on a journey where the 
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sensations and intensity of the lived experiences of informants can be credibly 
appreciated. 
The study’s protocols encapsulated in Appendices A to F encouraged 
forthrightness, candor, and detailed descriptions of lived experiences of NIAIs. Further, 
the provisions of clarification of researcher’s bias, confidentiality, member checks, 
freedom of unimpeded withdrawal from the study, and a mechanism for conflict 
resolution as articulated in the provisions of the informed consent were such that 
potential social milieu (Guba, 2004; Narag & Maxwell, 2014), for example, intimidation, 
recriminative legal action, obligatory beneficence, or other foreseeable constraints had 
very little impact on the veracity and quality of responses. Peer debriefing, though not 
compulsory, was held as an option to be utilized by engaging the services of a 
disinterested third party, for the purpose of additionally evaluating the quality of the 
inquiry, that is, to reinforce and/or enchance the accurracy of the transcibed and analyzed 
data (Collins, Onwuegbuzie, Johnson, & Frels, 2013; Guba, 2004). Reinforcing the 
process, Guba (2004) proposed observing certain authenticity standards that included 
fairness, ontological constructions, educative constructions, catalytic constructions, and 
tactical propositions. These prescriptions of quality-centered criteria foremostly served as 
a guiding consideration. 
Member checking. Member-checking is argued to be a key foundation of 
qualitative research, serving to broaden the interpretation beyond the understandings of 
the researcher, and may be key in bolstering the study’s validity criterion (Marshall & 
Rossman, 2011). This process of presenting to the informants the final transcriptions or 
interpretations, wholly or partially, or derived themes, served to verify the accuracy of the 
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qualitative findings (Reilly, 2013; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). With triangulation of data 
sources, methods, and theories, the claim to validity can be asserted more confidently 
(Marshall & Rossman, 2011). 
Bracketing. With the examination and calculation of evidence many 
phenomenological theorists have prescribed a bracketing process (e.g., Husserl, 2012; 
Moustakas, 1994; Rabin & Weizsäcker, 2009), one which holds in abeyance the 
researcher’s preconceptions and notions regarding the phenomenon. Patton (2002) 
described this as the concept or moment of the epoché, where by virtue of reduction of 
the phenomenon, prejudices and assumptions are removed and the researcher’s 
conciousness assumes a state of immanence; thereafter a fresh and more complete 
perspective is attained with ponderance of the evidence. 
In keeping with foregoing explication, the researcher disclosed capital market 
experience, by way of vocational involvement in the financial services industry and also 
participating as an investor in the equity markets. Contemporary experience has also 
provided exposure to finance/capital market-related instruction and pedagogic 
opportunities at the teritiary level. With a reflexive approach to potential biases, 
experiences, values, judgments and presumptions the approach to the study was treated as 
previously outlined. Reflexivity is the principal ideational position or worldview 
orientation that impinges upon those factors that could potentially shape the 
interpretations formed during the study (Chan, Yuen-ling, & Wai-tong, 2013). 
Data Collection Method 
Phenomenology as an approach to information asymmetry, contextualized to 
NIAIs and their decision making propensities, focuses on probing and elaborating the 
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machinations of structure, interpretations, and essence derived from experiences garnered 
as capital market participants, for whom corporate disseminations are vital inputs to their 
investment theses. Qualitative studies rely on statements that are gathered as evidence of 
an investigation (Polkinghorne, 2005). Evidence obtained through the interview process 
was an essential method of data collection (Erickson, 2012) as it underlie the collective 
experiences, understandings, opinions, and emotional sensibilities of informants (Collins 
et al., 2013). In capturing these important experiences, qualitative data in the form of 
spoken words, chronicled and provided a distillation of narratives (Polkinghorne, 2005). 
The design of the study principally centered on documenting each participant’s interview 
primarily with a recording device. Each interview was conducted in-person or by 
telephone/conference. All interview activity was preceded with the signing of a written 
informed consent document and audio recordings captured through a conference platform 
and digital recordings were transcribed by the researcher. Appropriate research logs, 
reflective journals, and research field notes augmented by the reviewed audio data 
(McLellan, MacQueen & Neidig, 2003) were utilized as necessary. 
Interview Process 
The interview has become the pillar in qualitative research and in the case of 
phenomenological studies, the paramount approach to data collection, which facilites the 
exploration of descriptions and the interrogation of ideas (Wimpenny & Gass, 2000). 
Moustakes (1994) and Rude (2013) for instance, recommended engaging the epoché 
where biases, predispositions, and prior experiences are disassociated in the interest of 
transparency and research integrity. 
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In-depth interviews for this study were largely formatted as a semi-structured 
endeavor where open-ended questions were presented to elicit the conceptions and 
contexts of informants’ experience. Follow up questions prompted elaboration and 
elicited greater interaction from informants. Information gathered from the interviews 
were principally recorded as audio files and when appropriate, hand written notes were 
taken supplementally to capture where possible, important interview aesthetics such as 
visual and/or auditory cues. 
Questions cohered with specific themes and concepts discursively considered 
through the applied conceptual frameworks, literature review, and the study’s objective 
(Speziale et al., 2011; Patton, 2002). The study was concentered to a phenomenological 
exploration of corporate disseminations particularly in the context of information 
asymmetry, its impact on the confidence and decision making propensities of the 
retail/NIAI and the ancillary effects of moral hazard and adverse selection. Research 
questions and related questions presented for the interview are exhibited in Table 1 
below. 
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Table 1  
Research Questions and Related Interview Questions 
Research questions   Interview questions 
1. What are the lived experiences of the 
retail/noninstitutional accredited investor 
regarding corporate disseminations, its 
role in the proliferation of information 
asymmetry, its impact on confidence, 
judgment, and decision-making 
propensities? 
 
1. To what extent has information 
asymmetry affected your experience of 
retail investing as it relates to perceiving 
and processing information in investment 
decision-making? 
 
 
 
 
 
         
      
2. How does information asymmetry 
impact your confidence and strategic 
approach as a retail investor? Could you 
recall instances and experiences validating 
your response? 
      
      
      
      
         
      
3. What has been the depth of impact of 
corporate governance reforms (e.g., 
populating boards with largely 
outside/independent directors) on your 
investment psyche/propensity and overall 
attitude to investing and risk (management) 
as a retail investor? 
      
      
      
      
      
               
      
4. What was it you felt you needed to learn 
that became increasingly obvious with the 
governance reforms? 
      
      
      
         5. What advice if any would you share with 
investors (who are similarly disposed in 
making determinations) about managing 
their own investments in the current market 
and information environment? 
      
      
      
      
      
         
2. What role has technology played in 
magnifying and/or minimizing the effects 
of informative dissemination and how 
does this affect the investor’s discipline 
and psychology with regards to decision-
making? 
 
6. What is your perception of the role of 
technology (e.g., information is 
instantaneous: tweets, blogs, 24-hour news 
cycle, internet traffic) with respect 
 
(table continues) 
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Research questions   Interview questions 
 
to investment psychology and framing 
bias (selective perception of information) 
when screening corporate disclosures prior 
to its utilization? Could you describe 
experiences that characterize your 
investment decision making in this regard? 
      
      
      
      
         3. What is the perception of the state of
principal-agent relations as it pertains to 
governance and disclosure?  
 
7. How trusting are you regarding matters 
of stewardship (trust of leadership), given 
that management’s employment requires 
agency (knowledge/access to proprietary 
information), where there is ample 
opportunity to engage in self-interested 
behavior? Are there any feelings you 
experienced that you are able to describe 
after realizing the extent of corporate 
misconduct exposed in the last decade 
(e.g., the 2008 market collapse)? 
 
 
 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
         4. To what extent has regulatory reforms 
changed the investment environment in 
restoring confidence by holding bad 
actors to account?  
 
8. How has your perception of retail 
investing as it relates to the qualitative 
improvement of disclosures been influenced 
by regulatory reforms (e.g., Regulation Fair 
Disclosure: mandates simultaneous 
disclosure of all material nonpublic 
information to all interested parties)? How 
has it shaped your investment behavior 
experientially? 
 
 
 
 
      
      
      
               
      
9. In what ways has Sarbanes- Oxley’s 
(SOX) strengthening of Internal Controls 
(e.g., everything controlling risks) in regard 
to financial reporting (Section 302) 
promoted greater and more meaningful 
transparency for yourself? Can you 
describe any perceptible change in your 
investment attitude after SOX? 
 
 
 
(table continues 
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Research questions   Interview questions 
         
      
10. Can you describe any other market-
centered experience relating to asymmetry 
if any (that has not been presented here) 
that has impacted your investment attitude 
post SOX? 
      
      
      
      
      
 
Responses to these questions provided a dialogical basis for additional probing conducted 
as needed for the purpose of illumination and elucidation of the subject (Patton, 2002).  
Data Analysis Plan 
With a phenomenological approach, data are concentrated to words, which are 
hence translated into texts. For analysis to occur the data must be processed; specifically 
untreated data must be refined by means of being corrected and edited (Miles & 
Huberman,1994). Data analysis according to Tesch (1990), commences at the point of 
data collection. Further, in processing the data, the researcher conceptually clarifies 
his/her perspective on the subject phenomenon, a euphemistic process of bracketing 
(Tesch, 1990). Procedurally, Patton (2002) in attempting to identify the core meaning of 
individuals’experiences, recommends analysis only after the bracketing process is 
undertaken. Exemplarily, the essence of the investment experience was epitomized and 
forefronted where the NIAI relied heavily on and was accepting of informative 
disseminations of firms/institutions that are engaged in capital market activity. 
Illustratively, data gleaned from the interview recordings were grouped by similarity, and 
repeatedly configured and reconfigured such that the criterion attribute became evident 
and meanings of each group began to coalesce around specific themes (Tesch, 1990). 
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Discrepant responses or negative data was considered and contextualized against 
the body of data gathered per interviewee and across the population of interviewed 
participants. Since all interview data were essential to the overall textural and 
experiencial fabric of interview participants, such data could be impactful in moderating 
or strengthing certain evolved structural and/or composite horizons (Moustakas, 1994). 
Analysis Method 
The analysis was conducted by rigorously examining the interview transcripts and 
exercising the requisite care in condensing the material (Miles & Huberman, 1994). At a 
practical level, materials were continuously perused and with circumspection, distillation 
occurred, facilitating the emergence of synthesized renderings, reflecting the essence of 
the narratives, and an uncovering of meanings and actions (Miles & Huberman, 1994). 
Paradigmatically and more granularly, interpretive phenomenological analysis 
(IPA), given its qualitative/methodological strength, has been proffered as one of the 
many structures through which the lived experience has been examined (Matua & Van 
Der Wal, 2015; Timulak & Elliott, 2003; Tyre, Myer, Lazo & Waters, 2016). Reinforcing 
this notion, Heideggerian phenomenology traditionally expounded that the situatedness of 
an interpretive approach hinges on the the researcher’s discretion and comprehension of 
the related philosophy, a factor that was consistent and considerable in influencing 
interpretation and design (Wright-St Clair, 2015). In explicating the intricacies of this 
inductive analytical process, researchers Joseph (2014) and Murray and Holmes (2014) 
advanced the IPA methodology as being an effective tool that captured not only 
perceptions and theoretical contexts, but social and cultural descriptives across a range of 
experiences spanning human, health-related, and social sciences. The oft suggested 
  
146 
varied formats, makes it a flexible and compelling analytical tool to researchers oriented 
to sphere of phenomenology in extracting themes, core meanings, as well as facilitating 
synthesis of the constellation of life events that are integral to shaping the lived 
experience. Moustakas (1994) and Pietkiewicz and Smith (2012) provided pithiness in 
suggeting a move to a reductive stance, such that researchers reflectively embrace 
experiential essences, free of preconceptions and ideational constraints. Arguably, giving 
voice to the emergence of the phenomena.  
A detailed series of steps presented by Pietkiewicz and Smith (2012) and (Smith, 
2015) elaborated preparation, organization, analysis and interpretation of the data. In this 
case, the methodology effectively deliniated and constructed meaning units (MU), 
organized data structure, engendered categorization of data, abstracted findings, validated 
analysis, and enabled rich interpretation of results, which underscore the essence of the 
lived experience of NIAIs. Meaning units in this context are data extractions that even 
when presented in part, are likely to communicate reasonable or approximate contextual 
meaning to an audience (Elliott & Timulak, 2005). DeFelice and Janesick (2015) in citing 
Giorgi, similarly described this as, a semantic typification of the psychological elements 
of the lived experience.  
The textual transcriptions of NIAIs’ statements centered to their investment 
experience and perception of asymmetric disseminations. A synoptical view of the 
framework, suggests a premise of broad experiential descriptions, thematic clusters, 
reflection and formulation of relevant and thick structural depictions that characterize the 
phenomenon, the generation of each individual’s anecdotal renderings, essences and 
  
147 
meanings derived through distillation and synthesis, and interpretive conceptualizations 
(Wright-St Clair, 2015, p 65) unearthed in the context of discovey.  
Analysis of these textual data was framed against the above-described construct. 
The elaboration of selected steps (see Chapter 4) provided a more sharply focused 
descriptive; one that is reflective, pragmatic, and purposeful. The data was coded 
according to the qualitative imperative of the types of experiences of each NIAI and 
assigned appropriate value descriptors (Chenail, 2012). 
The location of the respective themes, served as a validating resource and 
crosschecking mechanism. The handwritten notes compiled for the research and 
transcribed data in their entirety are recursively checked alongside the thematic findings 
for precise or approximate expressions (Moustakas, 1994) of the subject phenomenon. 
Triangulation has also been suggested as an effective methodological approach in 
bringing multiple and diverse sources of data together such that their various strands 
present an alignment and corroborating effect (Patton, 2002). Annells (2006) similarly 
endorsed the advantage of utilizing triangulation in phenomenological studies to facilitate 
the understanding and enhancement in meaning. The critical purpose, most importantly, 
is the strengthening of credibility and propounded accuracy of findings.  
Summary 
The study was fundamentally purposed to exploring and illuminating the essence 
and lived experiences of the retail investor/NIAI, notably the ways in which corporate 
informative disseminations implicate confidence and investment decision-making. The 
content of the chapter addressed the methodological aspects of the research to include 
research design, research population, process for collecting data, privity and 
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confidentiality protocols, detailed systematic and analytical process, validity and 
reliability measures, and research tools/instruments and their application to data 
evaluation. These processes and mechanisms are considered appropriate to derive 
informationally rich and thick data from NIAI informants who provided a window to 
their phenomenological experiences. The extracted and developed themes, derived 
understandings, and meanings buttressed cognizance of the experiential orientation, 
conception, and social construction of the NIAI’s reality.  
Chapter 4 elaborates data collection, data analysis, delves into textural 
descriptions pertaining to the respective research questions, and present results. The 
chapter concludes with a summary. Figure 4 summarizes the methodological approach 
utilized in conducting the study. 
 
Figure 4. Research methodology chart. Methodology chart outlining the research 
framework and mapping the methodological flow of the study’s constituent parts.  
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Chapter 4: Results 
   Introduction 
This qualitative phenomenological study concentered to rendering a thick holistic 
portrayal of the essence and lived experiences of noninstitutional accredited investors 
(NIAIs) who experienced the effects of information asymmetry. The examination 
excursed a number of heuristic and theoretic principles, which are relevant to corporate 
governance praxis; principally its relationship to corporate information dissemination, its 
influence in inspiring confident decision-making for the investor/shareholder, and the 
conflicts of interest that pervade the agent- principal exchange. The study as viewed 
through an interpretivist prism was aimed at capturing the lived experiences (Clayton, 
2016; Smith, 2011) of noninstitutional accredited investors (NIAIs) by textual expression 
of experiential anecdotes as it regards the anteceding phenomena. These descriptions 
provide essences or meanings of experiences as they are perceived, and help researchers 
identify themes, patterns, and relationships (Spencer, 2015) that are derived for 
extraction, assessment, and analysis.  
Research and Interview Questions 
The study examined the lived experience of NIAIs specifically as it relates to their 
confidence and decision-making propensities as influenced by the force of informative 
disseminations. The foregoing is addressed in the interrogatives, which follow: 
(1) What are the lived experiences of the retail/noninstitutional accredited 
investor regarding corporate disseminations, its role in the proliferation of 
information asymmetry, its impact on confidence, judgment, and decision-
making propensities? 
  
150 
(2) What role has technology played in magnifying and/or minimizing the effects 
of informative dissemination and how does this affect the investor’s discipline 
and psychology with regards to decision-making? 
(3) What is the perception of the state of principal-agent relations as it pertains to 
governance and disclosure?  
(4) To what extent have regulatory reforms changed the investment environment 
in restoring confidence by holding bad actors to account? 
These questions explored through interviews and the journaling process required 
answers, which were addressed through a subset of 10 principal interview questions (see 
Table 1). Interview Questions 1-5 pertained to the decision-making and attitudinal 
disposition of the investor (NIAI). Interview question 6 related to the impact of 
technology, specifically on the dissemination of capital-market relevant information and 
its effect on the discipline and investment psychology of the NIAI investor. Interview 
question 7 pertained to the matter of principal-agent relations and the ensuing dialectical 
underpinnings. The final interview questions 8-10 focused on the regulatory environment 
and its perceived ability to (a) impact the requisite investor confidence and decision-
making propensity and (b) its effectiveness in serving as a mechanism for improved 
corporate disseminations. A supplemental questionnaire comprised of 12 demographic 
questions was requisitely completed and provided a profile of participating NIAIs (see 
Appendix C). The demographic questions were essential in elaborating and validating 
background, personal and professional experience, qualification, and disposition to 
decision-making. 
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Interview questions were semi-structured open-ended and administered uniformly 
taking each participant through the same sequential series as well as applying a proximal 
interview standard for consistency. There was provisioning for some measure of 
flexibility in the interview process, where new understandings and information gleaned 
enabled follow-up questions for the elicitation of greater insights and optimality in 
participant response (e.g., see Perry, 2013). Repetitive enunciations contributing to an 
overlapping of responses were critical variables highlighted in the interview protocol. As 
previously noted, the research questions were structured to probe (a) involvement, 
experience, and background with the phenomenon; (b) the effects of (information) 
technology in the context of amelioration or exacerbation of asymmetrical 
disseminations; (c) the principal-agent exchange/obtrusion; and (d) perception of 
regulations, rulemaking, and deterrence on corporate behavior regarding asymmetrical 
disclosures. 
Researcher Credibility 
The effectiveness of any phenomenological approach is largely determined by the 
actual experience of the participants and the researcher (DeFelice & Janesick, 2015). 
Patton (2002) and Pezalla, Pettigrew, and Miller-Day (2012) have spoken about the 
instrumental nature of the researcher as it relates to qualitative research projects. The 
perspectives of both Patton (2002) and Pezalla et al. (2012) it appears, is that the 
idiomatic position of the researcher has significant bearing on the potential outcome as a 
valid mechanism of any research study. One such aspect of instrumentality is researcher’s 
credibility. As noted by Patton (2002) there are no concrete series of questions that must 
be addressed to specifically validate credibility. This fact notwithstanding, credibility is 
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contingent on world-view, experience, training, benefaction (as applicable), the 
researcher’s relationship to the subject matter, and association with participants (Patton, 
2002; Thorne, 2016). Patton (2002) again underscored criteria to bolster researcher 
credibility. These criteria include detailing rival or alternate explanations, engaging the 
process of triangulation, and disclosing negative cases.  
With a finance and academic professional background spanning more than a 
decade, the researcher undertook the project because of intellectual curiosity of 
catastrophic meltdowns plaguing the capital markets in the past two decades. The natural 
interest was to identify plausible or explanatory (see Maxwell, 2005) factors or variables 
that consistently appeared as commonalities in the calamity of market crashes. Fueling 
this interest are confounded student audiences in the academic setting, who are 
consistently concerned as to the absence of credible safeguards in the financial markets to 
curb or forestall deleteriously economic-adverse tail events. While the above-mentioned 
considerations were fundamantal as background in catalyzing the research effort, 
qualitative scholarship is highly dependent on the academic and personal integrity of the 
researcher (Thorne, 2016).  
With the foregoing, and as noted in Chapter 3, the strict observance of the terms 
of the informed consent document included: (a) reiteration to ensure that respondents 
understood the voluntary and confidential nature of their involvement as well as their 
right to withdraw from the study, (b) requisite bracketing (Chan, Yuen-ling, & Wai-tong, 
2013; Moustakas, 1994; Rodham, Fox, & Doran, 2015) ensuring that personal 
preconceptions were set aside prior to each interview session, (c) semi-structured 
interview questions relating to the lifeworld experiences were instrumental in guiding the 
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process, and (d) scrupulousness and sensitivity were observed even as interviewees were 
encouraged to provide candid responses. The hallmark of sound qualitative research 
practice as it relates to researcher-participant instrumentality is futher enumerated in the 
following: 
• Keen awareness of the phenomenon and setting; 
• An approach that is multi-pronged as opposed to one that is uni-dimensional 
and focused to a singular disciplinary orientation; 
• Intuitiveness and a significant attention to detail, the ability to elicit the best 
veracity and forthrightness from respondents and, competence and aptitude as 
a researcher; 
• Having an open mind and non-judgemental attitude to particiapants and their 
perspectives, to encourage authencity, and; 
• Having an empathetic orientation and; a propensity for objectivity. (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldana, 2013, p. 42) 
Most significant, however, is that in conducting the study the researcher attempted to 
observe all objective rules, including those articulated herein; vital in supporting the 
practice of credible and ethical research. Of the researcher, Giorgi (2006) states 
“...examining the lived experience as it is lived and taking [it] as a true [representation] of 
the… [person’s experience enables an expansion] of [the] field of inquiry” (p. 83) and 
hence perceptions of the study’s rigor.  
Participants  
Upon the receipt of the university’s requisite approval for the study, the 
researcher adopted a multi-method approach to soliciting participants for the study. 
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Prospective participants were randomly selected from the private database of an 
investment institution and an affiliated marketing firm. Approximately 300 
noninstitutional accredited investors (NIAIs) were sent electronic email invitations 
soliciting their participation in the study. There were no responses. Following this 
unsuccessful approach, phone calls were placed to a number of qualified prospects. Of 
those contacted 21 expressed a willingness to participate. Of the twenty-one expressing 
an interest in participating, ten acquiesced. In addition to the direct emails, the researcher 
also utilized personal and professional networks in identifying individuals who satisfied 
the criteria and considered suitable for the study. Again, phone calls were made and email 
invitations were sent to 25 of these individuals as a means of soliciting participation. 
Eleven participated. There were some respondents that were eliminated for various 
discrepant and extraneous reasons, including privacy concerns and reluctance to revisit 
past experiences. In spite of the option and utility of purposive sampling, the 
demographics of the participants comported with recent U.S. statistics on investor 
composition. The data collection in its entirety spanned approximately seven months. 
Data Collection and Setting 
Interview 
After contact and obtaining a commitment to participate prospective participants 
were provided with the informed consent document stipulating the terms and conditions 
as outlined in Chapter 3. The signed statement of consent was obtained prior to each 
scheduled interview. As a practical matter, in-person interviews were accorded priority 
(where possible) so as to capture emotions, body language, concreteness and immediacy 
of the moment (Patton, 2002; Rimando et al., 2015). These interviews were typically at a 
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Starbucks coffee shop or the informant’s office. Audio recordings facilitated data 
collection and a series of journalized entries (Miles et al., 2013) were utilized as a 
supplemental medium. Other data collection, resulting from in-depth interviews, occurred 
by way of a synchronous Zoom audio/video conference platform (Marshall & Rossman, 
2016). Again, as feasible journalized entries were prepared. Interview questions 
presented were previously validated by an expert panel of industry practitioners and 
academics (refer Table 1) as articulated in the previous chapter. The interview protocol 
was aimed at eliciting rich experiential data relating to investment activity as influenced 
by corporate information disseminations. Interviewees were encouraged to be forthright 
in their recount of lived-experiences, yielding in many instances rich interview data 
(Rimando et al., 2015). Appropriate circumspection with respect to individual/personal 
vulnerabilities was observed. In instances, conversations extended beyond the scope of 
the interview and capacity of the recording device or prior or subsequent to the official 
proceedings. Impressions, the complexities of relevant participant perceptions, and 
judgments were also documented where possible.  
Transcription 
Data transcription was verbatim (Callary, Rathwell, & Young, 2015) and occurred 
usually within 2-3 days of data collection where possible. Voice recordings were 
transcribed using Apple’s voice to text application. Transcriptions took approximately 4-
6 hours on average per participant. Data were transcribed and subsequently 
pseudonymized using a randomized numeric system of assigning confidential participant 
codes as a replacement for names. Potential researcher bias was controlled or alleviated 
by stringently prioritizing and evoking the attitude of the epoché, a process that includes 
  
156 
stating one’s assumptions and preconceptions explicitly as a part of the engagement 
(Chamberlain, 2013). All interview data were transcribed to Microsoft Word documents, 
and later printed for re-readings and analysis. Transcribed interviews were also sent to 
participants to be verified for accuracy (Petty, Thomson, & Stew, 2012). All research-
related recordings, transcripts, and personally identifiable data were transferred to 
external data storage drives, password protected (where possible), and secured in a locked 
cabinet.  
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Table 2 
Demographic Characteristics (N=21) 
Participant code Occupation Age Group 
Years of 
experience 
Participant 1 Retired Investor 50-59 21-25 
Participant 2 Pharmacy Sales 40-49 1-5 
Participant 3 Business Development 50-59 20-25 
Participant 4 Retired Businessman 60-69 >31 
Participant 5 Medical Doctor 40-49 21-25 
Participant 6 Retired Medical Doctor 80-89 >31 
Participant 7 Technology Executive 40-49 16-20 
Participant 8 Businessman 50-59 21-25 
Participant 9 Businessman 40-49 25-30 
Participant 10 Businessman 40-49 20-25 
Participant 11 Electrical Engineer 50-59 25-30 
Participant 12 Businessman 50-59 25-30 
Participant 13 Retired Engineer 60-69 >31 
Participant 15 Businessman 50-59 11-15 
Participant 14 Businessman 40-49 11-15 
Participant 16 Businessman 40-49 6-10 
Participant 18 Engineer 50-59 21-25 
Participant 19 Pastor 60-69 16-20 
Participant 20 Ecommerce Business 40-49 6-10 
Participant 21 Technology 40-49 6-10 
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Data Analysis: IPA /Research Design 
Interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) is an established qualitative 
analytical approach in areas of person-centered research including social science, 
psychology, and healthcare (Joseph, 2014; Smith, 2011; 2015). IPA’s idiographic thrust 
(Thackeray & Eatough, 2015), its resonance in phenomenology and hermeneutics as a 
methodological framework is constructive in data analysis and provides guidelines for 
conceptualization and extraction of themes and textures as appropriate in the examination 
of lived experiences (Skinta & Brandrett, 2016). Extending the sentiments of Skinta and 
Brandrett (2016), the scope and rigor involved in exploring such facets of the lived 
experience and its analysis, reinforces IPA as a suitable tool for research studies 
particularly with small sample sizes.  
While highly regarded because of rigor and intensiveness IPA does have its 
detractors who point to the customarily smaller samples. Skinta and Brandrett (2016), for 
example, have suggested a sample size of five, while Finlay (2013) has suggested up to 
eight; there does not appear to be consensus, in light of the fact that the objective is 
saturation (Elliott & Timulak, 2005). To mitigate or overcome this criticism, the sample 
size was set at much higher levels than usual. Twenty to twenty five informants 
theoretically contribute richer data breadth and potentially improve resource and analytic 
quality, thereby ameliorating goodness of results (Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013; 
Miles & Huberman, 1994). Yet, amassing too large a sample size may likely overwhelm 
the reseracher with qualitative material to the point of diminishing returns where there is 
no emergence of new information (Pietkiewicz & Smith, 2012). 
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Data Analysis: Coding 
According to Pietkiewicz and Smith (2012) IPA researchers have a modicum of 
freedom in adapting an approach of analysis commensurate with their research goal. 
Accordingly, analytical efforts for the study included interrogation of 21 individual 
transcripts manually and with the aid of professional qualitative software, engaging the 
epoché or bracketing, data coding, and data analysis/abstraction. Elliott and Timulak 
(2005) and Finlay (2013) stress the sytematization and organitization in the analytical 
trail such that information gleaned from the data, can be reconciled in source and context. 
To align with this premise, data content of the transcripts were processed with the use of 
the previously stated NVivo 11 software package. Themes were extracted and clustered 
into subsets or subsamples.  
The coding of interview data for classification and analysis is a requisite step in 
the qualitative process. As observed in Chapter 3 the data examination is adapted to and 
grounded in Pietkiewicz and Smith’s (2012) IPA guideline for phenomenological data 
analysis. The methodolgy is thusly summarized:  
(1) Transcripts are read repeatedly.  
(2) Notes are taken capturing the transcriptions. 
(3) Emergent themes are derived from the research notes. Consonantly, data are 
separated into specific meaning units (Elliott & Timulak, 2005); Larkin and 
Thompson (2012) describes this process as developing patterns of meaning. 
(4) Relationship between emergent themes is constructed; themes are used 
as the basis of clusters (initial structural development followed through 
subsequent structural development). 
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(5) Process is repeated for subsequent cases; that is, the prior four steps are 
executed on each remaining case.  
(6) Constructed themes are individually documented, extracting patterns and 
themes (providing an interpretation for the reader). 
 An emergent nature and an inductive process have been descriptives closely 
associated with qualitative data analysis (Schreier, 2012). In explication, stages 1 and 2 
entailed repeated readings and the process of notation, capturing each participant’s 
rendering in description, vividness, linguistic representation, as well as cogitating the 
researcher’s experience and conceptualization of the topic.  
In keeping with the dictate of the previous steps, the third step entailed the 
identification and conceptualization of emergent themes/meaning units. Repeated checks 
for a more granular coding consistency in meaning units (Richards, 2014) yielded 
approximately 80% consistency. While there is no benchmark for a recognized 
standard/consistency of coding frame for qualitative research, acceptable evidentiary 
statistic requires approximately 80-90% at the minimum (Miles & Huberman, 1994; 
Saldaña, 2015). The particularities of the relevant themes were described abbreviately (in 
the case of NVivo 11, at the node) as a reminder of the original context and sources. 
Meaning units ranged descriptively, from the literal to the metaphorical. Guidance for 
this step was informed by the literature and research questions (Callary, Rathwell, & 
Young, 2015).  
Step 4 identified and partitionalized emergent themes based on the essential 
research questions. This was followed by axial re-grouping under superordinate thematic 
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constructions comprised of previously established emergent subordinated themes (NVivo 
11 provided a hierarchical overview of node organization).  
Step 5 was a reenactment of the preceding steps one to four, with subsequent case 
characterization examined for contiguity to fit to previously established themes 
(Maxwell, 2012) and where necessary, reconciled with the original data as appropriate for 
contextual/or thematic validity.  
The sixth step provided an interpretive description of the phenomenon. The 
principal categorizations, which largely cohered and were consistent across the entirety of 
participants, circumscribed themes, concurrencies, and discrepancies. Figure 5 details the 
process. 
 
Figure 5. IPA coding and analysis strategy created and utilized for the study. Summary of 
the IPA coding and analytical process facilitates coherence of methodological flow and 
identification of themes, which are integral to synthesis and formulation of informants’ 
renderings. The figure provides visualization and enables the construction and validation 
of conclusions (phases adapted from Pietkiewicz and Smith, 2012). 
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Substantively, the participants’ description of concatenations of their respective 
experiences of information asymmetry was compared and contrasted within and across 
cases (Gale, Heath, Cameron, Sabina, & Redwood, 2013). The reductive process 
contemplated the essence of horizonalization, where individuals’ perceptions contributed 
to the collection of experiences recounted (Moustakas, 1994). Horizonalization was vital 
in identifying emergent constructs for the purpose of distinguishing relevant conceptions 
and interrelated ideas, which subjectively underpin the lived experience of the retail 
investor. This was purposed to filling in gaps, where they existed (Jean, Hay-Smith, 
Dickson, Nunnerley, & Sinnott, 2013: Miles, Huberman, & Saldana, 2013). Figure 6 
presented below, provides an overview of the reductive coding process where subthemes 
annexed to research questions are distilled to two central themes: information 
idiosyncrasies and trust of the governance and regulatory systems. 
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Figure 6. Categorization and reductive coding process. The process is used for thematic 
extraction. The figure provides an overview of the reductive coding process (left to right), 
utilizing the NVivo 11 software, where subthemes annexed to four research questions 
relating to information asymmetry and its impact on the decision-making propensities of 
the non-institutional accredited investors are distilled to two central themes represented 
as: Primary theme 1 and Primary theme 2. 
 
Findings 
Analysis of the data coupled with searching keywords and category labels yielded 
48 themes, which captured the essence of the research questions. These thematic gestalts 
were subsumed under two central themes: (a) the state of information idiosyncrasies and 
its disseminative capacity and (b) trust of the management and of the governance and 
regulatory process. Both categorically advanced an emergent picture of ideational strands 
of the phenomenon that aligned with an interpretive and descriptive thrust (West & 
Borup, 2014) of conceptions undergirding information asymmetry.  
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The essence of the phenomenon was captured with the utilization of graphs, 
charts, figures, and tabular formulations, integrated for visual substantiation and analytic 
interpretation (Elliott & Timulak, 2005; Silver & Lewins, 2014). A series of queries 
consequently fine-tuned chart exhibits, depicting the frequency of key words/expressions 
as well as the magnitude of the core themes, which reflected constructs and explanatory 
narrative/excerpts derived from the coded content of the respective subordinated themes. 
Distinctive aspects of the qualitative research process have been described as 
cyclic according to Schreier (2012). Adopting this method of consistency, sample cases 
were initially analyzed by application of a systematic review of conceptual 
determinations and logic in the assignment of codes (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Noble & 
Smith, 2014). Initial code-assignments deemed satisfactory, enabled a similar standard to 
be applied to remaining cases. Forty-eight subordinated themes were clustered into the 
formation of the two higher order themes: (1) Information Idiosyncrasies, Access, and 
Asymmetry and (2) Trust of the Governance Structure and Regulatory Framework.  
Primary Theme 1: Information Idiosyncrasies, Access, and Asymmetry 
Information dissemination and its idiosyncratic attributes inform the capital 
markets about the performance of publicly traded firms in particular, enabling investors 
(shareholders) to make timely and important decisions about their investments (Miller & 
Skinner, 2015). Information production and dissemination are largely influenced by 
myriad technologies, which consequently dictate the ways it is managed and consumed 
by the noninstitutional accredited investor (NIAI) across a vast media landscape. The 
force of social media, the blogosphere as suggested by King (2014), and mobility 
platforms have also indelibly broadened the reach of these disseminative channels.  
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For Primary Theme 1, six categories of descriptive constructs emerged. Seventy-
five percent of participants supported the cost-benefit calculus of regulations (e.g., 
Sarbanes-Oxley) proffering opinions that were largely supportive of some strengthening 
of investor protections. Arguably, this is vital to the integrity of the investment process 
and for affirming investor confidence (Alnaser, 2014). On a follow-up question for 
instance, regarding beneficial ownership and the inference of “talking one’s book”, 
Participant 19 responded: “I guess they have that as a regulation for transparency [filing 
of Schedule 13D or 13G], but in that particular case, I think it would be fairer and more 
towards a level playing field if that information was never publicized." The inference in 
this case is that large investors, having bought investments, with subsequent reporting 
benefit from the drift in buy-side responses (e.g., see copy-cat investing, Kjetsaa & Kieff, 
2014), which could potentially inflate the profits of the Filer. The tabulated narratives 
additionally exemplify statements representative of the thematic sentiment (see Table 4). 
A summary is also provided of the emerged clusters and their relationship to the central 
theme as depicted in Figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7. Information idiosyncrasies. This high order theme categorizes the collective 
strands of subthemes, which formulate Principal theme 1. This reports informational 
disclosures by the reporting community (publicly traded companies, analysts, etcetera) 
and reflect how technology shapes media and related perceptions of the investor. 
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Table 3 
Primary Theme 1: Idiosyncratic Nature of Informational Disclosures 
Participants  Statements      
Participant 4 [E]ach organization that puts up information… all you have to do is 
look around and tune in…. Change the channel to the next one and 
within 20 minutes another station is [reporting] the same information. 
So what happens is that one company puts it out…[emphasis] one news 
outlet puts that information out; and it’s picked up…it’s picked up and 
down the line and spread across all of them [media]—the same 
information. 
 
 
 
 
Participant 7 [Impact of information...]: I think there are news agencies that bias 
their information on specific companies—particular companies that 
they may have an interest [inaudible] in. 
 
 
Participant 1 I think that with all information and with all the avenues where the 
information is passed these days, compared to days old, I think it hurts 
investors… in that they want immediate results… patience has been 
thrown out the window with the advent of technology. I think today 
people just feel that they want what they want, and they want it now. I 
think the days of planting a seed and letting it grow is out the window 
and I think that technology has created a more volatile marketplace.  
 
  
 
Subordinate Theme 1.1: Attitudinal Disposition 
Following major corporate failures such as Enron, WorldCom, Barings and 
others, investors have engaged in greater levels of activism including demanding greater 
disclosure, improved transparency, and initiating more corporate governance reforms 
(Solomon, 2007). Further, investors attitudes have shifted in an era where the quest to 
maximize profits is bereft of any consideration to the concerns of shareholders. 
Participants’ having responded to questions 3 and 4 through proxy interview questions 
(see Figure 5), have expressed perspectives that provide insights to their attitude 
concerning the capital markets and the disseminative effects of vital information, which 
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is channeled across various contemporary media. Responses ranged from the economics 
of their investing to the self-interested leanings of corporate leadership. Participant 15 
exhibited greater caution in his approach. He sides with the small investor in 
subcontracting investments to index funds. Attitudinally, he has little confidence in his 
ability to maintain parity with sophisticated more informed investors. He indicated:  
I…do less trading than a professional investor does because my feeling [is] 
anytime I’m making a trade I’m probably making a trade against someone that 
perhaps has better information than I do and more knowledge than I have. So I 
think it’s to my disadvantage to trade very often. 
The cost-benefit calculation in this case failed to align with the investor’s prerogatives. 
Participant 11 ventured, “I lost money because of certain things; because of 
recommendations from stockbrokers …. It’s…[pause] it’s not credible to me and the only 
way [is] to actually trade purely technical[ly] or based on fundamentals.” In 
benchmarking her broker, Participant 20 opined: “I really have no good way to 
reasonably evaluate how effective they are [pause]… which is frankly useless.” 
Participant 19 offers: “I have invested in companies that no doubt somebody in the 
company knew they were going belly up. But the average investor did not know.” Further 
exemplars of dialogic extracts underlying the subtheme are provided below in Table 4 
and Figure 8 provides graphical thematic summaries. 
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Table 4  
Subordinate Theme 1.1: Attitudinal Disposition 
Participants   Statements 
 
        
Participant 18 Most people, especially after a crisis—you know it’s said that after 
any individual crisis, people get out of the market—[some] say they 
will never get back in. And sometimes they say you even lose a whole 
generation because of what’s happened in the market—that’s 
unfortunate. That’s very unfortunate. 
 
 
 
 Participant 21 "[On the question of doing research]: Yes…doing one’s own research 
makes the idea of being necessarily affected by the asymmetrical 
process a little less likely." 
 
 
 
Participant 19 
Participant 19 
I weigh being in the market even with those situations occurring and 
realizing that as they have occurred in the past they could occur in the 
future. I weigh that against just keeping a sizable amount of money in 
Money Market Funds, which these days you’re almost certainly losing 
money each day that you have money in Money Markets. 
 
 
 
 
       Participant 8 So I think …and just knowing it (information asymmetry) is out there 
you just don’t trust because you feel like you’re at a disadvantage as a 
retail investor because the people you’re talking to know everything 
and you really know nothing. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 8. Subtheme 1.1: Attitudinal disposition. Characterization of themes relating to 
research questions 3 and 4. Fifty eight percent of the responses supported the theme: 
altered strategic approach, and 38% supported the theme: reflexive response of the 
investor. Minor theme identified was, the investor’s perception of the industry. 
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Subordinate Theme 1.2: Competence and Expertise  
Competence and expertise were established as overarching themes for the non-
institutionsl accredited investor (NIAI). This was of particular importance because many 
viewed its absence as a vulnerability that can and is often exploited given the increasing 
market complexity (Monti, Pelligra, Martignon, & Berg, 2014). Blonski and Blonski, 
(2016, p. 46) (citing Barber and Odean, 2013), used the word “perverse” in characterizing 
the levels of skill and investment competence exhibited by investors.  
Non-institutional accredited investors (NIAI) generally have greater levels of 
financial literacy relative to the mass investor population. A forerunning sentiment 
expressed, centers to the the competence effect (Erner, Klos, & Langer, 2013; Graham, 
Harvey, & Huang, 2006) or expertise engendered by way of confidence attained through 
decision-making in investing. Investors also expressed concerns relative to returns and 
trading expenses and have contemplated or are now engaged in self-directed investing 
strategies. Success at this, for them, means the acquisition of quality information, which 
is paramount. Self education and methodical development in/of their own investing 
systems was a proposition that garnered consensus. Accordingly, 38% of the responses 
supported the theme of a systematic approach to investing and 28.57% supported the 
theme: investment literacy. The analyzed data extracts which follow, affirms the point 
(see Table 5 and Figure 9). 
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Table 5  
Subordinate Theme 1.2: Competence and Expertise 
Participants Statements       
 Participant 7 "Unless you have an extensive financial background, and extensive 
knowledge about markets, not just domestically but globally, you will be ill-
advised to attempt to invest on your own."   
  Participant 9 Set up some tools of choice where you can receive information about your 
investments. Something to track your portfolio for technical analysis, but 
also fundamentals—e.g., press releases; any news events; know the 
company’s management/ the board structure. 
  
  
  Participant 13 Yes...I am more a long term player, guided by a longer-term strategy. Like I 
said, the market might go down 200 or 300 points and it usually goes down a 
lot quicker than it comes back, but if I’m confident with what I’m holding, 
and I know that they are sound companies…the market is not going to affect 
them that much. 
  
  
  
     
 
  
  
Participant 18 "I would base this (the propensity of rendering advice) on experience in the 
market and also experience…[pause]. And oh yeah, my personal experience. 
When I was young, before I had money to invest, I would read Forbes and 
fall in love with every company I read about. And on paper buy that stock 
and probably lose my paper investment. 
  
  
  
  
 
  
 
 
Figure 9. Subtheme 1.2: Competence and expertise. Characterization of emerged themes 
relating to research questions 3 and 4. Thirty nine percent of the responses supported the 
theme: a systematic approach to investing, and 28.57% supported the theme: investment 
literacy. Additional themes identified were professionalizing ones approach to investing 
and reducing the knowledge gap. 
  
172 
Subordinate Theme 1.3: Media and Dissemination 
Technology has changed the way that corporate leadership disseminates company 
information, reporting to their shareholders and the investing public (Miller & Skinner, 
2015). Information streams generated by new technologies have become indispensable in 
fostering improved investor understanding of the capital markets and providing needed 
transparency and market intelligence vital to informed decision-making (Kelton & Yang, 
2008). Technology-enabled disseminations, however, can also be nefariously 
appropriated with negative consequences (Cade, 2016). Fifty-five percent of the 
responses indentified quality dissemination as disquieting and 28% identified 
questionable disclosures as concerning. Participant 7 was dubious and considers 
disseminations as being somewhat contrived. He suggested: “…a lot of those different 
venues and mediums are [inaudible], they’re distractions to the truth; to what’s really 
going on within a company….” Participant 19 was very matter-of-factly in perspective. 
To the issue of proliferation of technology/disseminations, he responded: “Well, with 
every increasing facet of technology it can either be a friend or a foe.” Perspectives 
ranged from skepticism, to indifference, to pragmatism (see Table 6 and figure 10). 
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Table 6  
Subordinate Theme 1.3: Media and Dissemination 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participants Statements         
Participant 18 Yes, it has [technology has impacted my approach]. The automated 
trading—you call it machine trading or high-speed trading—with direct 
communication to the market, you just don’t have the luxury of trend 
following over a period of weeks or months like you used to. 
            Participant 5 Honestly, I don’t follow [the impact of technology] that closely; but 
when there is major news story …[inaudible] obviously as a person 
having an interest in general issues [inaudible]… I will read about it, 
whatever the company… somebody was doing …, or there is a major 
scandal or something, but I’m not the kind of person that reads the Wall 
Street Journal or is watching FNBC [sic] [CNBC] or any of these 
channels all the time.  
  
Participant 14 
 
No [there are no basic endpoints that information [qualitatively] should 
meet before it’s allowed to be disseminated into the public 
environment]. I think that would cause too many problems. I think it’s 
better to get it fast but I just think it’s a lot of information and that’s 
what makes it a gamble. There’s no guarantee the information you get, 
and that how you act upon it is going to be hundred percent relevant at 
the time that you act on it; you hope so but I don’t think you always 
know.  
         Participant 21 You have to be concerned where you’re getting [information] from. 
Everybody has a website, or thing, or a tweet, so you have to know 
where the information is coming from and whether it’s valid. 
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Figure 10. Subtheme 1.3: Media and dissemination. Characterized emerged themes 
relating to research questions 1 and 2. Key themes identified were quality of 
disseminations, opportunism associated with certain disclosures, and the impactfulness of 
technology as a disclosure medium. 
  
Subordinate Theme 1.4: Transparency 
Effective investing in the capital markets require a considerable amount of 
transparency (Asquith, Covert, & Pathak, 2013) in (a) mitigating pricing dispersion of 
bid-ask spreads, (b) improvement of market liquidity, (c) the enhancement of financial 
market rectitude, and (d) increased stability. For the investor, transparency is also called 
into question, with firms in the past, withholding or manipulating information deemed 
unfavorable. In other instances, firms may report poor earnings, often doing so at day’s 
end after market close, to minimize trade impact (Michaely, Rubin, & Vedrashko, 2014). 
Legislative efforts such as Dodd-Frank and Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) have been aimed at 
the reduction of market opacity and financial vagaries. In answering the question of 
improvement in market transparency as a result of legislative reforms, noninstitutional 
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accredited investors reflected a mostly irresolute perspective. Collectively, 57% of 
references themed to the notions: needed transparency in market internals and executive 
actions. Additionally, 26% of references identified institutional information bias as a 
point of contention. Participant 7, for instance, with a measure of doubt, suggested: “I do 
think [Sarbanes-Oxley has enhanced transparency].” When asked to explain, he added: 
[D]on’t know how much it bolsters confidence, but it does give you a little bit 
more information and transparency as far as that particular company is concerned 
and being able to make determinations as to whether or not you want to invest in 
that company. 
Participant 11 was measured yet equivocal in his response, suggesting:  
I don’t really know that it’s changed anything. Yes, it’s in place. Everyone knows, 
I/[we] have to behave a certain way to not violate the law. Yeah…probably a few 
people will obey that and do what’s right. However, we have seen—what was it 
here, Martha Stewart…that was after Sarbanes-Oxley…correct? 
For many participants it appeared that transparency was a relative and abstract concept 
and invited an approach of ambivalence (see Table 7 and Figure 11).  
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Table 7  
Subordinate Theme 1.4: Transparency 
Participants   Statements       
Participant 12 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant 2 
There’s insider trading so to speak going on every single day. If you 
made it so corporations couldn’t own [their own shares]… [meaning]: 
the executive officers couldn’t really buy and sell the stock of a 
corporation they work for; [that] might alleviate some of that 
[problem].  
 
"I think companies report what they want to report…. People react to 
this information." 
 
Participant 4 “And making decisions become a little trickier because there’s 
nothing there… there’s no fool like an old fool… someone who 
really thinks he knows when in fact [he's] about to take the worst hit 
[he's] ever taken.” 
Participant 19 "[To the question of disclosing large positions to the public already 
bought; the inference is “talking one’s book”]. I guess they have that 
as a regulation for transparency, but in that particular case, I think it 
would be fairer and more towards a level playing field if that was 
never publicized." 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Subtheme 1.4: Transparency. This illustrates the imperative of transparency in 
market integrity, efficiency, liquidity, and stability. A collective 57% of 23 references 
themed to: needed transparency in market internals and executive actions. Additional 
references themed: institutional information bias at 26% and laissez-fair reporting at 
17%. 
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Subordinate Theme 1.5: Miscellany of Investor Behavior 
Disposition effect. Individual investor behavior is driven by a miscellany of 
factors including the information received (Lam, DeRue, Karam, Hollenbeck, 2011), past 
performance of investments (Grinblatt, & Keloharju, 2000; Hoffmann, Post, & Pennings, 
2013), the demand and limitation of cognitive engagement in light of situational 
complexity (bounded rationality) (McCann & Shinkle, 2016; Stolte, 1994), and cognitive 
dissonance where there is the question of the responsibility for investment outcomes 
(Chang, Solomon, & Westerfield, 2016). These are characteristics that collectively align 
with notions of the disposition effect where investors are highly preferential to winnng 
investments but are reluctant to divest underperformers. Participants acknowledged to 
various degrees an overall disposition to a variety of factors that influenced investment 
behaviors. A review of the meaning units under the subtheme cluster, miscellany of 
investor behavior, yielded the composite references: satisficing, which scored 35%; 
investment performance scored 24%; and responsibility for outcomes scored 24% (see 
Figure 12). Aligning perspectives with the theme of satisficing and bounded rationality, 
Participant 20 explained (speaking of strategy and advisors): 
A part of the dilemma is that there’s no one best strategy. It is all very 
circumstantial but it’s still [inaudible], because I don’t fully understand any of the 
strategy; trying to determine whether any of these particular guys are really taking 
into account our situation sufficiently. It could be really good advice but I cannot 
evaluate any of that because the sufficient knowledge is lacking. 
Participant 12 in offering a similar themed response indicated:  
[Y]ou get… from the analysts, you get different perspectives... and one analyst  
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says it’s a buy, another analyst says it’s a hold or sell, and you don’t know what to 
do. I think you have to take that information with a grain of salt. 
Additional narrative excerpts are provided in Table 8.
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Table 8 
Subordinate Theme 1.5a: Investor Behavior–Advice 
Participants  Statements            
Participant 18 "My advice would be, not to fall in love within a particular company or 
sector. If you’re going to trade a sector probably trade the best in class." 
 
Participant 5 [In the way of advice]: I mean…it is my own view, but in general I 
think we’re at a big disadvantage. If this is what you do, if you decide 
you’re just going to take… you’re not going to have a regular job, your 
job is just going to be the market, and you learn a lot, and you got the 
[ability] thinking like these very rapid day traders. I mean…a lot of 
these guys took off from their full-time jobs and they learn and then 
they’re sort of like insiders. So now these guys can jump in and play the 
game (very) well. But if you’re a busy guy--you have another job—you 
don’t have time to be doing this. I think it’s better just to buy something 
like an index fund; sort of buy-and-hold forever… you know [both 
laugh] rather than try to time the market or see what companies are hot 
today and invest …. And with information asymmetry by the time you 
know [about the] companies, the insiders already know. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant 1 [To advice]: I think that if today’s investors are going to be managing 
their accounts I believe they should have at least 60% to 80% of their 
portfolios in the more established well run companies that have 
provided average to above average growth. Using that with technical 
and fundamental information with respect to when to buy and sell is 
definitely a good thing to use. But if you’re investing in the market with 
less than one to a three year time frame, that’s not a place they should 
be. 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant 8 [To advice]: I’d say get as much information as possible and use a 
broker to perhaps aid you in the trading; give you a little more 
information, and then maybe just someone that’s going to be there on a 
day-to-day basis, so that you can go to work every day and not worry 
about it. But don’t depend on him to do everything for you and just 
blindly follow whatever he says. 
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Philosophy. The investor’s philosophy directs normative behavior (Chang, & Lin, 
2015) and reflects core beliefs regarding market approach or specific strategic pursuits. 
Effective investors can ill-afford agnosticism. The investor must be oriented to a 
semblance of structured investment theory and have the requisite wherewithal to exercise 
such skills. Investors must also have a commitment to improving or refining their acumen 
and exemplify creativity and dexterity in their approach (Widger, 2014). When asked 
about their philosophical disposition 53% of the references supported advice and 
education, 47% suggested the impact of emotions, and 35% pointed to satisficing as 
being cognitively limiting. When asked about the research question 1 cluster, Participant 
6 suggested discipline gleaned through heuristic engagements: 
I would have to say… how do I arrive at taking a position in anything? I do 
subscribe to some pretty good literature…. It [there] might be some particular 
investments though… I’ll examine it…. I’ll get the hang of it; I’ll check the charts 
and if I act on it, I’ll try to pick up a place where my chart tells me, or there’s a 
good place to get in. I won’t allow a big loss to occur before I get out no matter 
what reasons I have to be in the stock in the first place.  
Participant 13 was equally sanguine in advising on a strategic approach and articulated a 
key strategy for improved success in investing as: 
Know[ing] that you can lose your ass when you do it. Then determine how much 
of your ass you want to hang on to. And that means, what level…if the stock goes 
down for one day, are you going to hang on to it or run away and sell it? You’re 
probably not going to make it…if you do that because you will end up selling a 
lot of the stocks that just had a bad day. 
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Table 9 and Figure 12 provide additional representative narratives, insights, and a 
summary. 
Table 9 
Subordinate Theme 1.5b: Investor Behavior: Philosophy 
Participants    Statements  
 
        
Participant 2 "People don’t know what to do with this information (the role of 
technology). They are confused." 
 
 Participant 20 Those of us who are making money outside the financial Industry don’t 
have enough knowledge of the finance industry to actually make any 
sort of reasonable decision. Because we’re too busy making that money 
to actually take the time to learn it. So it all comes down to, how reliable 
is the person we put our trust in. 
 
 
        Participant 3 [Relating to learning with obvious government reforms]: Well I do 
think I have a very good understanding of how the companies behave 
and again I have to take it upon myself to do the necessary 
homework and research on any stock that I’m interested in investing 
in. I cannot base it on information reported to me by these company 
leaders. I need to have an understanding of the product, an 
understanding of the market, and of the history before I make an 
investment—moving forward. 
 
 
 
 
        Participant 5 [Question of technology]: Anyway, my approach is that I only do 
healthcare index funds—the Vanguard healthcare index fund. I know 
what you’re saying [inaudible]. Long term I’m a doctor…I know that the 
population gets older and I know they’re going to need much more care. I 
know as an industry… it’s a most rapidly growing industry, so I know 
overall that the sector’s going to keep expanding. So an index is very well 
diversified [background noise]. I do not pay too much attention to one 
company doing something really bad. You’re diversified across the picks; 
you have pharmaceuticals [background noise], you have insurance 
companies, you have start-ups for certain products…, it’s truly a 
diversified thing. So I buy-and-hold. I started investing maybe 20 years 
ago I just keep periodically adding more to it. So I don’t wait for 
something to take place [almost inaudible—background noise]. 
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Figure 12. Sub question 1.5 (a & b): Miscellany-investor behavior. Identified thematic 
composite of emerged responses of noninstitutional accredited investor attributes to 
research questions 1 and 2. Leading subthemes were: proffered advice on strategic 
approach, the philosophical disposition to investing including impact of emotions, 
performance accountability, assigning responsibility for outcomes, and satisficing given 
the influence of bounded rationality. 
 
Primary Theme 2: Trust of Governance Structure and Regulations 
The notion of trust as it relates to the governance structure and regulatory 
framework underpinning disseminations, garnered responses, which spanned the 
continuum. An excerpt from Armstrong, Guay, Mehran, and Weber (2015) (in reprising 
Holmstrom, 2005) encapsulates one of the prevailing scholarly sentiments on issues of 
trust and governance: 
Getting information requires a trusting relationship with management. If the board 
becomes overly inquisitive and starts questioning everything that the management 
does, it will quickly be shut out of the most critical information flow–the tacit 
information that comes forward when management trusts that the board 
understands how to relate to this information and how to use it. Management will 
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keep information to itself if it fears excessive board intervention. A smart board 
will let management have its freedom in exchange for the information that such 
trust engenders. (p. 9) 
The foregoing conceptualization has been discoursed by the Verstegen Ryan and 
Buchholz’s (2001) Trust-Risk Decision-Making model and similarly elaborated in 
Akerlof’s (1970) Information Asymmetry postulations. Both, in substantive ways and to 
varying degrees capture the essence and gravity of trust as a mediative instrument of 
expectations when dealing with agents/functionaries (generally fiduciaries), whose fealty 
should be to their equity investors. Extrapolating Armstrong et al. (2015), while there is 
explicit discourse of costs and other complex elements that proscribe trust and improved 
governance praxis, there is argument regarding the relationship priorities of executive 
management and shareholders. There is tacit acknowledgement that (a) an alignment of 
interest between shareholders and boards of directors might not effectively be the same as 
the interest of management and shareholders and (b) an alignment of interest between 
executive and non-executive management constituencies, might not necessarily be 
accordantly responsive and attendant to the priorities of the shareholder. Both, if 
commensurately improved, potentially serve the interest of all stakeholders. Indeed, 
informed and judicious governance is more structurally, socially (Westphal & Zajac, 
2013), and financially amenable to all stakeholders, and is hence likely to improve or 
restore flailing levels of trust. Thus, the anteceding frameworks serve as a prism through 
which responses to the principal theme of trust and governance can be interpreted. 
Tabular excerpts of narratives comprising emergent themes are presented in Table 10 
below and summarized in Figure 13.  
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Table 10 
Primary Theme 2- Trust:Governance Structure and Regulatory Framework 
Participants    Statements            
 
Wells Fargo is a pretty good example [it is alleged that Wells Fargo 
has been engaged in fraudulent acts to bolster revenue and profit 
goals]. That pretty much says it all, right there. I don’t trust anybody 
except me. 
Participant 13 
  
[On the issue of trust]: Well I think information is disseminated from 
CEOs, information officers, and public information people—that 
information is always quasi-positive and they rarely tell you the truth 
about negative situations. 
Participant 12 
 
        Participant 18 I’m not trusting [of stewardship]. And [for] a good reason: obviously 
2008 exposed the fact everybody in the system had an excuse to keep 
degrading the quality of mortgages, and loans, and [inaudible] until 
the entire system broke down. That hasn’t ended. 
 
[Y]ou really don’t trust as much and you feel like [you should] 
because of the Internet; that there is a way that maybe you can get it, 
so I think that, at least for me, it makes me do even more [due] 
diligence, because I know in the market that sometimes information 
that’s out there can already be priced into the market. So now I am 
looking to verify that and also to see if there is any new information. 
 
 
 
Participant 8 
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 Primary Theme 2- Trust: Governance Structure and Regulatory Framework 
 
Figure 13. Trust of management and the regulatory process. High order theme comprised 
of subthemes, which formulate Primary Theme 2. This reports the matter of trust and 
confidence with regards to management praxis and the effective exercise of regulatory 
oversight. 
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Subordinate Theme 2.1: Investor Expectations Gauge  
Non-institutional accredited investors were concerned about the level of trust-
inspired confidence gleaned through the investment environment and its import to the 
decision making process. Opinions expressed by NIAIs, evidenced that this is also 
determinative of the discretion and lens applied regarding the scrutiny of regulatory 
protections. Acharya, Anginer, and Warburton (2015) have articulated investor-centered 
concerns ranging from government sponsored guarantees in the event of market shocks 
buffeting systemically important financial institutions, to the restoration of confidence as 
integral to the sound functioning of the nation’s financial institutions and capital markets. 
Analysis identified that expectations not only affect where the investor goes to collect 
information in context of related perceptions and biases, but how it is cognitively 
interpreted in terms of the weighting of variables, which are critical to the decision 
process. In communicating their experiences and feelings, with respect to their 
expectations, 47% identified confidence as concerning and 38% observed false assurance, 
specifically: (a) having an over-dependence on market integrity and (b) favoring of 
certain market constituents whose interests and priorities are seemingly more highly 
regarded in legislating and enforcing regulatory protections. Excerpts located in Table 11 
and graphically depicted in Figure 14 provide illumination. 
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Table 11 
Subordinate Theme 2.1: Investor Expectations 
Participants   Statements         
Participant 19 Well…(in terms of the qualitative improvement of disclosures) I 
think I have said before, I think that every time there’s a crisis, 
either legislation, or legislators, or people on Wall Street come  
together to look in the rearview mirror, to correct the crisis. I feel 
that that’s always helpful. 
  
  
  
  Participant 15 I think it [information asymmetry] impacts my confidence a little 
bit because, I think, just because information is more available 
today—and supposedly theoretically the small investor has just as 
much information as the large investor—I don’t really believe that 
they do. So I see the trend of people putting money into index funds 
and things like that. And I think that for many small investors that 
makes sense. 
  
  
  
  
         Participant 18 "In all seriousness my default position has to be that I do not know 
what I do not know. So I don’t have a high level of trust that I’m 
getting good information by whatever means."   
  
         Participant 9 "[Of course] it’s nice to know that a board is more independent, and 
it perhaps increases your confidence in the company and your 
investment, and just kind of knowing there are board members who 
are independents increase confidence, but there’s not much more 
beyond that...."  
  
  
  
   
 
Figure 14. Sub-theme 2.1: Expectancy gauge: Sub-thematic emergence of perspectives 
relating to Principal Theme 2. This clusters the most frequently suggested investor 
perspectives on capital market views as well as forward-looking sentiments. Confidence 
comprised 47% of the clusters, and; over-reliance on the regulatory regime, invited a 
sense of a false assurance, according to 38% of the participants’ responses. 
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Subordinate Theme 2.2: Leadership 
Standard metrics of sound corporate stewardship is performance that is acceptable 
financially, compliantly, and by some estimates environmentally (Aras & Growther, 
2016). In context, good stewardship in this instance focuses not only on internal 
benchmarks but also on external requirements such as veracious dissemination of 
information to stakeholders. A system of efficacious stewardship therefore enables 
predictability and inspires trust (Hurley, Gong, & Waqar, 2014) and confidence with the 
constituents served. Presenting the question of trust as it related to stewardship, elicited 
dichotomous perspectives, with a heavy leaning to distrust. Participant 14 expressed 
ambivalence. There were ample mixed feelings and an internal struggle to articulate a 
precise sentiment that calibrated criticism with comprehension. Feelings therefore 
appeared psychologically complex. In one response, the participant indicated:  
[I]n public companies where there is the push for higher earnings and return on 
investment, I think that management is sometimes pushed into the grey areas. Do 
I think that CEOs are responsible for that? I do. Do I think they’re taking more 
responsibility since then? No I do not. I really don’t think that’s changed all that 
much. I still think that they try and say they’re not responsible for that. No…. I 
think they’re getting held more accountable for it… 
Participant 12 was unequivocal and equally skeptical. He expressed his concern thusly:  
I don’t think you can trust a CEO to the extent that we should be able to. I think 
their actions are generally…they give positive reinforcement along the way and 
then they say, oops, I was wrong! And that certainly reduces your confidence in 
them. 
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Fifty five percent of respondents cited potential conflict as concerning and 35% 
questioned the disposition of company leadership. Additional examples are provided in 
Table 12 and a summary is provided in Figure 15.  
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Table 12 
Subordinate Theme 2.2: Leadership 
Participants  
S 
Statements 
SSSStatStatement
s  
          
Participant 9 I mean you could take a current and great example of leadership. 
Someone like Tim Cook is very well-known, his personal story, how he 
ascended to where he is, his vision of the company’s values, etc. That’s 
going to have a different context from maybe a CEO from a different 
sector—maybe from an energy company or something like that, which 
may have a different reputation. 
 
 
 
 Participant 1 That’s why they call it risk. Basically, if you feel like a company is a 
good company and it’s been around long time and there’s a CEO… 
everyone today more so than ever are all for themselves so it’s not one 
guy that’s going to be [doing] any more than the other. I just think it’s 
going to be, like kind of when you put an app on your phone they tell you 
to agree to disclaimers, and you agree and get the app or disagree and 
you don’t get the app. So… not much choice in the CEO matter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Participant 18 [As it relates to who sits on the board]: An existing management or 
founder is likely to populate the board with people he could essentially 
control before. And I would expect of them to find and recruit external or 
outside board members that they also could control. So it sounds good in 
practice, but to answer the spirit of the question, it does not have a big 
impact on my confidence. 
 
 
 
 
 Participant 13 I do however look to see how many shares of stocks the people that are 
on the board have. And that tells you what equity they have in the 
company. And also look to see when they’re selling it and when they’re 
buying. And when they’re selling if it’s just one guy that sold 10,000 
shares I’m not too worried. But when you see a whole room full kind of 
unloading at the same time that’s a scary thing. 
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Figure 15. Subtheme 2.2: Leadership characteristics. Emerged themes relating to 
research questions 1 and 2. Thirty six percent of the responses supported the theme: 
potential conflicts, and 31% supported the theme: questionable executive disposition. 
Minor theme of board composition comprised approximately 12% of cluster responses. 
 
Subordinate Theme 2.3: Cynicism and Confounds From Industry  
A fractured corporate governance system fraught with opportunistic behavior 
(Davidson & Stevens, 2012) and self-interest, and a regulatory system that promote 
arguable compliance and uncertainty (Bell et al., 2014) are some of conditions that bear 
upon the investor’s behavior and was concerning to a number of participants. In context, 
participants’ response to research questions 3 and 4 and its constituent subparts, elicited 
responses/attitudes of exasperation, cynicism, apprehension, levels of despondence, and 
resignation. For instance, Participant 20 suggested “…last few years I have been through 
guys whose specialty is insurance—probably the wrong place to come in. But neither one 
of them said listen that’s not really my expertise. Let me set you up with someone whose 
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specialty it is.” Participant 19 had a history of missteps. He is a man of faith, an eternal 
optimist, and is irrepressibly forgiving. Sharing one experience he said: “…my first 
experience dealing with the options market, I joined a group that now, I realize that either 
they did not know what they were teaching, or they deliberately did not teach you how to 
use options properly.” The data collection supported the sub-thematic label, confounds 
from industry behavior, which subsumed emergent themes relating to research questions 
3 and 4. Sixty-three percent supported the theme: self-interest predominates the 
investment environment and 30% of the responses supported the theme: behavioral 
cynicism as it relates to the capital markets. Machinations of corporate governance was 
another minor theme identified. Figure 16 and Table 13, which follow, provide attitudinal 
exemplars.  
 
Figure 16. Subtheme 2.3: Confounds from industry behavior: Confounds from industry 
behavior. Characterizes emerged themes relating to research questions 3 and 4. Thirty 
percent of the responses supported the theme: behavioral cynicism as it relates to the 
capital markets, and 63% supported the theme: managements’ self-interest predomimates 
the investment environment. Machinations of corporate governance was a minor theme 
identified.  
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Table 13 
Subordinate Theme 2.3: Cynicism as a Perspective 
Participants   Statements         
Participant 4 I think in order for [SOX] to work… I think we are talking about 
internal [governance]… internal transparency... whereby the onus is on 
the company, where I think that the reporting has to be [accurate] from 
an internal standpoint; where brokers [for instance] are dealing with 
individual investors they should be consistently and constantly audited. 
That reporting… that’s the kind of reporting that needs to be put out 
there, so that people can…become aware that the particular broker, 
dealing with the public, is being audited on a regular basis and that the 
information that they are distributing… that, that information has been 
checked and double checked. Because although someone has signed a 
disclosure form and then looks [carefully] at the disclosure, a broker can 
wave that off in one conversation. 
 
[To the question of needing to learn]: Not necessarily you know. More 
of a concern was enforcement and penalties. Let’s say no one went to 
jail. Very few were terminated—fired, not many instances that I can 
recall [paraphrase]. People that were fined, assets that were seized, 
monies that were clawed back…[I am] looking for some effect there. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Participant 9 
 
 Participant 18 They [Theranos] made the claim that they could draw one bead of blood 
from your finger, and do one hundred and forty blood tests. And it 
turned out that Walgreens and everybody got embarrassed and billions 
of dollars crashed. And that’s just an example of how self-dealing 
[occurs]…. [S]omehow people get mesmerized, or they get subverted 
[sic] [suborned] into participating in a hoax or exaggerate things 
whatever it is. I think you have to be very careful. I don’t have high 
trust; I have almost zero trust. Again, not being cynical just that this 
argues for diversity and it pushes me towards the center of the stream, 
towards the best in class, [and] best known companies. 
 
 Participant 1 Look…no I think absolutely not [Sarbanes-Oxley strengthening of the 
internal controls enhancing transparency]. I think people people in 
Congress and the Senate and the presidency, and those in public office 
are just doing things at the moment to…they can put something out there 
to say this is my legacy. [One former congressman from MA] was one 
of the first people who [was complicit in] starting the housing bubble 
and came in the back door and tried to put a bill together; [essentially] 
after they shot the victim they tried to bandage him up. It’s a joke. They 
robbed a bank and now they’re trying to say we didn’t take that much. 
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Subordinate Theme 2.4: Desire for Improvements-Due Diligence 
Responsibilities that are incumbent on the investor are captured in a mosaic of 
ideational and behavioral trappings: from the way decisions are formed with respect to 
biases, to the executional and discipline-oriented entanglements that occur while 
attempting to extricate one’s self if already involved in the investment. Besides 
ideological biases such as representativeness, the disposition effect, anchoring (Jain, Jain, 
& Jain, 2015) and others, which affect perceptions of rationality and attendant due 
diligence, there is the added issue of stock market greed. Ironically for some, the pain of 
suffering repeated financial losses, has routinely eclipsed any meaningful satisfaction 
attained from realized gains (Agarwal, Verma, & Agarwal, 2016), what is often attributed 
to a kind of disposition-effect. Participant 19 exhibited such tendencies and cited an 
infatuation he had with a toxic stock: “I had a sizable amount of shares and as it was 
going down I bought more thinking it was going to go up.” The company went bankrupt.  
Participants voiced a general desire for improved understandings of doing 
effective due diligence. They were also concerned with understanding how to process 
information logically thereby mitigating impulses of indifference or greed. Analytically, 
the data yielded essential themes in areas such as the lack of preparedness and requisite 
research undertaken by the investor, the notion of investor/institutional greed, lack of 
control borne from a feeling of helplessness to market conditions, and the belief that there 
is credible systemic bias in a variety of media disseminations. Participants were 
circumspect regarding their role as investors and the inescapable responsibilities they had 
to avert the prospect of becoming victimized. For instance, participant 10 indicated, 
“…people can use the many mediums of information for nefarious purposes or for 
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reasons that are untoward…. It goes back to the point that you filter out who you’re going 
to listen to.” Participant 2 was sagacious and responded to a secondary question regarding 
advice given to other investors: “Be happy with [reasonable] returns [if you managing 
your own investments in the current market/information environment].” Table 14 and 
Figure 17 provide additional illustrations. 
Table 14 
Subordinate Theme 2.4: Desire for Improvements-Due Diligence 
Participants   Statements       
Participant 13 I think everything you need to know, if you know where to look, is 
there. It’s just like if you engineer something long enough you’ll never 
get it done. You have to take the information that’s at hand… It’s like 
anything else, if you throw a dart and pick that company or whatever it 
hits on, and if you haven’t done any research, that’s probably the best 
way to do it [meaning: the requisite research should be done]. I think we 
have all the information we need. It just takes time to learn how to you 
use it. 
 
 
 
 Participant 21 “That’s why you have to know who the companies are. Only invest in 
the ones you know and you are following all the information about. 
Because that’s the only thing you can do.”  
  Participant 4 “And making decisions become a little trickier because there’s nothing 
there… there’s no fool like an old fool… someone who really thinks he 
knows when in fact [he's] about to take the worst hit [he's] ever taken.” 
Participant 3 [Relating to learning with governance reforms]: Well I do think I have a 
very good understanding of how the companies behave and again I have 
to take it upon myself to do the necessary homework and research on 
any stock that I’m interested in investing in. I cannot base it on 
information reported to me by these company leaders need to have an 
understanding of the product, an understanding of the market, and of the 
history before I make an investment—moving forward. 
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Figure 17. Subtheme 2.4: Desire for improvements. Describes emerged themes relating 
to research questions 3 and 4. Thirty seven percent of the responses supported the theme: 
investor due diligence, and 34.88% of responses supported the theme: investor-
institutional greed that appears rife in the capital markets. Lack of control, essentially, 
helplessness was a minor theme that was presented. 
 
Subordinate Theme 2.5: Heuristic-Default Standard 
The investors’ default standard is principally centered to a heuristic bias or blind 
spot due to cognitive sophistry (Hensley, 2016). The best decisions are often made when 
there is objective externaliztion of ideas, a process requiring a third party/independent 
source of imput or verification. In many cases, however, personal constraints bear on the 
process as was evident from many of the interview reports. Partipants’ responses 
suggested heuristic dispositions, a process of learning through experiencial events. Others 
ventured concerns of being curious (Participant 2), of second guessing everything 
(Participant 20), and averting the hype and principally employing a strict fundamental 
and technical strategic stance (Participant 11). Analysis of the data suggested 55% of 
responses converged thematically to the idea of caution, while 26% suggested doubts and 
verification as essential to any investment thesis (see Table 15 and Figure 18) .    
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Table 15 
Subordinate Theme 2.5: Heuristic: Default Standard  
Participants   Statements       
Participant 18 "I always know that there is a significant risk that other investors and 
“others"--period, know far more than I can [depend] upon, even if I 
read everything a company (reports)." 
 
  
  Participant 7 "That information has limited function because the author of that 
information… (a) you don’t know the author of that; (b) you don’t 
know their credibility; (c) or how accurate that information is. So you 
can’t really rely on that type of information or you will end up in 
trouble." 
 
  
  Participant 4 "There must be skepticism. Never ever believe that that trader is 
actually definitely looking out for you because that’s never ever the 
truth, it never is. He is looking out for number one. Number one being 
the fact that his bottom line [is more important]." 
 
  
  Participant 8 I’ve had a situation where I bought a stock and a few days later the 
CEO was indicted for putting out false information…. I paid $18-$19 
a share, and they halted trading for two weeks [after which] the stock 
started to trade at $.50 per share. Of course you like it (the reforms 
that reinforce the notions of appropriate stewardship) because it leaves 
a lot less room for CEOs to make up things pump up the price of the 
stock. Because obviously they’re being held a lot more accountable 
now. 
  
 
   
 
Figure 18. Subtheme 2.5: Heuristics-default standard. Describe emerged themes relating 
to research questions 3 and 4. Fifty five percent of the responses supported the theme of a 
cautionary stance; 26.53% responses supported the theme: verification as a neccesary 
validation mechanism, and; 18% suggested thematic reliance on instinctual heuristics. 
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Subordinate Theme 2.6a: Trust Sentiment: Management 
For the investor trust is essential to all economic exchanges and is moderated by 
the fidelity of beliefs, faithfulness in managements’ behavior, and force of the regulatory 
environment (Pevzner, Xie, & Xin, 2015). Further, the literature provides evidence that 
investors relationship with perceived trusting managements, positively align with 
fundamentals of economic theory (e.g., Lusardi & Mitchell, 2014; Pevzner et al., 2015), 
where knowledege validates phenomena. In sharing their feelings, respondents posited a 
range of argumentations: the vagaries of language used by management and investment 
functionaries, language designed to confuse and obfuscate (Participant 8), questionable 
trust in sources of information (Participant 7), and exploitive use of regulations as it 
relates to rich and powerful investors (Participant 5). Equally important for some 
respondents, were the axiomatic expectations of the inequities in information 
dissemination and access (e.g., Participant 19) and disparities in analysts’ 
recommendations, that is, no official standard to ensure intelligibility and consistency in 
buy, sell, or hold recommendations (see Table 16 and Figure 19). 
Table 16 
Subordinate Theme 2.6a: Trust Sentiment: Management 
Participants 
 
Statements 
 
 
    
Participant 18 "I’m always going to place relatively small bets on any one investment 
or any one company because as we all know something like Enron, or 
Theranos, or other companies can go belly up out of the blue. It could 
be their fault [or] it could be due to an exogenous event."  
(table continues) 
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Participants 
 
Statements 
 
    
Participant 17 “Well I’m not by any means totally full of trust of the behaviors that I see, 
or hear about, or read about coming from the  
executive offices of companies that I know are out here.” 
 
Participant 13 My feeling is that you can make numbers say anything you want them to. 
I don’t care how much you legislate to keep that from happening, there’s 
someone that’s a little bit smarter that’s going always figure out a way to 
do it. So my dad was a CPA and he used to say, numbers don’t lie, but 
they do—because you can make numbers say anything you want to. 
 
Participant 11 I mean… the professional analyst that we listen to—they make their 
recommendations based on all that—and they might have better 
information than I do—but from my experience as a retail investor, I 
don’t get first-hand information. And whatever I get might be incorrect 
[or] might be untruthful. So for that reason I don’t trust it all. 
  
Subordinate Theme 2.6b: Trust Sentiment- Governance and Regulations 
The last two decades have borne witness to profound regulatory reforms (Naranjo, 
Saavedra, & Verdi, 2015) given excesses, which bankrupted companies like Enron, 
WorldCom (Pevzner et al., 2015), and other venerable businesses. Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank legislations were supposed to resolve many of the regulatory dearths. 
Participants conveyed very strong opinions when asked to address the question of 
regulations and regulators’ ability to reform capital market shortcomings, and in 
particular their views relating to qualitative disclosures and improved transparency. In 
responding to these questions 28% suggested responses that cohered with the theme: 
inevitability of market imperfections; 27% expressed responses that aligned with the 
theme: flailing trust; 24% expressed responses that aligned with the theme: deception and 
tendencies to mislead, and; 19% expressed a response that was themed: trust influences 
(see Table 17 and Figure 19). 
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Table 17 
Subordinate Theme 2.6b: Trust Sentiment: Governance and Regulations 
Participants Statements       
Participant 4 "[Of needing to learn from government reforms]: You can’t change his 
system, you have to change the culture… and the culture is what needs 
to change." 
 
Participant 14 The terms and conditions of the disclosure [are] there to make you feel 
good about what’s going on and about what you have just gotten into, 
and to make it feel as though it’s 100% legitimate. And if I have a 
problem I can take it up with the different authorities that governs the 
industry. But at the end of the day unless… unless the investor who 
happens to have an issue, comes up with additional…with a lot more 
money to go after corporation, that has the types of lawyers that can 
knock that sort of stuff out of the ballpark [there is no chance of justice]. 
So I am not anymore convinced now than I was before about disclosures. 
 
Participant 9 And [governance reforms] probably wouldn’t have any meaningful way 
to change an investment decision unless obviously something on the 
negative—fraud and or mismanagement—comes up which would then be 
a major announcement or investigation that would change a decision. 
 
 
Participant 20 
 
And short of them spelling it out like, here’s what a hundred dollars 
would have looked like over the last 15 years; and now if you deduct the 
fees (the buy sell fees) that would’ve happened in this [case], here’s the 
actual [returns]. Because most of the numbers I see, I think are gross of 
any fees. And sometimes they don’t seem to specify and… it seems 
like… you know… the time frame they choose to reflect their 
performance are not necessarily standardized. And so sometimes I find 
myself wondering…oh… did this happen to be the best five years they 
are reflecting? I just think they’re not particularly clear. 
 
 
 
`  
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Figure 19. Subtheme composite of 2.6 (parts a & b): Trust constituents. Characterization 
of merged themes relating to research questions 3 and 4. Twenty eight percent of the 
responses supported the theme: inevitability of market forces, and 27% supported the 
theme: flailing investor trust. Additional themes identified: delibertate attempts at 
deception (23%) and issues of trust influence (20%).  
 
Subordinate Theme 2.7: Regulatory Complexities 
The reach and exaction of the capital market’s regulatory framework cues the 
investor to legitimacy of all market engagements and underscores the commensurate trust 
that is therefore exhibited by the investor (Bell, Filatotchev & Aguilera, 2014; 
Nicolăescu, 2013). Perception of the financial regulatory regime (Naranjo et al., 2015) 
was of paramount concern to respondents. Respondents were also concerned with issues 
traversing the perception of regulatory efficacy to the cost-benefit tradeoff of reforms. 
The scope of responses of the larger population of participants suggested disenchantment, 
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uncertainty, and apprehension. In response to the question of: whether SOX’s 
strengthening of internal controls promoted greater and more meaningful transparency? 
Participant 9 responded: “[E]verything is mixed...right? I like the signing off on the 
financials reported by the CEOs and CFOs, but I don’t feel there has been much 
accountability for any inaccuracies and all that—they just restate the financials.” 
Participant 19 was hopeful yet cautious:  
I realize that while there are those who are trying to make an honest effort to 
correct situations, and to get more transparency, and to make sure that there is a 
level playing field; at the same time that is happening, there’s somebody else or 
some group of people who are trying to find a way around those things. And that 
sometimes lead to the next crisis. 
Table 18 provides additional germane excerpts and Figure 20 provides a subthematic 
summary.    
Table 18   
Subordinate Theme 2.7: Regulatory Complexities 
Participants   Statements           
Participant 20 I just did a Google search; and here’s a Reuter’s article: Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
Lost Promise; Why CEOs Haven’t Been Prosecuted. I mean arguably the 
whole 2008 crash was a whole bunch of financial CEOs making decisions 
about these mortgage-backed derivatives. But nobody went to jail [was 
there]? 
 
 
 Participant 12 "I’m not quite sure what we really expected to come from the government 
regulations. They tried to rein in Wall Street but they really don’t do that. 
They just make it more complex." 
 Participant 11 Even if they put those (corporate governance reforms vis-a-vis board 
independence/ rules and regulations) in place, people do it [engage in 
deviant behavior] anyway. Before Sarbanes-Oxley was in place people  
 
(table continues) 
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Participants   Statements           
 
did it; and after Sarbanes-Oxley was put in place people did it. And they  
will still be doing it. Whatever government does it won’t change a thing 
in my opinion. 
 
Participant 14 I think that… well I think that there’s a lot more reporting, and therefore 
we should have more information but I’m not sure how relevant 
information is by the time we get it. So I guess in terms of whether it’s 
gotten better or not, I don’t think it’s gotten better because I don’t feel it’s 
given to us in a timely manner. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Subtheme 2.7: Regulatory complexities. Characterizes emerged themes 
relating to research questions 3 and 4. Thirty two percent of the 87 responses supported 
the theme: cost-benefit calculus, 30% supported the theme: perceptions of regulatory 
efficacy (essentially regulatory scorecards) and, a collective 19% supported the 
aggregated themes: regulatory perceptions and regulatory environment.  
 
Discrepant Cases and Validity 
A validity-testing regimen in qualitative research includes identifying negative 
cases or what is deemed discrepant data (Maxwell, 2005; Pavlova, Delev, Pezeshkpoor, 
Müller, & Oldenburg, 2013). These data are aberrant in not conforming to normal 
  
204 
sequences or pertinent interpretations and may highlight inconsistencies and defects in 
the recollective process. Yet, disconfirming data for the sake of expedience and/or 
academic piety runs counter to the rigorous examination suggested by Maxwell (2005) 
and Booth, Carroll, Ilott, Low, and Cooper (2013). Accordingly, negative cases require 
further examination to be resolved; that is, for instance, ensuring that descriptive 
classifications are appropriately themed (Yilmaz, 2013). Stringent examination of both 
comfirming and disconfirming data are consequently pivotal in arriving at an 
epistemologically plausible location. 
The processing of the data with the NVivo 11 software facilitated ease in 
navigating between and across the data files. Queries identified data inconsistencies, 
which were double-checked manually, both descriptively and interpretively (West & 
Borup, 2014). Discrepant cases in this regard, could introduce possible biases with 
respect to the perspectives of the investor and investee constituents; principally the 
prisms through which the priorities of the relationships are viewed, are generally at odds. 
Participant 4 is the owner of an investment firm but is also a private investor. He 
therefore profits or loses in a number of ways. Broaching the subject and subsequently 
asked about his role as a fiduciary, he responds: 
So when you’re purchasing [precious metal investments, for instance]…you’re 
not sure as to whether or not the party that you’re dealing with… they 
[communicating an insider’s perspective] do tell you that yes, here is what we’re 
doing, but the law allows them to do or make an alternative adjustment whereby 
they’re still within the [dictates of the] law but not above board [transparent] the 
way you would think. 
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He is deliberative and infers that the investor is at a disadvantage because of 
asymmetrical differences in the information stream as suggested by Akerlof (1970). 
Viewed contemporarily this is a classic recitation of the agent-principal exchange. The 
discourse continues: 
Interviewer: Okay. You could be left without understanding at least initially, that 
everything isn’t covered in physical form; where in fact it might be simply done 
theoretically on paper? 
Participant 4: Exactly! There’s nothing to guarantee that what you’re doing isn’t 
simply on paper. It leaves you actually wondering what you actually own. 
Foss and Stea (2014) advanced interpersonal-sensemaking and percipience in fathoming 
the issue where there is a measure of tenuousness with respect to a principal’s 
understanding and awareness of an agent’s perceptions. This conception is undoubtedly 
challenged by the pronouncements of Participant 4 and at a minimum demonstrates the 
advantage of the principal’s position in an exchange. 
For many investors the market domain is partitioned into a semblance of an 
integrative (win-win) universe as described by (Gillespie, 1997) where there is something 
for everyone. In reality, however, a winning investment does so at the expense of another 
that loses. Regulations moderate and impose constraints on market participants’ 
behaviors so as to assure institutional integrity; hence the purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley and 
Dodd-Frank. While there are questions regarding the cost-benefit calculus, for some 
participants, there was ambivalence regarding the efficacy of added regulations. 
Participant 1 was conservative and profoundly concerned. Like many laissez-faire 
thinkers, the approach was imputing an onus on the investor to become requisitely 
  
206 
informed; ideally an endorsement of exacting a sense of personal responsibility. In 
response to the question of market reforms (related to research questions 1 and 2 clusters) 
Participant 1 expressed his concern: 
It’s like anything else you can read to become more aware. Like anything else, 
there are people who are paid millions of dollars and get things wrong every 
single day so you have to… when it comes to regulations I think… they hurt the 
brokers, they hurt the individuals, and hurt the investors.  
Implicitly, the suggestion is that regulations in their cost and consequence are deleterious 
to the extent that society is likely worse-off. This inference stands in contrast to the 
consensus view on the question of regulations as many participants view stricter 
oversight in the aggregate as a tradeoff in the preservation of market integrity versus the 
financial/administrative costs imposed. Further, 75% of respondents had strong opinions 
centering to the regulatory environment. Relating to discrepant-like cases, Maxwell 
(2012) provided insights, suggesting that a participant’s theories should be treated with 
serious regard, and understandings should not be marginalized or dismissed. Discrepant 
as the responses were, these are noteworthy and should be viewed in the context of the 
collective responses provided by the informants. Ultimately, readers are left to make their 
own judgments and formulate their own conclusions (Maxwell, 2005). 
Assessing the Quality of the Study 
Trustworthiness in qualitative studies is underscored by a variety of standards to 
include transferability, dependability credibility, confirmability, and authenticity 
(McNulty et al., 2013; Polit & Beck, 2013). It is an attestation of the rigor and 
faithfulness that is achieved in the overall process in reporting findings (Houghton, 
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Casey, Shaw, & Murphy, 2013). As explicated in Chapter 3, background, context, and 
ratiocination as it relates to the data as well as procedural methodology are integral to the 
concept. Trustworthiness in this study is achieved by obeserving these precepts. Below is 
an articulation of the process.  
Transferability 
Patton (2002), as noted in Chapter 3, adopted the terms transferability and 
fittingness to describe what is the qualitative or naturalistic equivalent of quantitative 
generalizability. The concept of transferability is achieved when through proximal 
similarity, an individual’s moments, conceptions, structure or circumstance might be 
transferred along a continuum of like order (Polit & Beck, 2010; Yilmaz, 2013) while 
preserving the contextual inferences and meanings (Houghton et al., 2013). A series of 
pragmatic standards for transferability might contextually include circumstances where: 
(a) results are purposed or are meaningful to the individuals represented, (b) a potential 
audience might find relatable parallels with their own unique experiences, and (c) an 
audience has the ability to determine levels of congruency in outcomes after being 
provided with sufficient context and background on the study’s participants (Cope, 
2014).  
Non-institutional accredited investors provided germane responses to questions 
relating to asymmetric disseminations, advanced insights as to how confidence and 
decision-making propensities were affected, and offered perspectives regarding the 
governance and principal-agent dynamic. The overall recollections and resulting 
documentation and abstractions supplied findings that might be tenuously extrapolated. 
Audiences, however, will have to contemplate the relevance/congruence of the study to 
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their unique situations and decide whether there is sufficient context to merit perceived 
transferability (Katz et al., 2012). 
Dependability 
Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest dependability as being paramount to 
consistency. Consistency underlies the idea of whether a study’s findings are 
reproducible with similar populations, given similar context or conditions. It addresses 
the judgments of the researcher that are intrinsic to the outcome of the study. The 
criterion of dependability is premised on the notion that qualitative latitude cedes non-
linearities in the replication of studies because of intrinsic differences in sample units, 
temporal changes, and circumstantial contexts (Petty et al., 2012).  
Rodrigues et al. (2012) described dependability as an integrating concept. 
Integration in the context of this study, was underpinned by a holistic approach to the 
study’s design, which included data collection, data coding, data thematization, 
delineation and data analysis, and synthesizing and abstracting data into an 
epistemological structure (Miles & Huberman, 1994). As an imperative, requisite rigor 
was employed in the journalizing and note taking aspects of interviews, transcribing the 
recorded data, validating transcriptions by soliting verification from interviewees on the 
accuracy of the reproduced data (member checking), and manual verification of coded 
data. While methodological consistency is an aspirational ideal, the analytical process is 
systematic yet dynamic (Petty et al., 2012). The data collection and analysis process were 
streamlined to preserve all data captured, as was an audit trail, which was simiarly 
purposed to detailing inconsistensies and explicating methodical idiosyncrasies 
(Sinkovics & Alfoldi, 2012). The NVivo 11 facility was instrumental in supporting the 
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configuration and parsing of data as well as the mitigation of potential bias through 
flexibility in queries, annotations, and memoing. 
Credibility 
Accepted standards. In deeming a study credible, there should be the elicitation 
of the requisite confidence that data have been appropriately collected and that 
interpretive findings derived from the data are representationally truthful and accurate 
(Yin, 2015). In strengthening requisite rigor, Houghton et al. (2013) and Petty et al. 
(2012), with some compilation nuancing, proposed the following: through engagement, 
one may attain a deep understanding of the phenomenon involved; data collection should 
be from a variety of contexts (sources), which facilitate triangulation cross-checking; 
securing documents that futhers understanding of the phenomenon; engage member 
checking through data verification with subjects and; acknowledging negative cases.  
Satisfaction of credibility standards. In satisfaction of the foregoing 
noninstitutional accredited investors (NIAIs) were first called, breifed on the nature of the 
study, and their participation was solicited. Following this engagement, formal invitation 
letters were emailed to potential participants. Invitation packets included an informed 
consent, interview questions, and supplemental questionnaire. Once scheduled, 
participants called a Zoom conference platform which facilitated the recorded interview 
sessions. Repeated interactions bolstered understanding of each participant’s disposition 
(see Petty et al., 2012). 
The data collection process evolved to include digital documents, data 
(recordings), jounalized entries, and notations. Aligned with the recommendations of 
theorists including Bryman (2015), transcribed data were provided to participants for 
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verification and interpretive accuracy. This verification also facilitated member-checking 
by the respective participants. In addition to the organized and thematized data extracted 
from transcripts, supplemental inclusions contemplated documents, notes, journal entries, 
and memeos, all of which facilitated the triangulation requirements as proffered by 
theorists such as Cope (2014), Houghton et al. (2013), and Petty et al. (2012). In sum, the 
use of the NVivo 11 facility in concert with the adoption of the preceding, provided a 
level of transparency, which established a window to a methodical and exhaustive audit 
trail (Sinkovics et al., 2012). 
Confirmability 
Confirmability addresses the elemental or evidentiary aspects of the data; its 
veracity and its neutrality as is perceived and interpretively presented by the researcher 
(Cope, 2014; Polit & Beck, 2013). In this case, research logs, journals, notes, recordings, 
and transcripts were maintained to facilitate reconciliation of descriptions and 
interpretations to the source data of noninstitutional accredited investors. The utilization 
of the NVivo 11 coding facility provided an audit trail where thematic assertions and 
abstractions could be reconciled. Further, direct quotes and exemplifications provided a 
measure of thick, rich, logic-based, and explanatory constructs that linked the data to the 
inferences and representations (Cope, 2014).   
Data Saturation 
Data or thematic saturation occurs at a point where the replication of a study is 
theoretically possible (O’Reilly & Parker, 2012). As an essential part of the qualitive 
texture of a study, saturation bears on the validity or credibility of the research (Fusch & 
Ness, 2015), and credibility undergirds the accuracy of the data (Yilmaz, 2013). 
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According to Fusch and Ness (2015) it is the point of exhaustion: void of new themes, 
new information, or coding prospects. With pre-interview discourses coupled with the 
actual inteviews, saturation became apparent after approximately the tenth to eleventh 
participant’s interview. 
Summary of Findings 
Utilizing modalities of interview data, journalized jottings, notes, and 
supplemental questionnaire the researcher was able to construct a comprehensive picture 
of the information asymnmetry process, particularly its impact on the decision-making 
propensities and confidence of the noninstitutional accredited investor along with the 
ancillary effects of moral hazard and adverse selection. The interviews were organized 
along the lines of semi-structuredness and questions focused on four principal areas: (a) 
the role and influence of the disseminative process; (b) technology as a contemporary 
medium of dissemination, specifically the advantages and disadvantages of the tool; (c) 
the perception of the corporate governance and devolution in principal-agent exchanges; 
and (d) the impact of regulatory reforms in restoring system-wide confidence. The data 
was exhaustive and presented a diversity of ideas that eventually converged and were 
subsumed under the principal headings: information idiosycrasies and its import and trust 
in governance and the regulatory systems. 
Findings from the interrogation of the research questions and emerged themes 
provided an overarching picture of a multiplicity of ideational and attitudinal constructs 
as it relates to the phenomenon. With examination, understandings of related experiencial 
structures and ensuing behaviors provide a basis for the NIAI’s perception of the capital 
market environment; its effectiveness in governance, informative disseminations, 
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regulatory reliability, and confidence inspired. The many perspectives proffered, 
highlight the desire for credible information, which in its absence, suggest the investor 
will continue to be challenged with uncertainty, and will exhibit cautious preference for 
information disseminated through/by trustworthy channels.  
Research Questions 
The research objective was to discern the scope and pervasiveness of information 
asymmetry and through inquiry, understand the role of asymmetrical disclosures and the 
ways in which it has impacted the retail investor in the collection and utilization of 
information in key decision making. To facilitate the process, a series of questions listed 
below were developed that were intended to answer the foregoing concern with 
sufficiency and robustness (Ritchie, Lewis, McNaughton Nichols, & Ormston, 2013). 
The questions were guided by conceptual frameworks proposed by Verstegen Ryan and 
Bucholtz’s Trust-Risk decision-making model and Akerlof’s information theory. 
Evaluating participants’ insights into information asymmetry provided evidence of the 
phenomenon and its related effects. 
Research Question 1 
Research question 1: What are the lived experiences of the retail/noninstitutional 
accredited investor regarding corporate disseminations, its role in the proliferation of 
information asymmetry, its impact on confidence, judgment, and decision-making 
propensities? This question proxied interview questions 1 to 6. A synthesis of the many 
themes constructed during the study proffered a number of contentions. First, informative 
disseminations of questionable veracity brought about a reflexive response, such that 
NIAIs’ strategic approach to the market was measurably altered. Participants’ changed 
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behavior included adopting heuristic stances (e.g., timing the market for extraneous 
events), subscribing to professional research publications, hiring professional money 
managers, minimize exposure by utilizing leverage tools such as options, invest utilizing 
mechanized tools such as robo-advisors, and increased diversification across investment 
types and markets. 
Second, participants agreed that reflexively responding to informative 
disseminations should be minimized as thoughtful and deliberative actions are likely 
more sustainable. 
Third, participants acknowledged the scope of potential conflicts of interest; that 
it is systemically complex, historically perennial, and beyond all legislative reach. In 
essence, the phenomenon has deep-seated political and economic roots. 
Research Question 2 
Research question 2: What role has technology played in magnifying and/or 
minimizing the effects of informative dissemination and how does this affect the 
investor’s discipline and psychology with regards to decision-making? The data suggest 
great concern as it relates to communication technologies. Fundamentally concerning 
were (a) the process of information aggregation, (b) its influence on the speed of 
transmission/delivery of information, (c) the pervasiveness and disseminative scope of 
information, and (d) the qualitative integrity of the information. The multifarious nature 
of information is such that there is commodification and hence a price attached not only 
to the technological medium but also to the information itself. 
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Research Question 3 
Research question 3: What is the perception of the state of principal-agent 
relations as it pertains to governance and disclosure? The data illuminated widespread 
suspicion and distrust of principal-agent exchanges. A majority of the participants found 
agents’/managements’ behavior untrustworthy, unchecked, imperious, often tyrannical, 
lacked integrity, and that they were insatiable in their financial cravenness. At the core of 
their concerns are the basic truths: the exclusiveness and monopoly on private 
information and rampant conflicts of interest. These conflicts of interest are fertile 
grounds for adverse selection where principals, given their private information advantage, 
benefit at the expense of shareholders. Moreover, even with lofty pay incentives, 
solutions are interminably distant because of cost and circumstance. It is unsurprising for 
many participants, as well, that this further invites the specter of moral hazard. Consistent 
with this notion, participants pointed to previously mismanaged and failed corporate 
giants. AIG, for example, had to be rescued through massive government financial 
infusions. WorldCom and Enron failed spectacularly, losing tens of billions, and the 2016 
illicit implications of the Wells Fargo fraudulent accounts scandal cost its shareholders in 
excess of $185 million in settlement with regulators, and loss of its premier ranking as 
U.S. top bank. For investors, these administrative and fiduciary failings will almost 
certainly continue to vitiate prospects for long-term shareholder value. 
Research Question 4 
Research question 4: To what extent have regulatory reforms changed the 
investment environment in restoring confidence by holding bad actors to account? An 
examination of the data suggested that this elicited unanimity in agreement that essential 
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reforms were mostly symbolic, with protections for the investor still wanting and 
inadequate. There was attitudinal dichotomy as to whether lawmakers should be 
chastened for their dereliction or be regarded sympathetically given the long-standing 
difficulty of the governance enterprise. Reform efficacy was questioned on several levels:  
(1) The unintended complexity and consequent volumes of financial disclosures, 
invites confusion and renders disclosure virtually worthless.  
(2) The status quo is very little if not nearly unchanged; there is still rampant shoddy 
corporate behavior and very few resulting prosecutions and jailings. 
(3) Meaningful cost-benefit tradeoff of proposed reforms still presents perplexity. 
(4) Black-box or high frequency trading has exploited structural weaknesses of 
market systems and has consequently created a sharp demarcation of investor-
class in the equity markets; the fallout from computer generated (black-box) 
errors and/or fat-finger indiscretions precipitated mini crashes and/or enormous 
price fluctuations, which have frightened investors and undermined confidence.  
Given the scope of the study and nature of the phenomenon, again, it is ironic that a 
common refrain that evolved is, how does one un-ring the bell?  
The foregoing chapter encapsulated the framework of the data analysis phase of a 
study focused on the lived experience of the noninstitutional accredited investor. 
Consonant with Miles et al. (2013) the process entailed an articulation of the researcher’s 
role, sample unit/ participants, data collection, data coding, analysis, abstraction, and a 
summary of findings. Significantly, participants expressed their thoughts on the 
phenomenon and provided valued insights on which the study rests. Chapter 5 will be 
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informed by the findings of this chapter and will consequently instrumentalize 
understandings, implications, recommendations, and limitations of the study. 
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Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusion, and Recommendations 
Introduction 
The purpose of the study was to examine the lived experience of the 
noninstitutional accredited investor (NIAI) as it regards asymmetrical disseminations 
made by corporations, and the resulting impact on investor confidence and decision-
making propensities. The study further examined the ancillary effects of adverse selection 
and moral hazard as obtrusions of the corporate environment, perceived by some 
researchers (e.g., Donker, 2014; Gutiérrez Urtiaga & Sáez Lacave, 2014) as being fraught 
with rampant self-dealing and asymmetrical behaviors. Interview transcriptions along 
with journalized jottings, notes, and memos were key components in facilitating the 
synthesis and triangulation of data to mitigate methodical and systematic bias, and to 
assure greater generalizability of explanatory findings (see Lahtero & Risku, 2014; 
Maxwell, 2005). Integral to the research was an interpretative phenomenological analysis 
methodology, which provided a framework for the collection and conservancy of 
perspectives of the 21 NIAIs who participated in studied. Through this process, meanings 
were derived and findings constructed that were central to the analysis.   
Discussion of Major Themes 
An examination undertaken of the phenomenon of information asymmetry, within 
the framework of the research questions presented, warranted a discussion of the major 
themes that emerged in the examination of the problem. Apriori understandings and 
acquiescence of equity market indiscretions contextualize the level of cynicism and 
distrust typified by a considerable segment of the opinion-base of investor participants. 
The qualitative data are also consistent with those of other research efforts (e.g., Abad, 
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Sánchez‐Ballesta, & Yagüe, 2015; Bhattacharya et al., 2013) in showing that information 
asymmetry comprised a considerable portion of equity market concerns and was 
perpetrated, in many cases, by means of earnings and accounting-related schemes. In a 
market of heterogeneous expectations, information asymmetry is consequential in that it 
incites dichotomized investor behaviors. Empirical research suggests that very informed 
or more sophisticated investors have the capacity and inclination to exploit market 
disequilibrium and capitalize on their superior informational advantage (Amiram, Owens, 
& Rozenbaum, 2016; El Ghoul et al., 2013). This is exemplified in instances where 
investor competition (liquidity) and/or earnings quality are concerning. Both 
exemplifications contribute endemically to an exascerbation in levels of information 
asymmetry.  
This study’s findings are also consonant with the literature in proposing that 
investors /NIAIs who are less sophisticated, reflect pronounced circumspection in their 
investment decision-making, as they tend to invest or trade much less in the presence of 
manifested information asymmetry (e.g., Johnson, Percy, Stevenson‐Clarke, & Cameron, 
2014; Rossi, 2016). The literature holds that less sophisticated investors are more inclined 
to invest in equities with a history of solid performance rather than investing in issues 
that are more speculative. Overall, the study’s findings appear to align with the literature, 
as greater opportunism is exhibited on the part of sophisticated investors (Johnson et al., 
2014) who are not deterred by higher volatility (risk) levels, which viewed in their 
estimation, is a requisite for greater levels of potential returns. Consonant with the 
foregoing, participants attempted to blunt the force of asymmetry by either (a) holding 
diversified portfolios, (b) investing in local companies and/or in companies with which 
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they are intimately familiar (El Ghoul, et al., 2013), or (c) utilizing synthetic or derivative 
strategies to invest while minimizing potential exposure. Figure 21 which follow provides 
perspective on the investors’/participants’ impression of the information dissemination 
process and consequent behavioral response. 
 
Figure 21. Investors’ (NIAIs) perspective on informative disseminations. Perception of 
the way asymmetric dissemination is viewed by noninstitutional accredited investors. 
Note: on average it is presumed that there is little or no intermediation between 
disseminations and the time it reaches the consumer/investor. In the model, the investor’s 
information preference is binary, that is, responses are likely to occur affirmatively or 
non-affirmatively. 
 
Theme 1: Idiosyncrasies of Dissemination and Strategy Impact 
At the heart of the asymmetric phenomenon are the disseminative idiosyncrasies 
of information. In regulated markets, the foremost intent of information to the intended 
constituent is education; here, it is on issues germane to specific investment realms and 
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capital market realities. As noted by Bhasin (2012) the facts are informative 
dissemination should convey some value to users. Given the persistence and 
pervasiveness of technology, investors are unavoidably exposed to information, in many 
instances, with little or no vetting or assurance of content-integrity. Many market 
proponents have nonetheless pointed to capital market efficiency (e.g., Chordia, 
Subrahmanyam, & Tong, 2014; Kristoufek & Vosvrda, 2014), but a system void of or 
with little information precision argues against such a proposition. Ultimately, capital 
market efficiency is decided, not necessarily by proposed theoretical constructs, but by 
investment behaviors shaped by investors’ beliefs and opinions moderated by their 
exposure to informative disseminations, which may or may not be reliable.  
Altered Strategic Approach 
Classic investment strategies require evaluation of risk-return payoffs (Lustig, 
Roussanov & Verdelhan, 2014). At a formal level, it requires a disciplined approach to 
include the types of securites, interest rates, sector, investment horizon (Stein, 2013), 
country, currency, etcetera. The investor philosophy or strategy is highly determinative of 
outcomes. Risk, which is intractably a part of the investment calculus must further be 
undesrstood in the context of idiosyncratic and systematic attributes, that is, risks unique 
to individual securities and that which is endemic to the markets in general. 
Broadly, a strategic approach is an integrated series of actions undertaken to elicit 
a prescribed and tenable advantage. It appears that the lack of trust and certainty (this is 
to be expected in risk investments) has elevated levels of ambiguity (Singer, 2010) and 
suspicion to the extent that investor participants have moderated or have considered 
changing their approach to the market. Strategy change as a part of decision-making in 
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this case, is a myriad series of adaptations focused to individualized levels of need. 
Twenty percent of participants, for instance, suggested utilizing index-funds to engender 
improved levels of consistency: smoothing levels of risk and hence and lower return 
dispersion (Chichernea, Holder, & Petkevich, 2015). While formal planning, given the 
structure/framework articulated previously, is anything but static, it is still at a fairly 
basic level for some, whose concerns center to an environment that is perceptibly 
unsteady. The parsing and partitioning of strategies continue to be an objective pursuit, 
with approaches ranging from elementary to sophisticated. Findings include self-directed 
investments; professional assistance; professionalizing approach (skills-enhancement) 
with respect to investment fundamentals and mechanics, and; alternative forays into 
hedge funds and private equity.  
Participants also expressed an interest in pursuing strategies that derisked the 
investment portfolio, when feasible, by untilizing leverage, whether in the context of 
futures contracts or equities or commodities options. Dierkes, Erner, and Zeisberger 
(2010) used a cummulative prospect theory strategy to determine investment preferences 
and have suggested protective put options (used to capture price declines) as one of six 
forecast-free strategies examined. Accordingly, an options-based strategy aligns with a 
number of preferences exhibited by participants. To the extent that there is strategy 
agnosticism for some, implies that there is little directional bull/bear preference, as 
investors are equally inclined to exploit opportunites requiring the utilizaton of call 
and/or put options. Essentially, these investors will opportunistically speculate for profits 
regardless of positive or negative market trends, even as they are inclined to protectively 
hedge as needed to minimize or avert potential losses. For these investors, options 
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provide an opportunity to exploit market diseqilibrium without the marked exposure to 
adverse market actions. Tactically, it also focuses their level of engagement and 
fundamentally shift and/or improve their investment skills to the extent that as opposed to 
being exploited by the markets they can, instead, be better equipped to exploit the 
markets. 
Reflexive Response. Investors’ behaviors are presumed to be rational, at least in 
an economic sense (Vasile, Sebastian, & Radu, 2012; Williams & Ravenscroft, 2015), 
but there is ample evidence that argues otherwise (e.g., see Jain et al., 2015). At a visceral 
level investors are largely influenced by what they see, hear, and the instinct of gut-feel; 
something akin to what psychologists term non-concious or intuitive processes (Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Indeed, there is a case to be made that investors responding reflexively 
to informative disseminations are perhaps not reflecting the requisite discipline and 
appropriate judgments.   
Williams and Ravenscroft (2015) discourse psychological traps, a behavioral 
normativity in instances where facts seldom matter and objective evaluation is seldom the 
first choice. The dialectic, according to some theoreticians, is manifested at the 
intersection of a cognitive response to what investors imagine, and a manipulitave 
prescription of attaining the outcome which is ideally desired; that is, an orchestrated 
behavior to change a state or condition. Such, invariably underlies a virtuous loop of self-
reinforcing behaviors, a fact that is not lost upon investors who have proffered many 
concerns, as the data indicates. For many investors, this was ascribed to the notion of 
discipline: a need to be rules-based; exercising improved ratiocination; to be deliberative 
in an investment strategy and avoid peripheral noise; minimizing lapses in concious 
  
223 
attention, and; to be more reflective in approach. While these recognitions are 
evaluatively critical, the issue that firmly moderates the circumstance, however, is again 
circumscribed by the idiosyncratic nature of informative disseminations and whether or 
not trust is merited.  
Systematic approach to investing. In most cases, only a small fraction of what is 
available of potential capital market profits will be exploited by the average investor. 
Again, investors are considered wanting in levels of skill, are substantially lacking in 
competence, and are irrational in judgments (Blonski & Blonski, 2016: Jain et al., 2015). 
Juxtaposed to this assertion, Erner et al. (2013) appear sanguine in holding that through 
the competency effect certain investors, by virtue of heuristics, have developed requisite 
expertise and mastery of the capital markets. Vital to and supportive of the development 
of effective competencies, qualitity information flow is imperative, according to 
Armstrong et al. (2015), who discerned that timely and reliable information is needed by 
the active investor/(NIAI) to make informed decisions about companies and markets in 
which they invest.  
Understanding that there is scarcely complete and precise information flows, 
participants agreed that even the most skilled investors need reasonably transparent 
disclosures to make effective and informed strategic decisions. Participants also 
acknowledged the imperative of a defined strategy as opposed to trusting the opinions of 
Wall Street analysts who, in their judgments, are perennially conflicted in their loyalties 
and criteria for issuing buy/sell recommendations. More generally, participant investors 
understood that even with the complexities and idiosyncrasies of the disseminative 
apparatus linked to the capital market system, there has to be some measure of trust, as 
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any predictive judgements are highly dependent on the accuracy of disseminations. The 
irony, however, is that investor participants have admitted to trusting as is required, and 
have consequently experienced the force of information asymmetry at various levels and 
often in inimical ways. Accordingly trust, if, when, or where it exists, is decidedly very 
tenuous. 
Strategically, many participants were very methodical in their tack to the capital 
markets, approaching cautiously as though traversing a minefield. Hence, caution and 
risk management are key operative principles. Partipants surveilled not only for internal 
financial and managerial inconsistencies but for exogenous conditions that could affect 
an investment approach. Aligned with the perceptions of Jain et al. (2015), participants 
acknowledged market misconception and its role in influencing their investment views 
and behavioral biases, as well as its impact on their investment strategies. Participants 
also expressed the need for patience to the extent that an investment can be executed, 
modified in scope or timing, postponed, or foregone. Behaviorally, participants are aware 
of the pressure, particularly to recoup losses and consequently a propensity to overtrade; 
a strategy yielding declining utility (e.g. see Dierkes et al., 2010 ; Jain et al., 2015)  
Theme 2: Trust of Governance and the Regulatory Framework 
Shareholders are principal owners of companies in which they invest. Yet, 
Armstrong et al. (2015) identified investors/shareholders as ranking third behind 
managers, and outside directors in their ability to access company-relevant information, a 
finding and sentiment evidenced repeatedly in the data. In addition to a general relegation 
as it relates to information access, Müller et al. (2013) identified governance as being 
underpinned by trust, a pillar of support for successful capital market functioning. Trust, 
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as theorized by Müller et al. (2013), and consistent with the paradigmatic grounding of 
Verstegen Ryan and Buchholz’s (2001), is irrespective of the ability and/or desire to 
monitor the party/(trustee) of whom it is expected; and presupposes that the trustee is 
endowed with attributes of integrity, benevolence, abilty, and the like. The data has 
suggested participants are trusting by instinct, and many view trust as reflexive and 
axiomatic. This disposition appears dialectical in construction, their having exercised 
trust on one hand while maintaining a stance of dubiety and distrust of the governance 
system on the other. The data also reflected significant responses where there was need 
for vigilance, circumspection, and where there was wariness of deceptive practices. 
The regulatory and governance environments are inextricably and symbiotically 
linked in that they mutually influence each other. Generally, governance is the force of 
regulation, conceived and enforced by parties who themselves must be governed (Müller 
et al., 2013). Both literature and data reveal the entanglements between regulatory 
apparatuses and corporate dispositional functionings. An extant concern of participants is 
the proximity of relations between regulators and large corporations and the migration of 
regulators from government to publicly traded companies, motivated in many respects by 
very sizable increases in compensation. The reverse, as pointed out by participants, is 
also true. Many government appointments have been frequently made from Wall Street, 
and there are heightened concerns of conflicts of interest pervading the regulatory system 
particularly in the introduction of pro-investor regulations and the enforcement of 
existing regulatory laws. Ultimately, the data yielded evidence that the regulatory 
framework influences disclosures, which in turn impacts information choice, and 
consequent decision-making of investors (Johnson et al., 2014). 
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Self-Interested Mindset 
Priviledged management. Severe corporate governance and the regulatory 
failures are indelibly imprinted in the minds of investors (Vasile et al., 2012) and in some 
cases facilitate institutional memories where shareholders have suffered very large 
financial losses. Non-institutional accredited investors (NIAIs) to an extent have become 
cynical and distrustful. They are aware of the myriad conflicts of interest circumstances 
that prevail and levels of self-interested behaviors discoursed through literature. Vasile et 
al. (2012) provided insights on the behavior phenomena. Acknowledged and highlighted 
by investors are competive pressures within oraganizations where executives are 
perversely incented to take risks with the prospect of large payoffs (Armstrong et.al. 
2015) but not commensurately having to pecuniarily restitute such losses if/when they 
occur. These gambles also include aggressive/over-optmistic earnings forecast and 
undertaking ill-advised acquisitions as opposed to focusing on organic expansion, all 
designed to bootstrap earnings growth. Dividend payment is often foregone so as to 
utilize internal capital to fund investments that are often not well conceived; this includes 
share repurchases at inopportune price evels, ultimately doing little or nothing to improve 
the price of the stock, and in many cases destroying shareholder wealth. 
Principal-agent concerns. The data further revealed an entrenched labyrinth of 
self–interest: that the loyalties of management is to the enterprise and that compliance 
exist soley for the legal protection of management. Moreover, findings suggest that, 
unlike any felicific calculus, the investor would be naive to expect executives to 
subordidate their own self-interest to the benefit of the shareholder constituency. The 
principal-agent exchange therfore, features prominently in investors contentions and 
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consideration, not only in their evaluations, but in the context of the trust and governance 
process. The irony is that theorists have speculated that increased incentive through profit 
sharing and options compensation would have been a strong motivation for management 
to improve value creation as their interst was aligned with the shareholders (Bosse & 
Phillips, 2016). Empirical evidence, nevertheless, suggest a failure of expectations as 
losses escalated even as profits failed to keep pace. The effects of the circumstance has 
provoked strained relations between principals and agents, as evidenced by the explosion 
of shareholder lawsuits, increasing in dollar magnitude by over 1000%, from $1 billion in 
1996-1999 to over $10.6 billion by 2006 (Gillan & Panasian, 2015).  
Some companies have paid a considerable price for behavioral dereliction: 
reputational loss, heavy financial sanctions, and elevated insurance risk profiles. In 
addition to the foregoing contention, investors’ concerns regarding agency-related 
problems and moral hazards have persisted, as in their minds, the ultimate cost, 
regardless of penalties and reforms, is borne by shareholders/investors. Given the latent 
unease, investors, paradoxically, are not completely distrusting of regulations and/or 
governance as they view the system as one that largely works, even as it is fraught with a 
host of problems. Moderating these findings, Tafel-Viia and Alas (2015) remarked on 
Estonian investors’ expectations, asserting that investors did not normalize angst in the 
principal-agent exchange as traditionally believed. Implicitly, there is belief and 
expectations of more responsible levels of corporate stewardship. The caveat, however, is 
that the findings were deemed inconclusive. 
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Cost/Benefits of Sarbanes-Oxley 
As with all regulations there are winners, losers, and interest groups ideologically 
united or divided along faultliness defined by the extent of their respective self-interest. 
Some of Sarbanes-Oxley’s (SOX’s) essential purpose was to mitigate/deter fraud, 
enhance transparency by requiring qualitative improvement in disclosures, and reduce the 
frequency of financial restatements. Restatements are typically associated with significant 
negative activity; a veritable financial purging according to some theorists (e.g., Willits & 
Nicholls, 2014). With asymmetry as a continuing presence in the capital markets, SOX 
was intended to safeguard the investing public’s interest. What was intended to have been 
commonsensical regulations, took on a quasi-political, laissez-faire versus government-
paternalism twist, such that participants were conflicted even as they held rationalistic 
views as to the cost-benefit implications of SOX. The point of significant agreement and 
psychic necessity is that participants unanimously acquiesced to not fully understanding 
the rudiments of SOX and largly relied on piecemeal information to formulate any 
meaningful perspective on SOX’s merits. All participants agreed that some rules were 
necessary. Where participants diverged in perspectives, however, was the extent and 
specificity of what SOX regulations did and did not do.  
According to Gupta, Weirich, and Turner (2013) one of the most misunderstood 
and highly criticized areas of SOX is Section 404-Internal Control requirements. The 
crux of Section 404 is that it describes actions taken by a publicly traded company’s 
management and independent auditors as it relates to the implementation and monitoring 
of internal controls. What is less apparent and even less understood, is that through the 
introduction of the Dodd–Frank regulation’s Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and the 
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Jump Start Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, companies with income of less 
than $1 billion are exempted from SOX’s Section 404(b) (Gupta et al., 2013). Complying 
with Sox is estimated to cost most average companies $4.36 to $7.8 million and 
approximately $10 million for larger companies exceeding $10 billion in annual revenue 
(Willits & Nicholls, 2014). 
Besides increasing the scutiny of publicly traded companies, some participants as 
with detractors of SOX, have cited increased compliance cost as a concern. The findings 
established that many participants’ concerns pertaining to cost-benefit was a function of 
perception, as no concrete analysis had been undertaken to substantiate their judgments, 
rendering most opinions malleable when subjected to interrogative scrutiny. In 
elaborating perspectives, many favored executives having to be signatories to all filings 
as this enhanced accountability. While cost was a principal reason for SOX-related 
perplexity, results also showed that participants acknowledged and were encouraged with 
the additional benefits, some of which include: exchanges being able to attract higher 
quality foreign companies listings because of increased prestige; a preference for the 
exchange certifying companies having to meet a certain listing standard; and the added 
scrutiny, which increases the likelihood of a company’s compliance. In addition to 
onerous compliance costs and in some cases higher cost of capital, marketplace 
discontent ranged from the increased number of companies “going private”, to the 
chilling effect on listings from international companies, to fewer cross-listings in the U.S. 
by foreign companies (Gupta et al., 2013; Willits & Nicholls, 2014). 
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Caution 
Akins et al. (2012) posit that greater masses of aggregated information become 
imputed to the equilibrium price of securities and as a consequence decrease the 
likelihood of asymmetrical information flows to lesser informed investors. In like manner 
Albagli (2015) asserted the imputation of knowledge into pricing schemas via elevated 
levels of trading by informed investors, thereby reducing levels of uncertainty for many 
not-as-informed and uniformed investors. Underlying these findings is the simple 
proposition of the import and contest for information at all levels of capital market 
activity. The data underscores some measure of prudence, and recognize the investor’s 
perspective as tilting heavily to circumspection, what Huang and Stapleton (2013) 
described as a form of risk aversion tendency. Regardsless, many participants are 
pragmatic with respect to overall risk tolerance/intensity and have suggested an approach 
and an attitude of respect, not fear. Uncertainty, or rather lack of clarity in many 
instances, as to exact levels of information precision therefore elicits caution as a logical 
default standard when approaching the markets.  
Cautiousness impacts strategy, as in a case where the investor is more motivated 
to seek out insurance for portfolio protection (Huang & Stapleton, 2013). Following the 
premise, caution for many participants entailed employing risk management strategies 
utilizing derivatives, instituting fixed points of egress via protective stop loss orders, 
and/or by diversifying into inversely correlated instruments/sectors: ETFs, commodities, 
single equities, and/or debt. 
Caution was also characterized with varying degrees of suspicion in questioning 
the genesis of information streams: its source, purpose, credibility, accuracy, and 
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temporality. Skepticism and routine examination of information strands were central to 
their quest for improved understandings. The data also revealed contraints and boundaries 
dictated by abilities to discern, to compare, to clarify, to be logic-driven, to deduce and 
induce, and in short, avert being victimized or suffering avoidable welfare losses because 
of a lack of requisite diligence. Analogous of Akerlof’s (1970) Market for Lemons (as 
with defective cars), the investor must battle gullibility or risk being taken for a ride.  
Limitations of Study 
It is reasonable to stipulate that even with herculean effort, qualitative studies and 
indeed all studies will present some semblance of limitations (Barnes, 2016). In this 
regard, limitations inherent in this study are (a) representativeness in the sample 
population (Johnston & Sabin, 2010), (b) perspectives are largely those of the sample 
population and not of a cross-section of investors and the generalized industry, and (c) 
personal and professional experiences are a mediative consideration. 
First, the sample population was self-selected and comprised noninstitutional-
accredited-investors (NIAI). Participants’ motivation for cooperating might have been 
attached to an interest in the area of research and/or altruistic considerations, which might 
not be exhibited by the typical retail investor population. One description of an NIAI is 
an individual investor with networth valued at a minimum of $1million excluding a 
primary residence or having individual income of $200,000 or more over the last two 
years with a reseasonable expectation of maintaining a comparable level of earnings in 
the coming years. NIAIs are largely educated, posses some affluence, and are generally 
reasonably sophisticated investors. It should be noted that levels of responses provided 
are likely guided by commensurate investment experience and economic affluence, as 
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noted in Chapter 1. Representativeness should therefore be contextualized in 
consideration and in the examination of investment behavior and its generalization to 
other groups. 
Second, in keeping with the anteceding, while there are substantial overlaps of 
capital market experience between NIAIs and retail investors, the breadth of available 
resources, capital market relationships, and in some cases experience and training, imply 
conditions that might not necessarily comport with all other investment populations. 
Moreover, unexplored opinions and perspectives of industry actors, that is, executive 
leadership and regulators, could possibly impact findings as confirming or disconfirming 
strands bearing upon credibility, richness, and depth of the study (Patton, 2002). 
Third, the researcher has previously disclosed a personal interest and involvement 
as an investor in the capital markets. Additionally, over a seventeen year period, the 
researcher has had various vocational engagements/interactions (e.g., portfolio 
management and pedagogy) in the capital markets and academia. In attempting to 
moderate this limitation, the researcher assumed a state of the epoché and the requisite 
attitudinal immanence to the mitigation of cognitive biases. This supported the 
researcher’s ablility to assume the appropriate reflexivity (Chan et al., 2013) and 
objectivity in the collection, curation, and analysis of the data. Even though the data 
collection was purposive, random cold calling of sample population captured a diversity 
of ethnicities, gender, and ages (Booth et al., 2013). Essentially, the process of member 
checking along with the foregoing satisfied the study’s validity criterion proffered by 
Marshall and Rossman (2011). Ultimately, reporting these complexities and 
contradictions served to reinforce the findings of the study.  
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Recommendations 
There continues to be an array of uncertainties as to the ideal approach that 
investors/NIAIs should pursue, not only to be more effective at their craft of investing, 
but to also avoid what is perceived as the inevitable pitfalls of information asymmetry. 
What became evident from the findings is that, despite consensus regarding the damaging 
effects of information asymmetry, its dynamic attributes or typification remains an 
enigma, its reach defying boundaries, and its character unmistakable. As with a force of 
nature, what is apparent is its unambiguous presence and effects in impacting the 
behavior and psyche of the investor. 
In a purely objective world the investor’s decision-making would be guided by 
rules of rationality: understanding the problem, formulationg a decision criteria, weighing 
such criteria, structuring a solution and alternative, and selecting the optimal response. 
With inevitable life stressors, however, decisions are often made in haste based on 
incomplete (Feldhütter & Lando, 2012; Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011) and often 
asymmetrical information, frequently with unfortunate outcomes. The discerning investor 
should be his/her own devil’s advocate by: (a) looking at a variety of evidences, (b) being 
circumspect by carefully interrogating confirming information, (c) constructing what-if 
scenarios, and (d) seeking disconfirming information. In essence, the NIAI should avoid 
decision traps such as selective anchoring as well as heuristics of availability and 
representativeness (Williams & Ravenscroft, 2015).  
Reforms are needed at the governance level. Specifically, short-termism, an effort 
to manage and maximize earnings for the near term, has proven to be deliterious in its 
impact. Managing without keenly focusing on short-term results has incited constant 
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threat and fear of management shakeup with demotions or firings. Equally, fixating on 
short-term results can also be strategically myopic (Levesque, Phan, Raymar, & 
Waisman, 2014) and has potential to wreak havoc on businesses resulting in employee 
firings (downsizing), under-investment in businesses, and various degrees of businesses 
restructuring to demonstrate responsiveness and meet future earnings forecast. Managers 
are therefore inclined to self-preservation and at times have engaged in asymmetrical 
behaviors, such as earnings management (Beaudoin, Cianci, & Tsakumis, 2015) or 
outright fraud as a consequence. With findings underscoring the negative effects of 
mangaging businesses with specific focus on short-run objectives (Johnson et al., 2012), 
a return to responsible management praxis with mindfulness of the idiosyncrasies of 
business cycles is likely to mitigate a host of concerns. Concerns would include firm-
specific risk (unsystematic risk), the destruction of long term value, the artificial-inflation 
of equity prices, increased agency costs, and higher weighted average cost of capital 
(Fried, & Wang, 2017). In addition to tempering the foregoing, a diminution of short-
termism may also be positively associated with investors’ interest in owning a company’s 
stock as a result of greater operating stability. There should also be consideration in 
revising laws and creating disincentives that specifically reward short term capital gains 
(Dallas, 2012), or rather increase incentives that target acrual of longer-term returns.  
Regulations guiding the behavior of larger shareholders (now specific to 
beneficial ownership) should be modernized to include those large shareholders who fall 
just outside the 10% ownership threshold, yet are influential enough to impact market 
activity. Specifically, addressing the apparent gap between insider trading and front-
running. The law permits insiders, having access to public information, to buy and/or sell 
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a company’s securities, but only if done in excess of six months apart, in keeping with the 
short-swing profit rule. It is also plausible that larger shareholders and insiders may be 
privy to private information because of their fiduciary associations and professional 
responsibilities (e.g., fund managers). There is argument, theoretically and empirically, to 
suggest an insider (beneficial ownership of more than 10% voting shares) advantage, as 
in instances where there are significant and/or unusual logic-defying returns to insiders 
(Bhattacharya, 2014). While not surprising, but even more problematic as the data 
suggest, are those larger shareholders who might be direct, indirect, or non-beneficial 
owners, who acquire large share positions, and thereafter use the media to publicly 
promote/advertise their ownership interest under the guise of transparency. Such 
promotions, in many cases, serve to disproportionately benefit those self-interested 
investors with the potential to profit as a result of copy-cat buying. It is true that 
beneficial ownership purchases are reported via Form 3, 4, or 5 as appropriate, such that 
the public is privy to information relating to insider investment activity. What is more 
nebulous, nonetheless, are ways in which post purchase promotions are managed by 
many of these non-beneficial and beneficial owners, whose goal it might very well be, to 
excite “animal spirits” among investors, possibly boosting the shares to the benefit of 
those already owning the stock. Regulatory technicalities, often used by individuals, 
facilitate opportunism in exploiting media coverage, thus circumventing prescribed rules 
in advancement of their own self-interest at the expense of the public’s welfare, does bear 
examination. 
Social Change 
A study that examines information asymmetry and its effect on the investor 
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confidence and decision-making propensities is potentially beneficial to the practitioner 
community, academic institutions, and regulatory regimes by virtue of gained insights as 
to the relationship of informative disclosures and its attendant effect on the investor’s 
psyche. Second, through documenting the findings of the research, there is a chance to 
add a measure of qualitative viscerality to what has been largely a quantitative approach 
(e.g., Shroff, et al., 2013; Traflet & McGoun, 2008) regarding matters of confidence and 
decision-making exercised by the retail investor (NIAI). In essence, the study adds a 
qualitative dimension of depth and meaning, as well as facilitates the capturing of textual 
complexity of the psychological process (Stringer, Agnello, Baldwin, Christensen, & 
Henry, 2014). Third, investment sentiments, pertaining to informative disclosures 
expressed through market positioning may enable firms to modify governance praxis, as 
with board composition, leadership discretion, and compliance priorities. 
Many have argued that extant leadership, too often, has represented perhaps the 
worst caricatures of corporate governance praxis and social effectiveness. More than 
rhetoric, the actions of many leaders and institutions are constructed as pretense for 
perpetuation of solipsistic and self-interested behaviors. A key exemplification is 
evidenced in the statistic cited by Anderson, Collins, Pizzigati, and Shih (2010), where 
reports assert: 50 Fortune 500 CEOs, between 2008 and 2010, having increased their 
take-home pay by approximately 42% as a result of massive company layoffs, had 
combined earnings to provide unemployment benefits for 37,759 workers for an entire 
year. In context, this bears relevance in that, the public is conditioned to accept business 
enterprises as deified, institutionally/organizationally paternalistic, and a determiner of 
economic and social life. It follows, therefore, that the enormity of the power that many 
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of these companies weild, alters economic activity across communities domestically and 
globally. 
Regulations and social constraints on a firm’s behavior are in many cases found 
wanting in encouraging responsible social behavior as suggested by the divergence of 
empirical information and theoretical expectations (Rhodes, 2010). Aspirationally, this 
study may provoke a heightened degree of awareness not only in the respect of the dictate 
of mandated rules, but as it relates to the overall regard for the interest of shareholders 
and stakeholders.  
The prospect of contributing to meaningful social change may also be improved 
through regulatory reforms and protection for the investor where disclosures express 
greater veracity thereby enhancing the confidence and propensities for capital allocation. 
Improved governance may uniquely position each company to be more competitive in the 
raising of capital and the growth of firm value given reduced asymmetries (Cormier et al., 
2010). Additionally, a regime of appropriate governance may reduce uncertainty and 
dampen volatility, ultimately improving market efficiency as observed by Mukherjee 
(2007). Most importantly, social responsibility contextualized to informative disclosures, 
may serve as a glide-path in fostering greater transparency and improved intelligibility in 
constituent relations thereby supporting a more informed shareholder and a veracious 
governance community, which would be instrumental in a revitalization of the public’s 
trust. 
Implications for Future Research 
In accordance with a number of academic efforts on the subject of information 
asymmetry, none of which are specific to the noninstitutional investor (NIAI), there is the 
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belief that given the economic influence of the NIAIs, there is real concern as to the 
principal and ancillary effects as it regards strategic decision-making. In particular, the 
proximity and machinations/correlates of corporate disseminations and its attendant 
influence on NIAIs’ behavior in terms of confidence, strategy, and discipline. Yet, a 
prospective and fertile area of potential inquiry, centers to the financial magnitude or 
monetized and behavioral-influencing costs of asymmetrical disemminations; specifically 
its direct and indirect cost to retail investors/NIAIs and firms. Further, this could be a 
major source of influence that helps regulators, craft market directives and may also be 
beneficial to governance programs within firms who are highly dependent on the capital 
markets and investment industry. 
Conclusion 
Informative disseminations and its potential impact with respect to asymmetrical 
influence is an important empirical question that has been modestly addressed in 
literature, though not with requisite sufficiency, particularly as it relates to the non 
institutional accredited investor (NIAI). The influcence of disseminations in conjunction 
with trust elements are key factors in shaping investor behavior and consequently a 
number of capital market elements. This finding appears to be consistent with similar 
research postulations; for instance, the role of trust in the behavior of stock market 
participants (Pevzner et al., 2015); the expediency of financial fraud propects as a product 
of information asymmetry (Ndofor, Wesley, & Priem, 2015); and the attenuation of 
asymmetry by frequent media dissemination on insider activity thereby engendering a 
discipline and moderating opportunistic propensities (Dai, Parwada, & Zhang, 2015). 
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Subsuming previously discussed themes imputed to information asymmetry into a 
coherent and organized structure provides a window to the investor psyche.  Experiences 
articulated highlight the complexity and verity that investors are often imperfectly 
informed. Credible disclosures are vital for transparency, a key determinant of investor 
confidence (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014) and behavior, and support  ideals of empowerment 
and accountability. Further, transparency engenders control and surveillance functions, 
addresses dissemination, and in many respects communicate managements’ orientation to 
governance, as with the composition of (a) board size, (b) board indepenence, and (c) 
board diversity. Importantly, the anteceding factors appear to mediate the intuition of 
transparency (Yang, Liu, & Zhou, 2016), which arguably stands in contrast  to the notion 
of asymmetrical disseminations. In addition to the foregoing attributions of transparency, 
and even though regarded with some interpretive dubiousness (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014), 
ancilliary benefits include: lower transaction costs; greater market depth; enhanced 
liquidity; reduced cost of information acquisition, particularly for analysts and; 
constituent ownership diversity/variation of company stock (Boone & White, 2015), all 
of which are considered constructive for shareholders. Moreover, transparency through 
best practices is central to any principal-agent exchange, the levels at which the 
relationship functions, and the imperative of its interconnectedness in positively 
impacting asymmetrical behaviors (Bauhr & Grimes, 2014).  
The interpretivist phenomenological approach to the lived experience of the 
noninstitutional accredited investor facilitated participants apprehending the enterprise of 
investing, discoursing behaviors and attitudes, and exhibiting a sense of engagement and 
self-awareness in presenting an archetypal depiction of their role as investors. 
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Participants described an approach reasonably consistent with conclusions posited by 
Verstegen Ryan and Buchholz (2001), who suggested, investment behavior was largely 
driven by personality and investment circumstance. Here, however, behaviors are 
intensely framed along the lines of investment philosophy and perception and/or response 
to exogenous conditions. Many participants, heuristically, have come to appreciate the 
distinction between imaginal and real-world attributes of the capital markets, which in 
part, proffers rationality of strategy choices and philosophical leanings. Current literature 
(e.g., Saxton & Anker, 2013; Smith & Block, 2016) provide numerous examples of real-
world asymmetrical exchanges: doctors and patients, realtor and home seller, employee 
and manager, and corporate executives and shareholders. These validate arguments 
centered to sense-making: that the forces of asymmetrical disseminations are inevitable 
and existential. A foremost point of practicality, however, is power over knowledge; that 
is, scrupulous regard for the information environment in all respects.  
A particular conclusion to be drawn from participants’ experiences, relating to 
information asymmetry, is the significance of trust in concert with and as a result of 
informative disseminations. The psychological phenomenon of trust, and its derivation 
from anteceding informational disseminations is very necessary in the formulation of 
confidence (Sapienza & Zingales, 2012). Underscoring this premise, researchers (e.g., 
Hurley et al., 2014; Monti et al., 2014) have suggested the impossibility of investing and 
the commensurate loss of economic welfare absent the trust invested in advisors, their 
private/public information resources, and the accordant negation of confidence and 
competencies, all of which when viewed in the affirmative, are vital in successfully 
investing in today’s market environs that are now significantly virtual. Of information 
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asymmetry and its influence in shaping the attitudinal and experiential disposition, 
participant 18 sagaciously opined, “[I] believe that retail investors are the tail of the whip, 
and I presume that if we get better access to information, that the professionals also get 
better information and continue to invest to maintain their edge.” The observation is 
poignant, purposed, veracious, and resonant and significantly embodies a belief and 
aspiration for a more honest and transparent investment environment where regulations 
are fairly and effectively administered and investment opportunities afford reasonable 
chances for success as a result of improved information precision. 
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Appendix A: Sample Introductory and Invitation Letter–Email 
Name of Researcher:________________ 
Address: _________________________ 
City:__________: State: ____________ 
Zip:_____________________________ 
Date:____________________ 
 
Dear Contact, 
 
As a potentially suitable candidate, I am contacting you to solicit your assistance in 
participating in a study that is being conducted as partial fulfillment of a Doctoral degree 
in Management, focusing on Leadership and Organizational Development. The affiliated 
academic institution is Walden University. 
 
The study is broadly corporate governance; principally, the effects of informative 
disseminations on the confidence and decision making tendencies of the retail/non-
institutional accredited investor (NIAI). Non-institutional accredited investors are 
described as natural persons with a net worth of at least $1 million, individually or jointly 
with a spouse, excluding the value of the primary residence in the calculation of net 
worth. Or it may also be a natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the 
two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years 
and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year. The study is 
intended to explore and describe the lived experiences of NIAIs and will hopefully 
provide new and valued insights for those who may have an interest in the topic. 
 
The study’s criteria require the satisfaction of the following:  
(a) The noninstitutional accredited investor status as described above. 
(b) A minimum of two years investment experience in the U.S. capital markets 
(stocks, mutual funds, exchange traded funds, bonds, derivatives–options, 
futures, swaps, etcetera). 
(c) Attained the age of 18 years or older. 
(d) Have experienced the effects of information asymmetry (incomplete 
corporate disclosure/dissemination). 
If you were to participate in this study, you will be asked to answer a number of questions 
concerning your investment experience. To aid the process, you would be provided with 
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a brief questionnaire as well as a list of interview questions to be conveniently 
previewed/perused prior to our conversation. Prospective candidates can be expected to 
participate for approximately one half to one hour. 
Participation in this study is voluntary and does not present any risk to safety, reputation, 
or wellbeing. Confidentiality is of the highest concern and will be appropriately observed. 
Accordingly actual names will not be reflected in the study; instead a coding system will 
be used by the researcher. Agreeing to participate in the study will in no way affect your 
ability to withdraw at any time if you so desire. 
Again, if you satisfy the foregoing criteria and would like to participate in the study, you 
are welcome to contact me by telephone: _________ , or email:___________________. I 
value your interest and greatly appreciate your consideration. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
________________, Ph.D. Candidate 
Walden University 
Phone:_________________ 
Email:_________________ 
 
Supplemental Participation Disclosure: 
Participants in the study will be required to recall and describe certain experiences, some 
of which may present minor discomfort in light of the(ir) nature and passage of time. 
Materials gathered in the interview will be securely stored and accessible only to the 
researcher. Further, such materials will be retained for a period of five years in keeping 
with the university’s document retention policy, after which it will be destroyed.  
 
The study is geared to the construction of generalized knowledge relating to the subject 
of information asymmetry and its impact on the confidence and behaviors of a certain 
class of retail investors. Consequently there is no direct benefit accruing in the way of 
direct payments or otherwise to participants. However, the generalized contribution of 
participants may be acknowledged and if desired, participants will be given a summary of 
the completed study. 
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Appendix B: Informed Consent 
         CONSENT FORM 
 
You are invited to take part in a research study of corporate governance: information 
asymmetry and its impact on the confidence and decision making propensities of the non-
institutional accredited investor (NIAI). An ancillary area of investigation are the effects 
of adverse selection and moral hazard. The researcher is inviting noninstitutional 
accredited investors with a minimum of two years investment experience in the U.S. 
capital markets to participate in the study. Non-institutional accredited investors are 
described as natural persons with a net worth of at least $1 million, individually or jointly 
with a spouse, excluding the value of the primary residence in the calculation of net 
worth. Or it may also be “a natural person with income exceeding $200,000 in each of the 
two most recent years or joint income with a spouse exceeding $300,000 for those years 
and a reasonable expectation of the same income level in the current year”. Participants 
should be a minimum of 18 years old. This form is part of a process called “informed 
consent” to allow you to understand this study before deciding whether to take part. 
 
This study is being conducted by John Buchanan, a researcher and doctoral student at 
Walden University. 
 
Background Information: 
 
The purpose of this study is to explore the lived experiences of noninstitutional 
accredited investors with respect to the impacts of corporate dissemination/disclosures, 
and the way it shapes confidence and the decision-making process. 
 
Procedures: 
• Participate in an interview where the proposed interview questions will be 
provided in advance in the interest and economy of time. Interviews may last for 
approximately one half to one hour.  
• Depending on location, interviews might be conducted in-person, via telephone, 
or by other acceptable electronic means. 
• A simple demographic questionnaire will also be presented for completion. The 
questionnaire may be completed in approximately 10-15 minutes. 
• While these questions represent the macro focus, additional follow-up questions 
may be asked to provide clarification and/or elaboration. 
• The initially proposed questions will center on your investment experience as 
impacted by corporate disseminations and management disclosures. 
• The recorded contents of the interview may be transcribed utilizing 
transcription/dictation software or by a professional service/agency familiar with 
the handling and treatment of matters that are confidential. If utilized, this 
service/agency will be required to sign a binding confidentiality agreement.  
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• Transcribed and final interpretations, wholly or partially, and/or derived themes 
and meanings gleaned from the interview, may be presented to each informant for 
verification of the accuracy in translation.  
The taped recordings and transcripts will be retained for a period of no less that 5 years 
based on Walden University policy of document retention, after which they will be 
destroyed.  
 
Below are a number of sample questions: 
▪ To what extent has information asymmetry (incomplete corporate disclosure) 
affected your experience of retail investing as it relates to perceiving and 
processing information in investment decision-making? 
▪ How does information asymmetry impact your confidence and strategic approach 
as a retail investor? 
▪ How has your perception of retail investing as it relates to the qualitative 
improvement of disclosures been influenced by regulatory reforms (e.g., 
Regulation Fair Disclosure)? 
 
Voluntary Nature of the Study: 
 
As a potential participant your contributiuon will be invaluable to the study. However, 
please note that the study is wholly voluntary and your decision to participate (or not) 
will be respected. Agreeing to participate in the study at this time does not preclude your 
ability to withdraw at a future date if you so desire. Where a participant is known to the 
researcher, declining or withdrawing from the study will not negatively bear upon the 
relationship, or (where applicable) will not cause the participant to be deprived of any 
lawful access to services.  
 
Risks and Benefits of Being in the Study: 
 
As a participant in this study, you will be encouraged to recall and describe experiences, 
some of which might present minor discomfort with memories evoked and the passage of 
time. The study will not present any risk to the safety or wellbeing of participants.  
 
The principal benefit of the study is contributing to an improved understanding of the 
ways in which corporate disclosures affect the confidence and decision-making 
tendencies of the noninstitutional accredited investor. 
 
Payment: 
 
Participation in this study will not entail or elicit payment of any kind. However, 
participants (as a collective) may be acknowledged and a summary of the research will be 
provided at completion if desired. 
 
Privacy: 
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Any information provided by a participant will be accorded the highest confidentially. 
Your personal information will not be used by the researcher for any purpose other than 
that which is required for this research project. Further, the researcher will not include 
your name or any other personal or identifiable information in the study reports. All 
information comprised of recordings, transcripts, and other computer related data files 
will be kept securely in a safe to which only the researcher has access. Data will be kept 
for a period of at least 5 years, as required by Walden University. 
 
Contacts and Questions: 
 
Should you have any questions you are welcome to contact John Buchanan at 
_____________ or by way of email: _____________. If you wish to speak privately 
about your rights as a participant, you may call Dr. Leilani Endicott. She is the Walden 
University representative designated to discuss participant concerns. She can be 
contacted by phone at 1-800-925-3368, extension 3121210 or 001-612-312-1210 (for 
participants outside the U.S.). Walden University’s approval number for this study is 03-
02-16-0232695 and it expires on March 1, 2017. Please retain a copy of this form for 
your records. 
 
Statement of Consent: 
 
I have read the above information and I feel I understand the study well enough to make a 
decision about my involvement. By signing below I am granting permission for the 
information provided in the interview and questionnaire to be used in a study required for 
the completion of a Ph.D. degree (including a dissertation and any other future 
publication). I am also confirming that I am 18 years of age or older and have met the 
minimum requirement as a noninstitutional accredited investor as well as years of 
investment experience needed to participate in this study.  
 
I understand that I am agreeing to the terms described above. 
Printed Name of Participant:________________________________  
Date of consent:__________________________________________  
Participant’s Signature:____________________________________ 
Researcher’s Signature:____________________________________ 
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Appendix C: Supplemental Informational Questionnaire 
The questionnaire is purposed to providing demographic information that is critical to the 
researcher contemplating sampling decisions and is important to informing the research 
community and other readers of the aggregated demographics of participants. Your 
information will be safely stored, as confidentiality is paramount in safeguarding each 
participant’s identity. 
 
For questions and concerns the researcher has provided an email address and phone 
number as well as the contact information of the Academic Institution. 
 
Please respond to the following questions appropriately and accurately. 
(1). Please indicate your age group: 19-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59, 60-69, 70-79 
(2). Please indicate you ethnicity: Caucasian__________, Latino_________, African  
       American, Asian__________, Native American____________, 
Other______________ 
(3). What is your gender?_________________ 
(4). What is your investment experience: 1-5 years_______, 6-10 years_______, 11-15 
years_______, 16-20 years_______, 21-25 years_________, 25-30 years_______, 
Over 31 years_______ 
(5). What is the level of your education: High school__________,  
(Undergraduate__________, Graduate_________, Post Graduate__________ 
(6). Marital Status: Married________, Divorced_________, Single_______, 
Widowed________ 
(7). Do you read any investment publication? _________; If yes, 
what_____________________? If no, why not?________________. 
(8). (a) Has your individual income been at least $200K for each of the past 2 years and 
do you have a reasonable expectation of earning approximately the same for the 
current calendar year? __Yes or __No ? (b) (For joint incomes, has the minimum 
income been $300k each of the last 2 years and is there a reasonable expectation of 
earning the same this calendar year? __Yes ____No ? ANSWER ONLY (a) or (b) 
(9). Is the approximate value of your net worth excluding residence over $1 million? 
____Yes or _______No. Have you worked in finance or related fields? If so state the 
what area________________ 
(10). Do you make decisions individually or jointly with a spouse or other (e.g., 
broker)?_____________ 
(11). What is your profession?________________________; what industry do you work 
in?___________________ 
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(12). Number of years in the job?_____________________ 
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Appendix D: Expert Panel Solicitation Letter 
Name of Researcher:_________________ 
Address ______________ 
City _____________ 
State________________, Zip _____________ 
Date: _________________ 
 
Re: Solicitation for Participation on Expert Panel 
 
Dear_____________: I am a Doctoral student at Walden University and I am presently 
conducting a study in the area of corporate governance. The study is intended to answer a 
series of questions specific to information asymmetry and its impact on the decision 
making propensities of a certain class of retail investors.  
 
I am therefore soliciting your participation as a member of an expert panel to be 
comprised of four to five individuals who are industry practitioners and/or academicians 
experienced in the field of business management, finance, or corporate governance. The 
panel will evaluate a number of interview questions relating to this qualitative 
phenomenological research study. The panel’s validation of these questions will facilitate 
their integration as an essential instrument in this qualitative study. The study’s topic and 
purpose are: 
 
(a) Title: Corporate Governance and the Shareholder: Asymmetry, 
Confidence, and Decision-Making.  
(b) Purpose: The study is geared to attaining an improved conception of the 
extent of the force of information asymmetry propagated through the 
corporate dissemination process, as well as deriving meaning of the lived 
experiences of retail/non institutional accredited investors as it relates to 
themes of confidence, judgment, and decision-making. 
Should you agree to participate I will provide approximately seven to eight questions for 
your perusal and evaluation. Your thoughts, suggestions, and insights on the 
corroboration or modification of these questions will be greatly appreciated. 
 
Please let me know if there are any questions. 
 
I wish to thank you in advance. 
 
Respectfully, 
 
Signature________________ 
Phone___________________ 
  
363 
Appendix E: Expert Panel Background  
 
Table E1. 19 
Expert Panel Background 
Panelists   Academic profile   Professional employment 
Panelist 1.   Doctoral degree in Business 
Administration 
(Transformational 
Leadership/Organizational 
Behavior) 
Instruction in business courses 
(at the university level): 
Accounting, Management, and 
Organizational Development. 
Chairperson of the Department 
of Business; Lentz Leadership 
Institute Member; author of 
several business-related 
publications; Dissertation 
Committee Member 
 
    
    
    
  
        
Panelist 2.   Doctoral degree in Business 
Administration  
Instruction in business courses 
(at the university level): 
Management, Organizational 
Development. 
 
    
    
Panelist 3.   Doctoral degree in Business 
Administration  
Instruction in business courses 
(at the university level): 
Finance and Business 
Management. Business 
manager/Administrator of a 
company in the healthcare 
industry. 
 
    
    
          
Panelist 4. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
Master’s degree in Business 
Administration, specializing 
in Finance 
Instruction in business courses 
(at the university level): 
Economics and Financial Risk 
Management. Industry 
practitioner with more than a 
decade's experience in the 
areas of risk management and 
portfolio management. Subject 
matter expert, consultant, and 
author of a number of financial 
publications. Member of the 
Financial Management 
Association. 
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Appendix F: Reprint Request for Trust/Risk Model of Shareholders Behavior 
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Permissions Request Form 
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